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Abstract
The essays in this thesis explore the effects of legislative leaders on the behaviour
of parliamentarians in the European Parliament and the UK House of Commons,
and the consequences of this relationship for parliamentary outcomes. The first
paper argues that when party leaders are motivated to maintain the voting cohe-
sion of their legislative contingents, and when disciplinary resources are in short
supply, leaders may block policy proposals that threaten to divide their members.
Accordingly, as the preferences of party members become more diffuse, agenda-
setting party leaders will be able to maintain cohesion but the actions they take
to do so may contribute to the overall level of gridlock in the legislature. I in-
troduce new data and methods to evaluate these relationships in the European
Parliament, where agenda control and ‘carrot and stick’ disciplinary powers are
held by different sets of parliamentary actors. The second paper argues that by
making the status quo less attractive and by increasing legislators’ tolerance to
new policies, external crises empower leaders who have the ability to propose leg-
islation. In the context of the European Union’s response to the 2008 financial
crisis, I combine topic modelling with a two-stage least squares procedure to show
that voting coalitions in the European Parliament changed after the crisis in ways
consistent with the theoretical model. The implication of the analysis is that pro-
integration agenda-setters were able to pass legislation in the post-crisis period
that would have been impossible to pass in the absence of the crisis. In the third
paper, I argue that when members of previously under-represented groups are
appointed to positions of high office within the legislature, they can serve as role
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models to their fellow group members. Using a difference-in-differences design, I
demonstrate that the appointment of a female cabinet minister in the UK House
of Commons leads to an increase in the participation of other female members
of parliament in legislative debates. Furthermore, I develop a novel approach for
measuring the influence of legislators in debate, and use this to show that female
members of parliament also become more influential following the appointment
of a female minister. In exploring the mechanisms that underpin this role-model
effect, I introduce an additional quantitative measure which reveals that female
ministers are more responsive to the speeches made by female legislators than
are male ministers. Taken together, these papers provide important theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence concerning the central role that leaders play in
the legislative process.
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1
Introduction
How do legislative leaders affect the behaviour of their fellow parliamen-
tarians? What are the consequences of this relationship for legislative outcomes?
As is the case in other hierarchical organisations, legislatures are marked by an
asymmetric relationship between a select group of influential leaders and a mass
of less powerful followers. From party leaders, to cabinet ministers, to committee
chairs, to Speakers of the House; many positions in the legislature are associated
with significant resources, both formal and informal, that give the holders of such
offices disproportionate influence over the legislative process. Studying the be-
haviour of these actors therefore sheds light not only on where political power
is located, and by whom this power is exercised, but also contributes to our un-
derstanding of the outcomes that are produced by democratic bodies. The three
papers which form the core of this dissertation each provide distinct contributions
– theoretically and empirically – to our understanding of legislative politics, but
all three are centrally concerned with the relationship that those at higher levels
of the legislative hierarchy have with those at lower levels.
Leaders are commonly viewed as solutions to collective action problems faced by
individual legislators (Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Cox,
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2006). Leadership institutions provide a structure through which parliamentari-
ans can obtain their objectives “more efficiently, more effectively, or with higher
probability than [they] could without the coordination and enhanced productivity
provided by the leadership institution.” (Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989, 20) First,
leaders can help legislators to overcome collective dilemmas that are internal to
the legislative process. For example, in the absence of a centralised leadership
with powers to regulate access to scarce plenary time, legislatures will be beset
by common-resource problems (Cox, 2006). Furthermore, by uniting under the
banner of a durable party and endowing party leaders with institutional privileges,
parliamentarians are able reduce the chaotic nature of policymaking and institu-
tionalise access to the gains from legislative trade (Schwartz, 1977; Aldrich, 1995).
Second, leaders can also provide collective benefits outside of the legislature. By
helping to secure a record of policy accomplishments, party leaders contribute to
the maintenance of a strong party ‘brand’ (Cox and McCubbins, 2005), which
positively affects the reelection probabilities of party members. In general, by
voluntarily delegating power to central legislative authorities, parliamentarians
can avoid problems common to group action dilemmas and secure the gains of
acting collectively.
Whether leadership institutions are created in response to internal or external
incentives, once created these institutions have profound implications for the na-
ture of politics within legislative settings. Accordingly, taking this literature as
a point of departure, the papers in this thesis focus on the consequences of the
decision to delegate power to legislative leaders, rather than on the causes that
underpin this decision. I therefore treat the existence of leadership institutions
within parliament as given, and focus instead on the effects that leaders have on
the behaviour of other legislators and the subsequent implications for policy.
13
By focussing on the role of leaders in the legislature, this thesis contributes
to a broader literature on political leadership, which has grown significantly in
recent years (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011). From a theoretical perspective, this liter-
ature has focussed on the role of political leaders in promoting institutional reform
(Schofield, 2006; Levi, 2006), in coordinating the actions of a mass of followers
(Dewan and Myatt, 2007, 2008, 2012; Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp, 2008),
and in structuring the policy agenda (Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989; Shepsle, 2010).
However, although our theoretical understanding of the consequences of political
leadership has advanced significantly because of these insights, empirical analyses
– particularly those conducted in observational settings – have lagged behind. As
Ahlquist and Levi (2011, 19) suggest, empirical approaches to studying political
leadership “are still in their infancy.” Empirical work in this area therefore has
the potential to contribute significantly to our understanding of legislative politics
specifically, and of political leadership more broadly. The papers I present be-
low combine theoretical analyses with quantitative evidence to highlight distinct
mechanisms through which leaders influence politics in the legislature.
I explore three themes of legislative leadership. First, a ubiquitous feature of
all legislatures is that plenary time is a scarce resource, the efficient use of which
requires regulating by centralised figures. In many cases, party leaders control
how floor time is allocated to different parliamentary business. As Cox (2006,
142) suggests, “while legislators are everywhere equal in voting power, they are
everywhere unequal in agenda-setting power.” This power gives leaders significant
ability to control the flow of legislative traffic. In the first paper (chapter two),
I consider the consequences of these negative agenda-setting powers when lead-
ers have incentives to maintain cohesive parties in the legislature. Where party
leaders have only a limited ability to discipline their members, I argue that they
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can manipulate the legislative agenda to prevent divisive proposals from being
considered on the house floor. However, by pursuing such a strategy, leaders af-
fect not only the behaviour of their own members, but also the composition of
the policy agenda in a political system more generally. While existing research
emphasises the importance of inter-party polarisation as a key determinant of
legislative gridlock, this paper, by exploiting a unique source of data from the
European Parliament, provides evidence that intra-party division can also lead to
gridlock.
The second paper (chapter three, coauthored with Benjamin Lauderdale) ex-
amines the conditions under which legislative leaders use their ability to propose
legislation in order to manipulate political outcomes. Although it is well known
that those with proposal power have important advantages in determining policy
(McKelvey, 1976; Romer and Rosenthal, 1978), the conditions under which these
positive agenda-setting powers are most beneficial have not been fully articulated
(Ahlquist & Levi, 2011, 20; Persson & Sjostedt, 2012, 618). We contribute to
this endeavour by examining the degree to which agenda-setting actors are able
to obtain preferential policy outcomes in periods of external crisis. By modelling
a crisis as an exogenous shock to the quality of the status quo, we argue that
crises increase the tolerance of legislators to new policy and that leaders therefore
have more discretion over policymaking during crisis periods. Leaders can exploit
a crisis by using their proposal power to realign voting coalitions in their favour,
which enables them to implement policies that would not have been possible in
the absence of an external shock. We evaluate our approach by examining the
effects of the financial crisis of 2008 on politics in the European Parliament.
The third paper (chapter four) considers the effects that legislative leaders have
on the representation of interests in parliamentary deliberations. Here, I focus on
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the symbolic effects of political leadership, rather than the institutional founda-
tions of leaders’ powers, and ask whether the identity of a leader can influence
legislative behaviour (Humphreys, Masters and Sandbu, 2006). Specifically, I
consider the potential for legislative leaders to act as role models to their fellow
parliamentarians in the UK House of Commons. By analysing the participa-
tion and influence of female legislators in parliamentary debate, I show that the
appointment of a legislative role model – a female cabinet minister – can have
important motivational effects for other women in the legislature. The evidence
presented in the third paper therefore emphasises a distinctive type of influence of
parliamentary leaders, but nonetheless also stresses that the incentives garnered
by the hierarchical structure of parliaments can affect the behaviour of legislative
members.
In sum, the first two papers in this thesis add new insights to an extensive
literature which considers the consequences of leaders’ agenda-setting powers on
the behaviour of parliamentarians and on policy outputs. The third paper also
focusses on privileged legislative actors, but analyses the symbolic consequences
that these actors have for the representation of interests in parliamentary deliber-
ations. Overall, the three papers emphasise that in order to understand outcomes
of the legislative process, it is vital to appreciate how the behaviour of those
holding leadership positions affects the behaviour of other legislators. In the re-
mainder of this introductory chapter, I discuss the core themes of the thesis in
more detail, and highlight the substantive contributions that the papers make to
the existing literature. I then discuss the parliamentary settings I examine and
the methodological contributions of the thesis.
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Intra-party dynamics and negative agenda-setting power
Central to the question of successful collective action amongst party members
is the degree to which such members vote cohesively in legislative roll-calls. In
line with colloquial accounts which suggest that “divided parties do not win elec-
tions”, cohesion can be a valuable collective good because it helps party members
electorally by establishing a reputation of legislative accomplishment (Cox and
McCubbins, 1993). In addition, incentives for cohesion also arise within the leg-
islative process itself. By committing to cohesive voting strategies, party members
can strengthen their leader’s hand in intra-parliamentary bargaining (Bowler, Far-
rell and Katz, 1999), enforce log-roll arrangements between co-partisans (Wein-
gast, 1979; Carrubba and Volden, 2000), and induce other parties to make more
favourable policy proposals (Dewan and Spirling, 2011).
Despite these benefits, party voting cohesion is often under-supplied: while
legislators may value the collective benefits provided by cohesive parties in the
long run, they may also face incentives to defect from the party line on individual
roll-call votes. A strong legislative party leadership can help to ameliorate this
problem. As leaders are responsible to the party as a whole, and the continuation
of their leadership is tied to the success of the party, they will internalise the
collective interests of party members. As Aldrich (1994, 335) argues, because
leadership positions are valuable to the office holders, it is “generally in the leaders’
self-interest to act in the collective interests of their party.” Members therefore
have strong incentives to delegate powers to the leadership to enforce cohesive
voting (Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989; Cox and McCubbins, 1993). As party member
preferences become more diffuse, the severity of the collective action problem
increases, and leaders must rely more heavily on the tools available to them to
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maintain cohesion.
Which powers allow leaders to maintain voting cohesion in the face of an ide-
ologically diffuse membership? First, an extensive literature focusses on the ‘dis-
ciplining’ power of party leaders to reward loyalty to and punish defection from
the party line (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Becher and
Sieberer, 2008; Kam, 2009). As Shepsle (2006, 31) argues, leadership “may be
interpreted as giving some agent the authority to wield carrots and sticks – that
is, to provide selective incentives – to induce contributions to group objectives”.
According to this view, leaders use inducements (such as internal advancement in
the legislature) and sanctions (such as revocation of the party whip) in order to
force legislators to toe the party line. Second, in the absence of such ‘carrot and
stick’ disciplinary tools, leaders can often use negative agenda-setting powers to
prevent divisive legislation from being voted upon on the plenary floor (Rohde,
1991; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). The degree to which leaders favour discipline
over agenda control is likely to depend on their institutional access to these tools,
and the relative costs that each strategy carries.
However, while these leadership tools may have equivalent effects on the ag-
gregate cohesion level of a party in parliament, they have strikingly different
implications for legislative outcomes more generally. In particular, the use of
agenda-control powers is an important determinant of legislative ‘gridlock’. Ac-
tors possessing negative agenda-control powers constitute veto players in the pol-
icy process – their assent is necessary for any bill to change the status quo. As
the preferences of veto players diverge, the set of status quo points amenable to
revision decreases (Tsebelis, 2002). In systems of divided government, where both
the executive and legislative branches possess some degree of negative agenda
power, increasing polarisation between parties can dramatically increase the level
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of gridlock in the system (Binder, 2003, 1999; Jones, 2001).
In contrast to this literature, chapter two considers the effects of intra-party
polarisation on leaders’ use of negative agenda control and the subsequent impli-
cations for legislative gridlock. In the context of the European Parliament, where
disciplinary resources and agenda-setting powers are largely controlled by sepa-
rate actors, I show that the strategic use of negative agenda control can indeed
help party leaders to maintain high levels of cohesion in roll-call votes, but in do-
ing so they prevent certain proposals from progressing in the legislative process.
The results therefore suggest that in addition to polarisation between parties,
preference dynamics within political parties can have substantial consequences for
legislative gridlock. Furthermore, by studying the behaviour of party leaders in
the European Parliament – where electoral motivations for legislative success are
relatively weak – the findings in chapter two also allow us to separate the leg-
islative incentives for cohesion from the incentives arising from a fear of electoral
defeat.
External crises and positive agenda-setting power
A second dimension of agenda power is the ability of leaders to positively set the
content of the plenary agenda – that is, the power to propose legislation. Those
with proposal power have distinct advantages over other decision makers in terms
of obtaining policy outcomes that they favour (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978). By
confronting them with a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ choice, (positive) agenda-setters force
legislators to choose between new proposals and existing policy. Leaders with
positive agenda-setting power are therefore able to select their most preferred
policy from the set of all policies which a majority of parliamentarians would
prefer to the status quo, thus resulting in considerable discretion over final policy
19
outcomes. Accordingly, while legislators may delegate agenda-setting power to
their leadership agents in order to overcome problems of collective action, once
in possession of these powers leaders may exploit unattractive existing policies to
secure outcomes that they prefer.
That leaders can manipulate final policy outcomes via their control over the
content of the agenda is well known (McKelvey, 1976), but, as Alquist and Levi
(2011, 20) suggest, “we have yet to explore actual political contexts in which
manipulation is more likely and with what consequences.” In chapter three, I
build on the model of positive agenda setting described above to elucidate one
context in which leaders are particularly well situated to manipulate the policy
process: in times of political crisis. A crucial component of these models is that
the policy discretion that agenda-setting leaders enjoy is related directly to the
attractiveness of the status quo policy. As Cox (2006, 155) argues, “the more
distasteful the policy outcome absent further legislative action will be, the wider
the range of proposals that the agenda-setter can offer that the assembly will
accept.” As the status quo becomes less and less attractive, the agenda-setter
is more and more able to move policy toward her preferred outcome. In the
model I present, when a crisis hits and the status quo becomes less attractive,
legislators become more tolerant to new policy proposals, which allows leaders to
pass legislation that would have been voted down in times of ‘normal’ politics.
This view accords with arguments that suggest crises open ‘windows of op-
portunity’ for various actors in the policy process (Kingdon, 1995; Keeler, 1993;
Cortell and Peterson, 1999). However, these arguments do not generally specify
the micro-mechanisms that lead to such opportunities, nor do they identify the
specific actors who benefit from crises. Without these features, we can say little
about the processes through which crises affect decision-making, nor the expected
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direction of policy change in the face of a crisis. The model I present in chapter
three specifies a particular impediment to policy change (the opposition of legis-
lators in a parliament) that is weakened by the onset of a crisis, and shows that
it is those actors in possession of proposal powers who are especially well-placed
to exploit crisis situations. Therefore, beyond simply asserting that crises open
‘windows of opportunity’ for policy change, my approach clarifies the actors for
whom such windows appear to open, and in which direction we expect the winds
of change to blow.
In addition, a central concern in the literature on voting in democratic parlia-
ments is in describing the ‘dimensionality’ of the political space (Poole and Rosen-
thal, 1997, 2011; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004; Hix, Noury and Roland,
2006; Shor and McCarty, 2011). The number of active dimensions and the po-
sitions that parliamentary actors take on these dimensions are clearly relevant
for understanding a broad range of legislative phenomena. While dimensions of
political contestation in many parliaments appear to be relatively stable, new
dimensions do appear and old ones strengthen or weaken over time (see, for ex-
ample, Poole & Rosenthal 2011, 141-142). My focus on crisis politics reveals that
agenda-setting leaders during crisis periods will often make policy proposals that
divide legislators according to dimensions of politics that previously were less cen-
tral to contestation. The argument I present therefore shares similarities with the
Rikerian view of ‘heresthetic’, in which a leader attempts to add new dimensions
to the political space that separate voters in a manner that is advantageous to
her (Riker, 1990, 51). I detail one instance of such a shift in dimensionality by
examining voting coalitions in the European Parliament during the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, but the findings may also help to explain changes to the dimensions of
politics documented in other settings.
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Beyond institutional powers: leaders as role models
The structural theories described above attribute leaders’ influence to the institu-
tional (specifically, agenda-setting) privileges they enjoy. However, by focussing
on the institutional powers of a leader, we risk neglecting another important ques-
tion: does the identity of the leader matter for the outcomes of the political pro-
cess? As Ahlquist and Levi (2011, 15) suggest, “a basic question is whether there
is any evidence that the identity of a leader makes a discernible difference for
policy or organisational performance.” It is clear that the privileged position of
leaders in the legislative hierarchy confers more than institutional strength. Lead-
ers are also highly visible actors both to the electorate and within the legislature
to other members. This visibility may be especially important when leaders share
characteristics or identities with certain demographic groups that have tradition-
ally been under-represented in the political process. When this is the case, a newly
appointed leader may represent a role model for other members of the group.
Women represent a particularly prominent under-represented group in parlia-
ments across the world. Female legislators account for just 20% of the seats
in national legislatures on average (Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014, 11), and
they have also been under-represented in positions of executive power historically
(Bauer and Tremblay, 2011; Krook and O’Brien, 2012). The extensive literature
on the representation of women in politics suggests that increasing the number
of women in parliament will increase the incorporation of women’s interests in
policy outcomes (Dahlerup, 1988; Phillips, 1995; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003;
Mansbridge, 2005). While the relative number of male and female legislators
may be important, scholars have called for research that moves beyond these
‘numbers-based’ theories (Beckwith, 2007). As Reingold (2008, 145) argues: “Be-
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yond questions of numbers and proportions, we could examine more closely the
collective resources of female officeholders – how those resources are amassed and
with what effect.” I follow this advice by asking whether women who are ele-
vated to positions of high political office act as role models to their fellow female
legislators.
Previous research has focussed on the potential for a female role-model effect
in electoral politics. Does the election of a female politician encourage other
women to run for office? Do female politicians inspire an interest in politics
from the female electorate, and does this lead to greater participation in political
activities? Research suggests that the answer to these questions is affirmative
(Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007; Broockman, 2014; Gilardi, 2015; Beaman et al.,
2008, 2012). Outside of political science, the idea that female role models can
affect the behaviour of other women is also well established. A broad literature in
economics and social psychology shows that female role models in education can
influence the course choices of female college students (Neumark and Gardecki,
1996; Rask and Bailey, 2002; Bettinger and Long, 2005; Lockwood, 2006), as
well as having significant effects on future career aspirations and achievements
(Gilbert, 1985; Nixon and Robinson, 1999; Marx and Roman, 2002; Marx and
Goff, 2005; Brajer and Gill, 2010).
In legislative politics, a number of scholars have argued that female role mod-
els may potentially be important (Jalalzai & Krook, 2010, 17; Dovi, 2002, 730),
particularly with regard to the motivational effects they may have on the partic-
ipation of other female politicians in the policymaking process. As Dovi argues,
“the ability to inspire and to be an example of a political leader from a histor-
ically disadvantaged group could be crucial for mobilizing that group.” (Dovi,
2002, 730, emphasis added) However, political scientists have not subjected this
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idea to systematic empirical scrutiny. This is surprising, as by challenging preva-
lent stereotypes, successful women can improve other women’s belief in their own
abilities and, hence, their aspirations and behaviour (Stout et al., 2011; Asgari,
Dasgupta and Cote, 2010; Lockwood, 2006).
Chapter four addresses this gap in the literature by examining the effects of
female control of one important legislative resource – cabinet ministries in the
House of Commons – on the speechmaking behaviour of other female members
of the legislature. In addition to being an increasingly studied form of legisla-
tive behaviour (Quinn et al., 2010; Proksch and Slapin, 2012; Lauderdale and
Herzog, 2016), parliamentarians’ speeches are important indicators of the repre-
sentation of interests in the policymaking process. By exploiting variation in the
gender of cabinet ministers over an 18-year period, chapter four uses a multi-period
‘difference-in-differences’ design to estimate the causal effect of the appointment
of a female cabinet minister on the participation of other female legislators in
plenary debates. The results indicate that the appointment of a female minister
increases not only the participation of other female members of parliament, but
also the influence that female members enjoy when discussing policy.
In sum, the papers in this thesis make a number of substantive contributions
to our understanding of legislative politics, and, in particular, to the role that
legislative leaders play in the policy process. In the next section, I describe the
settings in which I investigate the theoretical ideas described above, and identify
additional literatures to which the findings pertain.
The European Parliament and the UK House of Commons
While cross-national studies of legislatures have provided answers to a number
of important questions (Blondel, 1973; Döring, 1995; Shugart and Carey, 1992;
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Matland and Studlar, 2004; Carey, 2007, 2009), establishing credible inferences
about the impact of specific institutions on legislative behaviour is considerably
more difficult in a cross-country context than in analyses of single legislatures. In
each paper, I therefore choose to study a legislative setting which allows me to
test the theoretical arguments at the heart of the thesis. I focus on two specific
legislatures: the European Parliament (EP) and the UK House of Commons.
In this section, I briefly preview the advantages that these legislatures offer for
evaluating the theoretical arguments described above.
First, a central empirical challenge associated with assessing theories of nega-
tive agenda control is that the effects of agenda control and discipline on voting
cohesion are difficult to disentangle. In most national parliaments, disciplinary re-
sources and powers of agenda-control are both held by the leaders of government
parties. When this is the case, the two mechanisms have equivalent empirical
predictions in terms of voting cohesion. Simply put, observing high levels of
party cohesion tells us little about whether leaders are whipping their members
to toe the party line, or restricting the agenda to prevent division (Honnige and
Sieberer, 2011). Despite this observational equivalence, the use of these tools have
very different implications for the scope of the legislative agenda and the degree
of gridlock in the political system. The European Parliament offers a useful set-
ting for separating the effects of agenda control and discipline, as these tools are
largely controlled by separate actors. While national party leaders have primary
control of the strongest disciplinary mechanisms, it is the leaders of the European
Party Groups (EPG) who, under certain conditions, control the plenary agenda.
In chapter two, I exploit this unique structure of European Parliament politics to
document the frequency with which leaders use their powers of negative agenda
control, and relate this to the internal heterogeneity of the EPGs. The EP is
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therefore an excellent setting for testing the model I propose.
The model in chapter three reveals that crises empower those with proposal
rights, and the central implication is that crises should result in policy moving
toward the position of the agenda-setter. This theory could be used to understand
crisis politics across a wide range of legislative settings. However, the challenge
of verifying such a proposition empirically is non-negligible. Status quo points
and new policy positions are poorly identified in standard models of roll-call vot-
ing (Poole, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal, 2011), and the methodological difficulties
associated with measuring changes in policy such as those I describe are well
known (Richman, 2011; Woon and Cook, 2015), meaning that the opportunities
for empirical validation of the model are limited.
However, the model I present produces additional observable implications of
crisis politics when the pre-existing political space is multidimensional. When
legislative politics is structured by more than one dimension of contestation, crises
will also have consequences for the membership of the winning voting coalition
in roll-call votes: a quantity that is more easily measured than shifts in policy.
I consider the effects of a particularly important external shock – the financial
crisis of 2008 – in the context of the European Parliament, the politics of which is
structured along two distinct dimensions (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006, 2007). Of
course, the EP is not the only legislature in which politics is multidimensional, and
an additional advantage of testing the model in this setting is that the preferences
of the agenda-setting actors in the European Union are well-known and easily
measured, which makes it straightforward to develop expectations about these
actors’ behaviour during the crisis period. Consequently, while the theoretical
approach is more generally applicable, situating the analysis in the context of the
European Parliament makes it possible to rigorously test additional expectations
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of the model.
Similarly, the House of Commons provides a useful setting for examining the
importance of leadership role models in the legislative context. A central feature
of the argument in the third paper is that we should expect role models to matter
particularly when there is a demographic group that has been historically under-
represented in parliament. In the House of Commons, female legislators have
traditionally held only a small fraction of seats in parliament, and women face
considerable obstacles to participation in legislative activity (Lovenduski, 2005;
Childs, 2004). Furthermore, in addition to their important institutional powers,
cabinet ministers in the UK are highly visible actors within parliament, and play
a central role in legislative debate (Rogers and Walters, 2006). Accordingly, if
female leaders do act as role models to their fellow parliamentarians, the House
of Commons represents a promising case for evaluating such an expectation. In
addition, the identification of role-model effects is complicated by the fact that
one must separate the causal impact of the leader from the effects of the office
that the leader holds. The strategy I use – which exploits variation in the gender
of a cabinet minister over time – requires data on women’s participation in ple-
nary debate over a relatively long time period. An additional advantage of the
examining the potential for role models in the UK is that the speeches made by
members of the House of Commons have been digitised, and are easily accessible.
While the ‘within-parliament’ nature of these papers helps to improve the in-
ternal validity of the results I present, the trade-off, of course, comes in terms of
external validity. I do not argue that the lessons learnt in the context of the Euro-
pean Parliament or the House of Commons can simply be assumed to operate in
other legislatures, but the findings should encourage further study of these topics
in different settings. For example, the relationship between intra-party polarisa-
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tion and legislative gridlock (chapter two) might also help to explain sclerosis in
some areas of policymaking in the US Congress. Likewise, the evidence I present
in chapter three focuses on an economic crisis in the EU, but the general message
of the model, which relates crises to increased agenda-setter discretion, might help
to explain other situations of crisis politics (Howell and Rogowski, 2013) and may
provide a useful framework for understanding policy change in crises in the future.
Similarly, the approach I take to examine the importance of leadership role models
in the process of representation in the House of Commons (chapter four) might
also be profitably applied to other legislative contexts in which certain groups
have been under-represented historically. More generally, by prioritising internal
validity over external validity, I emphasise the importance of understanding the
specific distribution of formal and informal powers within each legislative context.
As the results demonstrate, even subtle differences in the allocation of leadership
powers can have profound effects on policy outcomes.
In addition to the general theoretical contributions made by these papers, the
thesis contributes to more specific literatures on legislative politics in the European
Parliament and the House of Commons. First, scholars have demonstrated that
despite its transnational nature, the EP is a ‘normal’ parliament in which cohesive
parties compete over outcomes in a policy space that is primarily socio-economic
(Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). Existing explanations of party cohesion in the EP
have largely focussed on the ability of national parties to ‘whip’ their members to
toe a common EPG line (McElroy, 2001; Faas, 2003; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005;
Ringe, 2010; Klüver and Spoon, 2013). By contrast, less attention has been paid
to the possibility that the EPG leaders themselves may utilise their institutional
powers to prevent divisive legislation from being considered on the plenary floor.1
1Though see Hix et al. (2007, 105-131).
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Chapter two contributes directly to this literature, and suggests that the power
of the EPG leaders has been under-appreciated in previous research.
Chapter three also contributes directly to our understanding of the European
Union’s political response to the 2008 financial and sovereign debt crises. These
crises were extraordinarily damaging for EU countries, causing large declines in
GDP, foreign direct investment and global exports, and dramatic increases in un-
employment. There was also considerable deterioration in the public finances of
EU national governments, with several countries brought to the brink of sovereign
default. The European Union’s response to these economic events was also dra-
matic, as significant regulatory powers were transferred from the national to the
European level, and a number of quasi-federal institutional structures were cre-
ated (Paulo, 2011). There is a growing literature on the European Union’s re-
sponse to the financial crisis, much of which is focussed on explaining the fail-
ure in previous regulation (Taylor, 2009; Begg, 2009; Hodson and Quaglia, 2009;
Holinski, Kool and Muysken, 2012), or providing policy recommendations for the
future (Dabrowski, 2010; Jacoby, 2014; Grahl and Lysandrou, 2014; Hild, Herz
and Bauer, 2014). Although some work has explored the roles played by differ-
ent EU institutions in forming the crisis response (Copeland and James, 2014;
Schimmelfennig, 2014), chapter three provides the first investigation of how the
crisis affected the internal politics of the European Parliament. Accordingly, the
findings in chapter three contribute not only to our understanding of the role that
leaders play in crisis situations in general, but also present new insights into the
specific policy response to a complex and important crisis scenario.
In the context of the House of Commons, several studies have analysed the
voting decision of MPs (Cowley, 2005; Spirling and McLean, 2007; Benedetto and
Hix, 2007; Spirling and Quinn, 2010), but considerably less attention has been paid
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to members’ speechmaking behaviour. Furthermore, while a number of studies
have analysed the representation of women’s interests in the House of Commons
(Childs, 2000; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003), and the experience of female MPs in
participating in policymaking (Childs, 2004), these authors do not generally use
quantitative data to evaluate questions of gender and politics in the UK. Those
studies that do use quantitative measures of speechmaking in parliament (Bird,
2005; Catalano, 2009) offer interesting descriptive insights into the differential
behaviour of male and female MPs, but they tend to be based on very small
samples, which limits the generalisability of their findings. Furthermore, to my
knowledge, no previous study has considered the importance of female cabinet
ministers for the representation of women’s interests in plenary debate, nor in
the UK political process in general. The approach in chapter four represents a
significant contribution to this literature. In addition to describing evidence of a
gender-gap in parliamentary debates over an 18-year period based on an analysis
of over a million parliamentary speeches, the identification strategy I use allows
me to provide causal evidence of the importance of female ministers in the process
of representation in the House of Commons.
Methodological and data contributions
I use a diverse array of data and methods in evaluating the theoretical arguments
outlined above. In addition to the substantive findings I present, the data I collect
and the measures derived from this data represent two important contributions
of this thesis.
The use of roll-call data for testing theories of legislative politics is well estab-
lished (Clinton, 2012), and I employ roll-call data from the European Parliament
to test arguments in chapters two and three. However, attempts to distinguish
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between competing theories of legislative politics have been hampered by an over-
reliance on parliamentary voting data (Krehbiel, 2006; Richman, 2011). While
many of the theories discussed above have ‘down stream’ implications for voting
behaviour, they also imply observable consequences for other forms of legislative
behaviour, the analysis of which would provide more proximate tests of the the-
oretical propositions I discuss. Krehbiel (2006, 22) makes the recommendation
“not to abandon roll call analysis but rather to conduct it with a keener eye to
…inferential problems …and to supplement it with other kinds of data whenever
possible.” I follow this advice by collecting new data and developing innovative
quantitative techniques which aim to create closer mappings between theoretical
concepts and empirical measures than has been possible previously.
First, in chapter two I present a new dataset of parliamentary agendas from
the European Parliament. Theories of negative agenda control predict the cir-
cumstances under which parliamentary leaders will block legislative proposals,
but actual blocking behaviour is rarely observed. The data I introduce provides
a unique opportunity to observe agenda-setting behaviour directly. In the EP,
party group leaders have the opportunity at specific junctures in the policy pro-
cess to remove items from plenary consideration. By analysing the agendas of the
parliament before and after this juncture, I am able to isolate the agenda-setting
behaviour of the leaders directly. I also develop a novel ‘blocking’ test, which
relates the frequency with which legislation is blocked to the level of intra-party
division on relevant issues. The combination of this data and empirical strategy
therefore offers important advantages over previous approaches which mainly rely
on roll-call data to infer purposive agenda-setting actions by party elites.
Second, chapters two and three make use of a new dataset of over four thousand
legislative summaries, which are used to map legislative proposals in the European
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Parliament to dimensions of substantive political interest. In chapter two I intro-
duce a probabilistic model for assigning legislative proposals to a priori defined
dimensions on which we have good measures for the positions of parliamentary
actors (McElroy and Benoit, 2007, 2011). Spatial understandings of legislator pref-
erences are central to many theories of legislative politics, and assigning proposals
to such dimensions is a common problem for applied researchers. The method
I describe uses the summaries of the legislative proposals to assign proposals to
expert survey dimensions in a way that closely mirrors intuitive understandings
of the ex ante defined meanings of those dimensions. In chapter three, my focus
is specifically on changes in voting coalitions on crisis-relevant legislation. After
linking the summaries to relevant roll-call votes, I combine topic-modelling with
a two-stage least-squares regression procedure to provide comparisons between
votes on crisis-relevant and non-crisis-relevant legislation before and after the cri-
sis period. These procedures could be applied by researchers who wish to relate
legislative texts to pre-determined dimensions of interest in other settings.
Third, chapter four introduces a dataset of over one million parliamentary
speeches from debates in the UK House of Commons from 1997 to 2015. Existing
studies have provided valuable insights into the ways in which MPs communicate
(Bird, 2005; Catalano, 2009; Auel and Raunio, 2014), but these works generally
study only very small samples of speeches. Although recent work has investigated
large collections of historical speech data in Westminster (Eggers and Spirling,
2014, N.d.), I am not aware of any previous study that has exploited the full cor-
pus of parliamentary speech in the contemporary House of Commons. I analyse
this data in the context of a multi-period ‘difference-in-differences’ design, which
allows me to isolate the causal effect of a change in the gender of a cabinet minister
on the participation and influence of female MPs in parliamentary debate.
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In addition, chapter four contributes to a more general empirical endeavour
of isolating causal effects of the identity of leaders on political outcomes. There
are two primary inferential problems associated with this task. First, leaders are
intrinsically linked to the leadership offices they hold, and thus it is difficult to
separate the effects of the leader from the effects of the office (Ahlquist and Levi,
2011, 19). Second, the criteria by which leaders are selected may be linked to
the substantive outcomes that we wish to study, meaning that any correlation
between outcomes and leaders may be the result of a selection process, rather
than an independent effect of the leader on the outcome (Humphreys, Masters
and Sandbu, 2006). The design-based strategy I employ in chapter four makes
progress on these issues by exploiting variation in the identity (here, gender) of
the leaders that hold a specific office (here, cabinet ministers) over time. Not
only does this allow me to separate the effects of the leader from the effects of
the office, it also means that the selection mechansims that lead to some types
of leader being appointed to some types of post are held constant. This paper
therefore offers a more convincing approach to estimating causal leadership effects
than has been the case previously.
Finally, in recent years, researchers have recognised the potential for using digi-
tised political texts to glean deeper insights into how politicians communicate.
Political scientists have focussed heavily on two main quantities of interest when
using legislative texts as a source of data: first, for scaling the positions of political
actors; and second, for measuring the priorities that politicians place on different
topics and issues.2 However, while the priorities and positions of legislators are
2For examples of text-scaling methods, see Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003); Slapin and
Proksch (2008); Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov (2009); Lauderdale and Clark (2012). For models
of topical attention, see Hopkins and King (2010); Grimmer (2010); Quinn et al. (2010); Roberts
et al. (2014)
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important, when politicians speak, they are usually doing more than expressing
their ideological leaning, or contributing to the volume of words uttered on a
given topic. Existing measures are therefore somewhat limited, and advancing
our understanding of political communication requires moving beyond these two
components of legislative speech.
To this end, in chapter four I provide two new quantitative measures of com-
munication in political debate. First, I introduce a measure of influence, based
on the extent to which words used by one legislator are subsequently adopted by
other legislators, and use this to demonstrate that women do not only speak more
following the appointment of a female cabinet minister, but that they also become
more influential in discussions in parliament. Second, in exploring the mechanisms
that drive the role-model effect, I develop a measure of ministerial responsiveness,
which captures the degree to which ministers engage with the words used by back-
benchers in their speeches. Using this measure, I show that female ministers are
more responsive to female MPs in parliamentary debate than are male ministers,
while no significant gender differences exist in ministerial responses to speeches
by male MPs. These new measures allow me to provide a detailed exploration of
gender dynamics in House of Commons debates and, more generally, they will be
of direct value to other researchers interested in UK politics, as well as to those
studying political debate in other legislatures.
Road map
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: each of the chapters includes
one paper, which is a self-contained piece of research. Chapter two analyses
the relationship between negative agenda control, party cohesion, and legislative
gridlock in the European Parliament. Chapter three investigates the effects of the
34
2008 financial crisis on voting coalitions and policy outcomes, also in the European
Parliament. Chapter four evaluates evidence for a female role-model effect in the
UK House of Commons. In the final chapter, I discuss the implications of the
papers, address some general limitations of the thesis, and highlight avenues for
future research.
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2
Intra-Party Politics, Cohesion,
and Legislative Gridlock
Abstract
Where the preferences of party members are more diffuse, it becomes more difficult
for legislative party leaders to discipline their members, making agenda control a
more attractive means of maintaining party cohesion on the legislative floor. Thus,
when disciplinary resources are limited, increases in intra-party polarisation will
increase the range of proposals blocked by party leaders. Using roll-call data and
a new dataset of legislative ‘blocking’, I show that these relationships hold in the
European Parliament, where agenda control and ‘carrot and stick’ disciplinary
powers are held by different sets of parliamentary actors. These findings have
implications for our understanding of European Parliament politics specifically,
and for the relationship between intra-party dynamics and legislative gridlock
more generally.
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How do leaders of legislative parties control their members in roll-call
votes? What are the consequences of such control for policy outcomes? Politi-
cal parties are ubiquitous in democratic politics (Schattschneider, 1942; Aldrich,
1995), and a critical determinant of legislative party success is the degree to which
party members vote cohesively in roll-call votes.1 From an electoral perspective,
parties that vote cohesively in legislative votes are more likely to develop a strong
party brand which signals competence to voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005).
From a legislative perspective, by voting cohesively, parties can secure long-term
policy bargains between party members (Weingast, 1979; Carrubba and Volden,
2000), induce other actors to make favourable proposals (Dewan and Spirling,
2011), and strengthen their leader’s hand in intra-parliamentary bargaining by
signalling strength and reliability to potential coalition partners (Bowler, Farrell
and Katz, 1999).
When the preferences of party members diverge, leaders can use two broad
strategies to compel their members to vote cohesively. On the one hand, party
leaders can make use of traditional disciplinary tools to cajole legislators to toe
the party line (Sieberer, 2006; Carey, 2007; Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Becher and
Sieberer, 2008). Alternatively, leaders may strategically manipulate the legislative
agenda to prevent divisive legislation from coming to the plenary floor (Rohde,
1991; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). However, identifying the effects of such ‘neg-
ative’ agenda control on party voting cohesion is empirically challenging, as the
parties with strongest control over the parliamentary agenda also tend to be those
endowed with a wide range of disciplinary resources. Although the dynamics of
1I distinguish between cohesion (the frequency with which party members vote together),
unity (the ideological similarity between party members), and discipline (the selective incentives
used by a leader to enforce cohesion).
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party behaviour within the legislature are interesting in their own right, distin-
guishing the effects of agenda control from those of discipline is also important
because – as I argue below – the two mechanisms have different implications for
legislative outcomes.
This paper considers the relationship between intra-party preference hetero-
geneity and negative agenda control in the legislature. I use a simple spatial
framework, which builds on existing models of agenda-setting (Cox and McCub-
bins, 2005), to evaluate the effects of agenda control on both party voting cohesion
and on the scope of the legislative agenda. I argue that when leaders are con-
cerned with cohesion, they use their power over the agenda to block proposals
which substantial minorities of their parties oppose. A desire for cohesion implies
that leaders will be sensitive to the preferences of non-median party members, and
will act to protect the interests of these members when deciding which proposals
are to be considered on the house floor.
The model I describe results in two testable predictions. First, while existing
studies focus on the importance of inter-party polarisation as a cause of gridlock
(Bowling and Ferguson, 2001; Jones, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002; Chiou and Rothenberg,
2003; Binder, 2003; McCarty, 2007; Krehbiel, 2010), I highlight that when party
leaders are concerned with maintaining high levels of voting cohesion, intra-party
polarisation can also lead to significant restrictions on the scope of the legislative
agenda. As leaders must satisfy non-median party members, the range of proposals
blocked by the party leader will increase as party-member preferences become
more diffuse. Second, while polarisation can have pernicious effects on party
voting cohesion, this effect is mitigated when a party leader is able to manipulate
the legislative agenda. Therefore, when traditional disciplinary mechanisms are
unavailable, party leaders can use their control over the legislative agenda to
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buttress party voting cohesion in the face of intra-party ideological polarisation,
but they do so at the potential cost of additional legislative gridlock.
I evaluate the predictions of the model in the setting of the European Parlia-
ment (EP), which provides three key advantages. First, traditional tools of party
discipline and powers of agenda control are primarily controlled by different sets
of political actors in the EP. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are af-
filiated with two parties – their national parties and their European Party Groups
(EPGs). National parties control the most important disciplinary resources, and
when the leadership of the national parties and the EPGs disagree, MEPs follow
the instructions of the national group, causing EPG cohesion to decrease (Hix,
2001, 2004; Faas, 2003; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005; Klüver and Spoon, 2013).
However, I argue that under certain circumstances, it is the EPG leaders who
control the legislative agenda. Specifically, when an EPG holds the median po-
sition in the Parliament’s central business-organising body – the Conference of
Presidents – its leader is pivotal for agenda-setting decisions. Thus, when an
EPG is median, it can manipulate the legislative agenda in order to overcome
the collective action problem posed by divisive national parties. Accordingly, the
distribution of powers between national and EPG leaders makes it possible to
isolate the effects of agenda control on party cohesion.
Second, the absence of an electoral incentive for party cohesion in the EP also
makes it possible to isolate a legislative incentive for party cohesion. European
elections are generally considered to be ‘second order’ (Reif and Schmitt, 1980),
with little connection between the actions of parties in the legislature and the
behaviour of voters on election day. This implies that EPGs have little incen-
tive to enforce cohesion in order to strengthen the party ‘brand’. Accordingly,
evidence of cohesion-inducing behaviour of party group leaders suggests that in-
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centives arising within the parliament are also fundamental to the organisation of
legislative parties. The implication of this is that parties matter not only because
they provide electoral benefits to politicians, but also because they help to solve
collective-action problems inside the legislature.
Third, previous empirical work relies heavily on roll-call data to infer the strate-
gic agenda-setting behaviour of party leaders (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Gail-
mard and Jenkins, 2007; Anzia and Jackman, 2013; Jenkins and Monroe, 2015).
The EP provides an excellent opportunity to directly observe instances of negative
agenda control, as EPG leaders are able to remove proposals from the legislative
agenda at specific points in the policy process, and parliamentary documents
record which proposals are removed at these critical junctures. I introduce new
data of all proposals considered by EPG leaders over a 10-year period, which en-
ables me to measure the agenda-setting behaviour of party leaders in the EP. I
use this data to relate the probability that a legislative proposal is blocked to the
internal division of the agenda-setting party group over the issues contained in the
proposal. To do so, I develop a novel text-classification procedure which matches
party positioning data to legislative proposals in a more systematic fashion than
has been possible previously. I supplement this with a roll-call analysis which
examines the consequences of blocking on the cohesion rates of EPGs in parlia-
ment. I show that when an EPG holds the median position in the Conference of
Presidents, they are able to circumvent the problem of ideological disunity and
maintain their high cohesion rates by preventing potentially divisive legislation
from coming to the floor.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the incentives and strategies
that leaders have for maintaining cohesion in legislative votes, and I formalise
the agenda-setting argument in the context of a simple spatial model. Second,
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I discuss the specific context of the EP and derive expectations for the blocking
of legislation and the consequent implications for party cohesion. In the third
section, I introduce the data and methodology for testing these implications, and
in the fourth, I present results. A final section concludes.
Theory
Why is cohesion a valuable good for party leaders? Many existing studies focus
on the electoral benefits that cohesive parties offer to their members. For exam-
ple, Cox and McCubbins (2005, 21) argue that party leaders are motivated by
the desire to protect the party ‘brand’ in the eyes of the electorate, and that “a
party’s reputation depends significantly on its record of legislative accomplish-
ment.” Party leaders are therefore concerned with avoiding votes on which their
party is likely to be defeated, in order to promote an image of legislative strength
to voters. Legislative defeats may be especially damaging, but even non-decisive
voting defections can have pernicious effects for a party’s electoral prospects when
they are interpreted by the electorate as signs of weakness and incompetence. As
Kam (2009, 9) argues, dissent from the party line “sends a signal of disunity and
disorganisation to voters.” While legislative defeats may be seen as the apex of
party leader ineptitude, defections themselves – even if they are not decisive – can
nonetheless be damaging for party leaders.
However, in addition to any electoral efficiencies cohesive parties may bring,
incentives arising within the legislature may also motivate leaders to take actions
to maintain the voting cohesion of their parties. First, legislators have incentives to
trade votes on issues which they weakly oppose for the support of their co-partisans
on issues that they strongly favour (Weingast, 1979; Weingast and Marshall, 1988;
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Koford, 1982; Carrubba and Volden, 2000). For example, consider two party
members, i and j, who cast votes over policies pi and pj. Each legislator will
always vote to approve ‘their’ policy, but voting to approve the other member’s
policy is costly. Assume that party member i is pivotal on the vote to approve
pj, and j is pivotal for pi. Assume also that the utility that i gains from the
successful passage of pi is greater than the costs she faces from voting for pj, and
vice versa for j.2 With such a preference structure, it is clear that both i and j
stand to benefit from trading votes – i and j both agree to vote for both proposals,
guaranteeing positive payoffs for both members.
However, now assume that votes are taken sequentially, such that the vote on
pi occurs at t1 and pj occurs at t2. If member j votes to approve pi at t1 (which
passes), member i no longer has an incentive to cast a costly ‘yea’ vote for pj at
t2. As Carrubba & Volden (2000, 264) suggest, the “first voter can vote with the
coalition on his bill, and defect thereafter, thus gaining the benefit of receiving his
own bill’s benefits while not having to pay for any other bills”. Thus, because votes
on log-rolls are not concurrent, the promise by i to vote for pj is not credible, and,
realising this, j will therefore not vote for pi in the first period. In short, absent
some form of commitment-enforcing procedure, the log-roll will quickly unravel.
Although both party members would be better off if they voted cohesively across
both roll-call votes, each member has incentives to defect on specific votes on which
they disagree with the other member’s position. Cohesion is therefore a valuable
public good to all party members, but collective action problems that arise from
the inability of legislators to commit to long-run voting strategies leads to an
under-provision of cohesion. However, by delegating cohesion-inducing powers to
2That is, the utility i receives for voting for the two policies is U(pi) > 0 > U(pj) and
U(pi) + U(pj) > 0, with j’s preferences defined equivalently.
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a central party leadership, a party’s members can overcome these problems, and
secure the benefits of cooperation.
Second, cohesive party voting may also be important for affecting the behaviour
of other legislative actors. For example, Dewan and Spirling (2011) show that
when an opposition party commits to voting cohesively, it can induce the gov-
erning party to make more moderate policy proposals which make all members
of the opposition better off. The intuition behind this result is simple: by voting
cohesively, an opposition party forces a (non-cohesive) governing party to make
proposals that satisfy more moderate government members, thereby shifting pol-
icy in the direction of the opposition. Therefore, the ability to commit to cohesive
voting strategies can lead to significant improvements in policy outcomes for a
given party, even when that party does not hold a majority of seats in parliament.
Third, legislative policy outcomes often reflect the relative bargaining power of
different parties, where party power is a function of legislative seats (Snyder Jr,
Ting and Ansolabehere, 2005). While a party may hold a certain share of the seats
in parliament, the party leader may not be able to credibly promise to deliver the
equivalent number of votes on any particular proposal. If legislators vote against
their party leaders, leading to a lack of cohesion, this reduces the effective vot-
ing weight of the party leader in intra-parliamentary bargaining (Fishburn and
Gehrlein, 1985; Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1986). As Sieberer (2006, 171) argues,
“expected defections from backbenchers might keep party leaders from forming
minimum size coalitions which they would otherwise prefer.” Similarly, as inter-
actions between parties within the legislature resemble a repeated game in which
deals over policy must be struck on a regular basis, persistent defections might un-
dermine the attractiveness of a party to potential coalition partners. As Bowler et
al. (1999, 13) suggest, “political entrepreneurs, who are in the process of building
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coalitions, would rather not team up with unreliable partners.” Cohesive party
voting therefore signals unity to other parliamentary actors and strengthens a
leader’s hand in intra-parliamentary negotiations.
Finally, defections may signal deeper divisions within the party which a strate-
gic leader would want to avoid. For example, defection in roll-call votes is a
strong predictor of party switching (Heller and Mershon, 2009). When legislators
consistently find themselves on the losing side of votes promoted by their party
leaders, the probability that they will switch their allegiance to other parties in-
creases, and this can have important implications for their original party’s control
over important legislative offices. In many parliamentary settings legislative re-
sources are apportioned according to group size (Carroll, Cox and Pachón, 2006),3
implying that if a dissatisfied legislator switches groups, the general legislative re-
sources available to the party leadership decline. Party switching is a common
phenomenon, both in the European Parliament, and in other legislative settings
(Heller and Mershon, 2005; Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2008; Benoit
and McElroy, 2009), and to the extent that voting defections signal more profound
party division, leaders in such settings will be motivated to limit defections.
These arguments suggest that party cohesion is likely to be valuable to party
members because of the internal dynamics of parliamentary politics, rather than
because legislators wish to secure a strong party ‘brand’ under which they can
compete in future elections. Overall, however, whether for electoral or legislative
reasons, party leaders should be expected to take actions that maintain the co-
hesion of their parties in legislative votes.4 As Bowler et al. (1999, 3) suggest,
3In the European Parliament, for example, committee chairs, seats, and rapporteurships are
allocated according to the share of seats each party group holds in the parliament.
4I comment on the relevant incentives for party group leaders in the specific context of the
European Parliament in the next section.
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“the maintenance of a cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a crucially
important feature of parliamentary life.” How, then, can party leaders ensure that
their members vote cohesively in legislative votes?
If party members share sufficiently similar preferences, party cohesion will arise
naturally, with little or no help from party leaders. Therefore, the observation
of cohesive party voting in legislative roll-calls does not necessarily imply that
parties are themselves empirically significant (Krehbiel, 1993). Several studies
have shown the importance of homogenous legislator preferences for party cohesion
(Skjæveland, 2001; Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Sieberer, 2006; Carey, 2007, 2009;
Kam, 2009). However, when the ideological unity of a party declines, leaders can
use two broad strategies to compel their members to vote cohesively.
First, leaders can use arsenals of incentives and punishments to change the
cost-benefit calculation faced by individual legislators so that defection from the
party line is more expensive, and loyalty is more rewarding. For example, the
strategic use of career advancement can help cajole individual legislators to follow
the party line (Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999; Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Becher
and Sieberer, 2008; Kam, 2009). By attaching career advancement opportuni-
ties to voting behaviour, leaders increase the benefits of party loyalty, and off-set
any costs legislators might incur from voting contrary to their own preferences.
Additionally, a vote of confidence procedure can encourage party cohesion, as the
long-term benefit of staying in power is tied to votes on which legislators face short-
term policy losses (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998). Furthermore, party leaders
can impose formal (deselection, revocation of the party whip) or informal (social
pressure) sanctions on individual legislators who contravene mandated party be-
haviour (Kam, 2009). The relative availability of these tools to party leaders will,
in part, determine the degree to which ideologically heterogeneous parties vote
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cohesively.
Second, theories of agenda control (Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 2005)
focus on party leaders’ ability to prevent certain proposals from being considered
on the floor of the legislature. Rather than inducing their members to vote the
party line, leaders can remove from consideration those bills that threaten to
divide their parties. Strategic agenda control can help party leaders to maintain
party cohesion in at least two obvious ways. First, when a party leader fears that
there exist irreconcilable differences between two or more factions of her party
on a given proposal, she can simply remove such a proposal indefinitely from the
agenda and avoid the inevitable divisive vote on the house floor. Second, a party
leader may choose to temporarily withhold a proposal from the plenary floor so
as to secure more time to apply pressure to recalcitrant legislators, or to secure
changes to the proposal that would make it less divisive to her membership. If
some party members strongly desire the passage of a given proposal, delaying
legislation may provide sufficient incentive for them to accept changes that would
water down the proposal but secure the support of legislators who were previously
opposed. A leader can thereby secure legislative compromises that satisfy a larger
proportion of her party, and allow the proposal to pass on the floor of the house
in a relatively cohesive party vote. Accordingly, even when party leaders cannot
exercise an absolute veto, control over the timing of legislative proposals can still
be beneficial in terms of maintaining party cohesion.
How do these unity-providing strategies interact? When preference unity de-
clines, party leaders should be expected to use both discipline and agenda control to
maximise their chances of controlling cohesive voting blocs in the legislature. One
way of conceptualising these different tools is as substitute goods. As Kam (2009,
210) puts it, “party leaders switch from costly or ineffective means of controlling
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their MPs to less costly and more effective methods.” Empirically, however, this
presents a challenge, as it means that the effects of agenda control and discipline
on cohesion are hard to disentangle, as both mechanisms often produce equivalent
empirical predictions in terms of observed voting behaviour.5 In most national
settings, governing parties typically control both the legislative agenda and the
distribution of political offices that allow them to discipline their members. Thus,
observing cohesive party voting of government parties does not help us to identify
the effects of strategic agenda setting by party leaders.
Fortunately, the distribution of powers to different parliamentary actors in the
EP allows us to isolate the effects of agenda-control on party cohesion. MEPs sit
as members of European Party Groups (EPGs) – transnational party federations
which are identified primarily by their ideological affiliations, rather than national
allegiances. However, within each of these groups are clustered numerous national
parties of which MEPs are also members. As described below, while national
parties hold the most powerful disciplinary resources in the EP, agenda-setting
power lies largely with the EPGs. In the empirical analysis, I exploit this structure
to isolate the effects of agenda control on EPG cohesion.
Before turning to this analysis, however, I use a simple spatial model to clarify
expectations about how changes in the ideological unity of a party will affect
the agenda-setting decisions of party leaders. The intuition is simple: when the
ideological unity of a party declines, and ‘carrot and stick’ mechanisms are in
short supply, party leaders will use their institutional prerogatives to restrict the
plenary agenda and avoid votes on policy proposals which would divide their party
5An example of this empirical difficulty is demonstrated by the debate between Chandler,
Cox and McCubbins (2006) and Honnige and Sieberer (2011) over the sources of party cohesion
in the German Bundestag. See also Zubek (2011).
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members.
Consider a uni-dimensional policy space, j, on which legislators have single-
peaked preferences, and where a policy proposal pj is pitted against the status
quo qj. Proposals are considered under open amendment rules meaning that if
pj reaches the house floor it will always pass at the floor median position fm at
final passage. Our focus is on the agenda-setting party, x, which is constituted
of N members who can be ordered by their ideal points on dimension j and are
represented by the vector x1; x2; : : : ; xN . Denote the median member of party
x on a given dimension as xm. The leader of the party has negative agenda-
setting power, such that proposals must be approved by the leader before they
are considered by the house. As my interest is in isolating the effects of ideological
disunity on agenda-setting, I assume that the party leader is not able to discipline
her members: she cannot induce members to support a proposal that is further
away from their ideal point than the status quo.
The leader of the agenda-setting party is concerned with protecting some ar-
bitrary fraction of her party from being ‘rolled’ on the house floor. Legislators
are rolled when they vote against a proposal, but the proposal is approved on the
floor despite their opposition. As a minimum, a leader will always block proposals
that threaten to ‘roll’ a majority of her party. A party is rolled when a proposal
passes despite a majority of the party’s members voting against. Therefore, for a
party with an odd number of N legislators, the minimum number of ‘aye’ voters
a leader will tolerate is N 1
2
+ 1. That is, a leader will never permit legislation
to be considered on the house floor unless at least a bare majority of her party
prefer the floor outcome, fm, to the status quo position q.6
6This special case represents the core intuition of other models of agenda-setting (Cox and
McCubbins, 2005) and forms a baseline expectation here.
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More generally, a leader may be directly concerned with the cohesion of her
party and thus will block proposals that threaten to make a substantial minority
of the party worse off. When a leader is concerned with cohesion the minimum
number of aye votes she will tolerate is N 1
2
+1+k, where k determines the desired
majority size for the leader on a vote on pj. Intuitively, k represents the additional
number of party members a leader would like to see voting to approve the policy
over and above a party-majority of 1.7 If a proposal passes on the house floor and
fewer than N 1
2
+ 1 + k party members vote for the policy, the leader suffers a
utility loss of l.
I illustrate the argument in the panels of figure 2.1, which depicts five legislators
from two parties on one dimension of conflict. Party x is the agenda-setting party
with legislators x1, x2, and x3, where x2 is the median party member. Party y has
only two legislators, y1 and y2. Legislator y2 is the median floor legislator (also
marked as fm), and the leader of party y does not possess negative agenda-setting
powers. Three status quo locations are labelled q1, q2 and q3.
When the leader of x is simply concerned with preventing the majority of the
party from being rolled, she will block any proposal addressing a status quo posi-
tion that the median legislator of her party prefers to the floor outcome. In panel
(a), when k = 0, the leader will block any proposal that addresses status-quo
points in the white-shaded area which ranges from fm to 2x2  fm. Proposals ad-
dressing status quo points to the left of fm or to the right of 2x2 fm are preferred
by at least two party members. By contrast, proposals which address status quo
7The maximum value k can take is N 12 , such that the largest ‘aye’ coalition that a party
leader desires is a completely cohesive party. The minimum value of k is 0, indicating the case
where a party leader is concerned only with preventing majority-rolls. Note thatN (N 12 +1+k)
expresses, for a particular value of k, the number of legislators that the party leader will tolerate
being rolled on a given vote.
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points falling between fm and 2x2   fm will be opposed by x2, and therefore by
a majority of the party’s members. In general, the range of status quo points on
which the party leader will refuse to allow new proposals to come to the floor is
the ‘gridlock interval.’ These intervals are depicted in the figure by thick black
horizontal lines. Note that the gridlock interval when k = 0 is identical to the
‘blockout zone’ defined in Cox and McCubbins (2005). In the figure, as all status
quo points fall outside of the gridlock interval, proposals addressing these points
will be approved by the party leader, and will pass on the floor of the house at fm.
Accordingly, when the leader is concerned only with preventing a party roll (i.e.
when k = 0), the distance between the median party member and the median
floor legislator determines the range of status quo points for which new proposals
will be blocked.
However, when the leader is concerned with maintaining the cohesion of her
party, her blocking decisions must reflect the preferences of members other than
the party median. Consider the gridlock interval in panel (a) when k = 1. Pre-
viously, the leader was sensitive to the preferences of the median member of the
party, where in this case the leader blocks proposals that threaten to roll any
member of her party. Accordingly, the leader will block any proposal addressing
a status quo position in the range 2x1  fm to 2x3  fm, thus increasing the range
of blocked proposals. In this case a proposal addressing q2 is rejected: although
x1 and x2 would prefer a new policy at fm, x3 prefers the status quo position. By
contrast, proposals addressing q1 and q3 will be approved by the leader in both
scenarios in panel (a).
In this example, k = 1 is equivalent to the party leader demanding that the
party votes unanimously on the house floor. However, when the party is larger,
k can take on any value between 0 and N 1
2
. The larger k becomes, the higher
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Figure 2.1: Intra-party polarisation and the gridlock interval
(a)
fm
2x2   fm 2x3   fm2x1   fm
k = 1
k = 0
x1 x2 x3y1 y2
q1 q2q3
(b)
fm
2x2   fm 2x3   fm2x1   fm
k = 1
k = 0
x1 x2 x3y1 y2
q1 q2q3
Note: In panel (a), the gridlock interval when the party leader is concerned with preventing
a majority-roll (k = 0) is depicted as the shaded white area. As the median party member
(x2) prefers fm to all status quo points, the leader will allow proposals addressing any of these
points to be considered on the floor. When k = 1, the gridlock interval is depicted by the
union of the grey and white shaded areas. Here, proposals addressing q1 and q3 are approved
for consideration, but the party leader blocks those addressing q2 because although a majority
of the party (x1 and x2) are in favour of policy change, x3 is not. Panel (b) demonstrates the
effect of an increase in party polarisation. While the gridlock interval for k = 0 is unaffected, the
gridlock interval for k = 1 increases such that neither q1 nor q2 will be approved for consideration
on the floor, as proposals addressing these points will not be approved by a sufficient number of
party members. The dark grey area indicates the extension to the gridlock interval induced by
an increase in intra-party polarisation.
51
the cohesion of party x must be on a given proposal before the party leader will
approve the proposal for consideration. In general, the pivotal blocking member
when k = 0 is the median member of the party, xm. When k > 0, however, two
party members are pivotal for the blocking decision: xm+k on the right of the
policy space and xm k on the left. Accordingly, as k increases, the party leader
must cater to the preferences of two non-median members.
How does the gridlock interval change as the ideological unity of a party de-
clines? I capture the idea of a decline in ideological unity through the polarisation
of the agenda-setting party, where polarisation is a median-preserving shift in the
positions of the party members. Increasing polarisation implies that members on
the left of xm move further to the left, and members on the right of xm move fur-
ther to the right. Polarisation can be understood either as an exogenous decrease
in ideological unity or, conversely, as a decline in the efficacy of more traditional
disciplining mechanisms for a leader faced with an already ideologically heteroge-
nous party. In either case, as polarisation increases, so do the incentives for party
leaders to restrict the parliamentary agenda.
Panel (b) of figure 2.1 illustrates the effects of polarisation. The party members
of x are dispersed more widely around x2 than in panel (a), while the positions
of x2, the members of party y, and the status quo points remain the same. The
position of x2 is not affected by an increase in polarisation, and so when the party
leader is concerned only with the prevention of majority rolls (k = 0), the size of
the gridlock interval is unaffected by polarisation. However, when k > 0, as the
party leader considers the preferences of two non-median party members, intra-
party polarisation has significant effects on the range of the gridlock interval. The
polarisation shock increases the distance between the pivotal legislators and the
floor median fm, and extends the gridlock interval in both directions. The darker
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grey shaded areas in panel (b) indicate the increase in the size of the gridlock
interval induced by the increase in intra-party polarisation. A consequence is that
a proposal addressing q1, which was approved by the party leader in panel (a), is
now blocked. Although x2 and x3 prefer the floor median position to q1, the same
is not the case for x1 who would now prefer to preserve this status quo than see
a new proposal pass at fm.
This also clarifies how agenda-control affects the relationship between polarisa-
tion and average voting cohesion across all status quo points. Consider first the
votes on which x will be divided when all proposals are considered on the house
floor (that is, in the absence of agenda control). In panel (a), members of x will
vote to unanimously approve proposals addressing q1 and q3, but will be divided
on those addressing q2. In panel (b), after the polarisation shock, proposals ad-
dressing both q1 and q2 would divide the members of x. Thus, in the absence
of agenda-control, polarisation leads to a decline in the cohesion of x. When the
leader can control the agenda, by contrast, in panel (a), the party will vote unan-
imously to approve proposals which address q1 and q3, but proposals changing q2
will be blocked. After polarisation, proposals addressing q1 are also blocked by the
party leader, but those addressing q3 are considered on the floor and passed in a
unanimous vote by the members of x. Thus because the leader blocks potentially
divisive proposals (such as q1 and q2), increases in ideological polarisation will
have a weaker effect on the average level of cohesion for agenda-setting parties.
Generalising beyond the specific cases illustrated in figure 2.1, and assuming
that status quo points are uniformly distributed across the policy space, there are
two central implications of the model. First, when party leaders are concerned
with party cohesion, and when they are unable to rely on traditional ‘carrot and
stick’ forms of party management, increases in intra-party polarisation of the
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agenda-setting party will be associated with a larger number of blocked legislative
proposals. Second, while the cohesion of a party is negatively associated with
polarisation, this effect will be less pronounced when party leaders have negative
agenda powers.
Of course, intra-party polarisation will not necessarily lead to gridlock. If dis-
cipline was a viable strategy for party leaders, side payments or sanctions could
induce legislators to vote against their preferences and maintain voting cohesion
even in the face of ideological polarisation. The more disciplinary resources are
available to party leaders, the weaker we should expect the relationship between
polarisation and blocking to be. However, so long as a leader’s disciplinary re-
sources are not unlimited, the central prediction of the model stands: as intra-
party polarisation increases, cohesion-oriented party leaders will block a greater
range of legislative proposals. Furthermore, while leaders may be able to both ad-
vance their policy interests and maintain cohesion by disciplining their members,
these actions may have other costs. For example, as Heller & Mershon (2008,
914) suggest, “a legislator for whom the lash of discipline bites too deeply might
see moving to a different party as attractive.” When the costs of discipline are
high, then, party leaders may prioritise negative agenda control and block divisive
proposals rather than forcing their members to vote against their preferences
The model also reveals that by restricting the agenda to prevent divisive bills,
leaders face a policy cost: some proposals favoured by a (small) majority of the
party are blocked. For example, although x2 and x3 would prefer a new policy
at fm to the status quo policy at q1, the leader blocks this proposal in panel (b)
because of the opposition of x1. Such a decision may disappoint legislators x2 and
x3, because they know that such a policy, if proposed, would bring them additional
utility. If these disappointments come at a significant cost to the leader (say, by
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being denied re-selection in the future), she may prefer to promote legislation that
is disliked by a minority of her party, so long as a bare majority of the party are
in favour of such proposals. Of course, this simply restates the assumption that
in order for polarisation to affect the level of gridlock in a system, party leaders
must be at least partially concerned with the cohesion of their parties, and not
just improving policy for a bare majority of the party.
Applying the insights of the model to a specific setting therefore requires assess-
ing a) the degree to which a party leaders are motivated to maintain cohesion (i.e.,
k), b) the ability of leaders to discipline their members, and c) the agenda-setting
powers of party elites. In the next section I discuss these features in the context
of the European Parliament.
Cohesion, discipline, and agenda-control in the EP
In the European Parliament, the electoral motivation for EPG leaders is likely
to be considerably weaker than in domestic legislatures. Research suggests that
MEPs are aware of the electoral consequences of their voting behaviour (Lindstädt,
Slapin and Vander Wielen, 2011), and the relevance of the EPGs to EP elections
has grown over time, particularly in the most recent elections where EPGs nom-
inated “Spitzenkandidaten” (lead candidates) for the Commission presidency for
the first time. Nevertheless, European elections are commonly interpreted as ‘sec-
ond order’ (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), fought on the basis of national issues rather
than on the legislative records of the EPGs themselves. Furthermore, it seems
likely that – to the extent that voters pay any attention to the internal politics of
the EP – national parties are likely to be rewarded for taking positions that are
distinct from those of their EPGs, rather than for loyally supporting them within
the legislature.
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However, as argued above, there are several reasons to think that long-run
intra-party voting cohesion is associated with efficiencies that arise solely within
the legislative process. Thus, although the electoral connection may be weak in
the EP, we should nevertheless expect many of these benefits to motivate EPG
leaders to maintain cohesion. First, as with other legislatures, individual MEPs
are unlikely to be able to construct stable winning coalitions on their own. Cohe-
sive parties in the EP allow legislators to reduce the transaction costs associated
with forming coalitions across multiple policy issues, which leads to less volatile
behaviour across votes and makes parliamentary politics more predictable (Hix,
Noury and Roland, 2007, 89). Accordingly, individual MEPs, and the national
parties of which they are members, stand to benefit in the long-run from commit-
ting to cohesive voting strategies that support a common EPG line.
Second, in the EP, legislators frequently switch their EPG affiliations from one
group to another (Benoit and McElroy, 2009; McElroy and Benoit, 2010). As
many legislative goods are distributed proportionately according to group size,
party group switching can reduce an EPG’s share of important positions such
as committee chairs and rapporteurships, as well as diluting their influence in
the main business organising body, the Conference of Presidents. Approving leg-
islation on which a particular national party is frequently opposed can lead to
frustration with the EPG leadership and may risk all legislators from the national
party switching their allegiance to a rival party group.
A case in point is given by the British Conservative Party who left the Euro-
pean People’s Party (EPP) to form the European Conservatives and Reformist
Group (ECR) in 2009. The decision to leave the EPP followed a period in which
the Conservatives frequently found themselves on the losing side of votes pro-
moted by the EPP group leadership. In the session before the Conservatives left
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the EPP, they were ‘rolled’ approximately 20% more often than other national
parties in the parliament, and more than twice as often as other national parties
in the EPP.8 These legislative defeats were often attributed to the failure of the
EPP leadership to protect the interests of the Conservatives. As one Conservative
MEP put it, “Our views have not been represented in the Conference of Presi-
dents…we don’t influence the EPP but, instead, are compromised by its agenda.”
(Van Orden, 2006) Although a systematic analysis of the relationship between
‘rolls’ and party switching is beyond the scope of this paper, EPG leaders clearly
have strong incentives to cater to their constituent national parties, and maintain
high cohesion rates. Failure to do so can lead to a permanent weakening of the
EPG’s position in parliament.
Third, the multi-level legislative process in the EU means that EPG leaders are
concerned not only with signalling their strength internally to other party groups,
but also externally to political actors in the Council and the Commission. For
example, using expert survey data, König et al. (2007, 299) show that the more
cohesive party groups are in the Parliament, the higher the probability that the
Parliament will “win” in conciliation committee bargains with the Council. The
importance of cohesion for securing preferential policy bargains in the bicameral
process is also acknowledged by parliamentary actors themselves. For instance,
in a plenary debate on the Europe 2020 strategy, Jerzy Buzek – then President
of the EP – argued, “If we want to influence the situation in the Union, we have
to organise a big majority which supports the resolution.” (Buzek, 2010) In sum,
the inter-institutional nature of EU policy-making reinforces the incentives for
maintaining high levels of party cohesion.
Overall, although the electoral incentives for party cohesion may be weaker
8See appendix section A.1 for the results of my regression analysis.
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than for party leaders in national parliaments, incentives arising from within the
legislature suggest that EPG leaders will use their institutional powers to encour-
age party cohesion in roll-call votes. This is consistent with the view of Hix et al.
(2007, 217), who see the development of the EP as a “case of party formation for
the sole purpose of solving collective action problems internal to the legislature.”
To what extent, then, can party group leaders in the EP use discipline and agenda
control to enforce cohesion?
In the EP, the strongest disciplinary powers are held by national party leaders.
The leaders of the EPGs have some control over the allocation of legislative posi-
tions (such as committee seats, chairs, and rapporteurships) giving them a limited
ability to structure the incentives of office-seeking MEPs within the parliament
(McElroy, 2001; Faas, 2003), but the incentives generated by the electoral sys-
tem give significant power to the national parties. Candidates for the European
Parliament are selected by their national parties, and not by the EPGs. Because
national parties can make credible deselection threats, they are therefore in a
strong position to discipline their MEPs to toe the EPG line (Hix, Noury and
Roland, 2007, 146). The critical question is whether in times of conflict between
these two principals MEPs follow their EPG or national party leaders. The over-
whelming answer to this question is that it is to national parties, and not EPGs,
that MEPs are ultimately responsive (Hix, 2002, 2004; Hix, Noury and Roland,
2007; Faas, 2003; Ringe, 2010). As the national parties within an EPG become
more ideologically polarised, they are therefore less willing and able to whip their
MEPs to follow a common EPG line and thus the voting cohesion of the EPG
declines (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007, 132-146).
If national parties possess the most powerful disciplinary resources, which actors
have the ability to control the agenda in the EP? As there has never been a single
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majority party in the parliament, agenda powers are widely dispersed, with key
positions allocated to the EPGs according to a strict proportionality rule. No
single party, therefore, can ‘cartelize’ agenda-setting offices in the EP (Cox and
McCubbins, 2005). Additionally, for legislative issues, the gatekeeping right of
initiative resides with the European Commission, with the parliament only able
to initiate non-legislative resolutions. More generally, previous studies suggest
that there are few formal negative agenda-setting powers available to the EPG
leaders (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007, 105-131).
However, as the EP has grown in legislative stature, the EPGs have reformed
the internal rules of the Parliament to their own benefit by centralising institu-
tional power structures (Kreppel, 2002; Whitaker, 2011). These reforms helped
to increase the power of the EPGs relative to the national parties, and “the most
stunning example of this was the creation of the Conference of Presidents.” (Krep-
pel, 2002, 102) The Conference is a political body responsible for the organisation
of parliamentary business, and it is attended by the President of the Parliament,
and the leaders of the EPGs. The EPG leaders are therefore afforded special in-
stitutional powers that are not available to other actors. Notably, the Conference
is not attended by national party leaders in the Parliament, and has thus come
to be used as an instrument of centralised control for the EPGs (Kreppel, 2002,
210).9
The EP’s rules of procedure make clear that the Conference “shall take decisions
on the organisation of Parliament’s work and matters of legislative planning” and
9 Similar business-organising bodies are found in other legislative settings, such as the College
of Leaders in the Brazilian Câmera dos Deputados, the Council of Elders in the German Bun-
destag, and the Chamber Directorate in the Argentine House of Representatives. Each of these
institutions has important agenda-setting powers, and share many procedural similarities to the
Conference (Neto, Cox and McCubbins, 2003; Chandler, Cox and McCubbins, 2006; Calvo and
Sagarzazu, 2011).
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that it “shall draw up the draft agenda of Parliament’s part sessions.” (European
Parliament, 2011, Rule 25) In practice, at the beginning of every part-session,
the Conference is presented with a draft agenda, which is amended before being
finalised. Crucially, amendments may remove items from the agenda, prevent-
ing debates and votes on these issues from occurring on the plenary floor. Once
approved, a final draft agenda is distributed to members of the Parliament. By
removing legislation from the draft agenda, members of the Conference of Presi-
dents can effectively prevent legislative proposals from progressing. The Confer-
ence therefore has the opportunity, at critical junctures in the legislative process,
to control the passage of legislation. With respect to the argument that “plenary
time is the sine qua non of legislation” (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, 10), these
junctures clearly represent important negative agenda-setting opportunities for
EPG leaders in the Parliament. Accordingly, while national party leaders control
the main disciplining powers in the EP, it is EPG leaders who, under certain con-
ditions, make agenda-setting decisions. What is crucial, then, is to determine who
is able to exercise the negative agenda-setting powers that are held collectively by
the Conference of Presidents.
Decision making in the Conference strives for unanimity, but can recourse to
simple majority voting, with each group leader’s vote being weighted according
to the size of that party in the Parliament.10 As the rules of procedure for the
parliament make clear, “where a consensus cannot be reached, the matter shall
be put to a vote subject to a weighting based on the number of Members in each
political group.” (European Parliament, 2011, Rule 24). Agenda-setting decisions
in the EP are therefore not made by a majority party with special institutional
privileges, but rather in a decision-making game in the Conference. How, then,
10The President of the Parliament presides over meetings, but does not vote.
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are we to understand who is able to make blocking decisions?
In a unidimensional policy space, it is the median voter who is pivotal in
decision-making under majority-rule (Black, 1948). The critical feature of decision-
making in the Conference is that, although decisions are made by simple majority
vote, party leaders are able to vote as if their parties were completely united.
Therefore, within the Conference, it is the leader of the median EPG who is deci-
sive in agenda-setting decisions. Only the party that controls the median position
in the Conference can prevent legislation from coming to the floor. Any individual
party, or coalition of parties, to either the right or the left of the median party will
have fewer than half the seats in the Parliament – and thus votes in the Confer-
ence – and so the median party is a necessary member in any blocking coalition.
Therefore, when the leader of the median party is concerned that a proposal will
divide her party, she can use her position in the Conference and vote with the
entire weight of her party group in order to block the proposal.
In conjunction with the analyses in the previous section, this suggests a predic-
tion about the effect of changes to the ideological unity of the median party in the
Conference of Presidents. As national parties within an EPG become less united
ideologically, the EPG is more likely to face legislative proposals that threaten
to divide its members. Additionally, the discipline mechanism that drives party
cohesion also declines as national party preferences become more diffuse because
national parties are less willing to whip their MEPs to follow a common EPG line.
Because EPG leaders have strong incentives to maintain cohesion, as preferences
polarise and discipline declines we expect parties with agenda-setting powers to
block a larger number of legislative proposals.
Hypothesis 1 The greater the ideological polarisation of the median EPG on a
61
given proposal, the greater the probability that the proposal will be blocked by the
Conference of Presidents.
This has a direct corollary for party cohesion on the parliament floor. When
there is greater ideological polarisation among national parties within an EPG,
the national party leaders will be less willing to discipline their members to follow
a common group line, and the cohesion of the EPG will decline (Hix, Noury and
Roland, 2007, 132-146). However, if the median EPG is able to remove items
from the agenda on which it is particularly polarised, the effect of polarisation
on voting cohesion will be less pronounced for EPGs when they hold the median
position in the Conference of Presidents than when they do not. That is, we should
expect that if the party group leaders are indeed strategically manipulating the
floor agenda, then this behaviour should also be detectable by examining the
relationship between polarisation and EPG cohesion in roll-call votes.
Hypothesis 2 While the cohesion of an EPG will decline as intra-party prefer-
ences become more diffuse, this relationship will be weaker for votes that address
dimensions on which the EPG holds the median position in the Conference of
Presidents.
Before progressing, it is also important to clarify expectations for the relation-
ship between party polarisation and cohesion in the absence of agenda control. If
we expect the cohesion of median parties to be less sensitive to intra-party po-
larisation even when these parties are unable to block proposals, then empirical
evidence in favour of hypothesis 2 would not necessarily identify the effects of
agenda control on EPG cohesion. In appendix section A.2 I provide a simple
analysis of the relationship between party position, party polarisation, and voting
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cohesion in a context in which no actor can block proposals from being considered
on the plenary floor. The analysis reveals that, in the absence of agenda control,
the cohesion of median parties will in fact be more sensitive to increases in ide-
ological polarisation than non-centrist parties. The intuition behind the analysis
is straightforward: when a party is median, increases in the polarisation of its
members results in many instances when members of the party find themselves
on opposite sides of an issue. When a party is relatively extreme, polarisation
is less consequential because the members of the party are sufficiently far from
the point separating ‘yeas’ from ‘nays’ on roll-call votes that they will vote to-
gether despite their relative ideological differences. Consequently, hypothesis 2
suggests a relationship between intra-party polarisation and cohesion in the Eu-
ropean Parliament that is directly opposed to the predictions of a model without
agenda control.
Taken together, the hypotheses here suggest two distinct observable implica-
tions of the argument that EPG leaders use their strategic control over the plenary
agenda to block legislative proposals that threaten to divide their members. In
the next sections I introduce new data and methods to test these hypotheses.
Data and methodology
Empirically evaluating partisan agenda-setting behaviour is non-trivial, and much
existing work relies on the analysis of roll-call votes to make inferences about the
agenda-setting actions of party elites.11 While I present a roll-call analysis below,
simply documenting an association between agenda-control and party cohesion
requires a large inferential leap that the latter is a product of the former. As Kre-
11See, for example, Cox and McCubbins (2005); Gailmard and Jenkins (2007); Anzia and
Jackman (2013); Robinson (2015); Jenkins and Monroe (2015). See Clinton (2012) for a review.
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hbiel (2006, 22) suggests, “the corresponding recommendation is not to abandon
roll-call analysis but rather to…supplement it with other kinds of data whenever
possible.” I therefore introduce a new metric for measuring the agenda-setting be-
haviour of EPG leaders in the Conference which I use to examine the conditions
under which leaders prevent proposals from reaching the plenary floor.
Measuring negative agenda control
The task of directly observing instances of legislative blocking seems especially
daunting when, by definition, negative agenda setting entails the absence of is-
sues, rather than their presence. I make progress by collecting a new dataset which
focuses on one key agenda-setting juncture in the EP’s legislative process where
EPG leaders are able to prevent proposals from reaching the plenary agenda. As
noted above, at each monthly meeting of the Conference, party group leaders are
presented with a draft agenda which they are able to modify before it is presented
to the parliament as a final-draft agenda. To determine whether the Conference
of Presidents blocked a proposal, I compared draft agendas to final-draft agendas
and recorded which proposals were removed.12 The unit of analysis is therefore
proposals that feature on the draft agendas presented to the Conference, and the
dependent variable, Blocked, is equal to one if a proposal was blocked (i.e. ap-
peared on the draft agenda for one part-session but was absent from the final-draft
agenda), and zero otherwise. Systematically comparing these agendas therefore
isolates the role played by EPG leaders in the process of agenda setting in the
parliament.
The sample consists of all proposals presented to the Conference of Presidents
12Unfortunately, while the minutes of each meeting of the Conference are publicly available,
they do not systematically document the removal of legislative reports from the final-draft
agenda.
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from September 2004 to April 2014: a total of 4,300 observations. I wrote an auto-
mated routine in the R programming language (R Core Team, 2015) to download
and process all draft and final-draft agendas in the study period from the Euro-
pean Parliament website. Each proposal is assigned a unique identifier for a given
part-session which remains constant between the draft and final-draft agendas for
that session, meaning that if the name of a proposal changes between the two
agendas, it is still possible to determine whether it has been removed. I searched
each draft and final-draft agenda pair for potential proposals, and recorded which
proposals were blocked by the Conference. This data constitutes a comprehensive
record of the parliamentary proposals considered by the Conference, and provides
a unique opportunity to observe agenda-setting behaviour directly.
The central claim is that this metric captures purposive negative agenda-setting
behaviour by party leaders. Before turning to the main analysis, I validate this
measure by showing that it reflects intuitive expectations about blocking be-
haviour. I demonstrate (a) that the measure captures patterns of blocking which
reflect the institutional constraints that party leaders face under different legisla-
tive procedures; and (b) that party leaders block reports more often when they
have less power to shape the legislative agenda at earlier stages in the policymak-
ing process.
First, while the Conference is able to block legislation indefinitely during the
first reading stage of the ordinary legislative (co-decision) procedure, at second
reading it is subject to externally-defined time limits.13 If the metric employed
here is valid, it should capture the institutional difference in agenda-setting powers
across first and second readings. Figure 2.2 shows the proportion of blocked
13Once the Council has stated its common position at second reading, the Parliament has
three months in which to approve, reject, or amend the proposal. (European Union, 2012).
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Figure 2.2: Proportion of proposals blocked, by legislative procedure
Note: The figure shows the proportion of proposals in the sample that were
blocked by the Conference of Presidents. The horizontal dashed line gives the
overall sample mean, and the bars give the mean for each legislative procedure.
proposals by legislative procedure, and the institutional difference shows up very
clearly: while 24% of first reading co-decision proposals (COD I) are blocked by
the Conference, the equivalent figure for second-reading reports (COD II) is just
10% (a significant difference: p < 0:001). In addition to validating the blocking
measure, this difference is also of substantive interest: when party leaders in the
Conference have institutional prerogatives to set the plenary agenda, they make
use of these powers.
We might also expect EPG leaders to block legislation less often when their
ability to shape the agenda in other stages of the legislative process is greater.
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For example, under the own-initiative (INI) procedure, party leaders have veto
power at earlier stages of the legislative process. INI proposals must be approved
by the Conference prior to being drafted. Accordingly, party group leaders should
be expected to block divisive proposals at the initial approval stage, and long
before they reach the agenda-setting stage considered here. Figure 2.2 provides
evidence of such strategic behaviour: own-initiative reports are blocked in just 10%
of cases observed in the data – a significant difference from the mean proportion
of reports blocked by the Conference (p < 0:001). Overall, these results suggest
that the blocking measure captures salient patterns of behaviour in the EP.
A potential objection is that while I identify whether a proposal was removed
from the draft agenda or not, this measure does not capture whether the proposal
reappears on later draft agendas, nor the length of time before any such reappear-
ance occurs. As argued above, it is not necessary for a party leader to prevent
the consideration of a proposal indefinitely to reap the benefits of agenda-setting
power. However, it is clear that by focussing on individual part-sessions, we are
missing potentially valuable information. A more nuanced analysis would be to
directly model the duration for which a proposal is delayed by the Conference
of Presidents.14 Unfortunately, such an analysis is not possible with this data.
While it is possible to accurately identify proposals that are removed before the
presentation of a final-draft agenda of a given part-session, the identifying pro-
posal numbers are not used consistently across different sessions, and the names
of the reports often change from one agenda to the next. This makes it very
difficult to tell whether a report has resurfaced at a later point in time. I proceed
by analysing the simple binary choice (Blocked, Not Blocked) taken by the Con-
ference in a given session, but it is important to acknowledge this limitation when
14 Haber (2015) provides such an analysis in the UK House of Commons, for example.
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drawing conclusions from the findings below.
Measuring party polarisation
The theoretical analysis indicated that as the median (agenda-setting) party group
becomes more polarised, the party leader will have incentives to block a greater
number of legislative proposals. Measuring agenda-setter polarisation requires,
first, identifying the median EPG for each proposal, and second, measuring the
internal ideological polarisation of that group on that proposal. I draw from the
data in McElroy and Benoit (2007, 2010, 2011), which provides expert survey
placement of both national parties and EPGs across a number of distinct policy
dimensions.15 I identify the median party group by taking the median of the
expert survey scores on each dimension, weighted by the number of MEPs in
each group.16 The polarisation of the median group is calculated by taking the
MEP-weighted standard deviation of the expert survey scores for national parties
within the median EPG on each policy dimension. Higher standard deviation
scores imply that the national parties within an EPG are more polarised in the
sense given in the theoretical section.
A central measurement issue in this analysis is mapping the proposals to the
expert survey dimensions used for measuring party group positions. As there
are nearly 4000 unique proposals in the data, manual categorisation is unfeasible,
and would regardless require a great deal of ad hoc judgement. A simple approach
commonly used in the existing literature is to assign proposals to the expert sur-
15As with any measure of party positions, expert surveys are subject to potential measurement
error. However, research has shown that of the available options, expert surveys tend to produce
accurate data for party positioning, and consistently outperform the most common alternative
– party manifesto data (Marks et al., 2007).
16Table A.2 gives the identity of the median group on each dimension in EP6 and EP7.
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vey dimensions according to the committee to which the proposal pertains (e.g.
Klüver and Spoon, 2013). However, it is often unclear how best to assign com-
mittees to dimensions. For example, should proposals from the Internal Market
and Consumer Protection Committee be assigned to the ‘Economic’ dimension,
or the ‘Deregulation’ dimension? Similarly, such an approach would exclude the
possibility that proposals may pertain to a number of policy dimensions simulta-
neously. For instance, should a proposal for increased taxation of carbon-dioxide
emitting motor vehicles17 count as an economic issue, or an environmental one?
On such a proposal, we might expect the polarisation of the median group on both
of these dimensions to influence the probability that the proposal is blocked by
the Conference.
To overcome this problem, I develop a probabilistic classification of proposals to
expert survey dimensions using a set of legislative summaries which describe the
content, purpose, and background of each legislative proposal.18 I use the textual
information in the legislative summaries to assign proposals to each expert survey
dimension based on the words the parliamentarians use themselves to describe the
content of the proposals. This approach has two main benefits. First, by making
use of the text data, I am able to match proposals to expert survey dimensions in
a way that closely mirrors intuitive understandings of the ex ante defined meaning
of those dimensions. Second, because the classification is probabilistic, this allows
for the possibility that proposals can address multiple issue areas simultaneously.
A simple example helps to clarify the intuition. Consider a proposal j that
is presented to the Conference for approval. Imagine that 75% of proposal j is
17“Proposal for a Council Directive on Passanger Car Related Taxes” (Commission, 2005)
18These summaries were collected from the European Parliament website – www.europa.eu –
and an example text is given in appendix figure A.2.
69
concerned with economic issues, but 25% concerned with environmental issues.
If this is the case, it is not only the polarisation of the agenda-setting EPG on
economic issues, but also of the agenda-setter on environmental issues that will
determine whether proposal j is blocked by the Conference. As the identity and
polarisation of the agenda-setting party group varies across policy dimensions, it
is important to take account of our uncertainty as to which policy dimension such
a proposal truly pertains. For example, if the median economic EPG is highly
polarised, but the median environmental EPG has a low level of polarisation,
then simply assigning j to the economic dimension will lead to an upward bias
in our estimate of the effect of party polarisation on blocking in the Conference.
I therefore use the legislative summaries to estimate the probability that each
proposal pertains to each expert survey dimension, and use these probabilities
to calculate a weighted polarisation score for the median party group(s) on each
proposal.
The classification proceeds as follows.19 First, I select a subset of proposals
for each expert survey dimension which relate clearly to the dimension at hand.
I define a short dictionary of words for each policy dimension, and search each
of the legislative proposals for these words.20 Each proposal is given a score for
each dimension which is simply the sum of the number of times a word from the
relevant dictionary is found in each proposal. I take the proposals with the highest
scores (those at or above the 97th percentile) for each dimension, and exclude any
texts assigned to multiple dimensions. The resulting mutually-exclusive subsets
19The classification approach is similar to Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003), though I use a penalised
multinomial model rather than a support vector machine for classification. The multinomial
model has the advantage of producing the predicted probability that each proposal is associated
with each of the expert survey dimensions in the data.
20The dictionaries for each dimension are presented in table A.3 in the appendix.
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include between 80 and 100 texts for each of the 7 policy dimensions, and they
form the training set in what follows.
I begin by converting the raw summary texts into a set of features that can be
used to predict dimension assignment. I follow common practice by stemming,21
removing ‘stop words’,22 and dropping very infrequently appearing words. I then
construct a document-word matrix, which records the number of times each of the
remaining 3634 unique words in the corpus occurs in each summary, and apply
a series of unsupervised topic models to the document-word matrix in order to
construct predictive features for classification of the proposal texts.23 I use the
Correlated Topic Model (Blei and Lafferty, 2006) which assumes that the relative
frequency with which terms co-occur within different documents gives information
about the topics that feature in those documents.24 The two main inputs into the
model are a user-specified number of topics, T , and the document-word matrix
for the corpus of documents.
The model returns a D x T matrix of topic proportions – denoted  – that
describe the fraction of each legislative summary d 2 f1; 2; :::; Dg that is from
each topic t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg. A common problem with topic models is that it is
not clear a priori how many topics the researcher should estimate, and existing
solutions (e.g. Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003)) aim to select the model that best
predicts textual data out of sample. In this case, by contrast, I am interested in
21Words such as ‘school’, ‘schools’ and ‘schooling’ all become ‘school’.
22Such as ‘and’, ‘if’, ‘the’, ‘but’ and ‘of’.
23An alternative approach would be to train a model on the word-frequency matrix directly,
but with over 3000 unique words, this would be computationally burdensome. Furthermore,
Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003) show that using a topic model to reduce dimensionality can, in fact,
lead to greater classification performance than relying on the raw text counts alone.
24I implement the model as the null model for the Structural Topic Model (Roberts et al.,
2014). The CTM is similar to Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), but allows for a covariance
structure between topics, and has been shown to have greater predictive accuracy than LDA
(Blei and Lafferty, 2006).
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predicting the dimension classification described above. Because the number of
topics that will do this best is unclear, I estimate K topic models for all integer
topic counts from 20 to 120. This results in 101 separate k matrices, with typical
elements td(k): the proportion of proposal-text d in topic t from topic-model k.
These matrices therefore provide summaries of the substantive content of each
proposal, and can be used to predict the expert survey dimensions that each
proposal addresses.
I then use the k matrices as the model matrix25 for a series of penalised multi-
nomial regressions predicting the discrete dimension classification in the training
set, repeating the exercise K times – once per topic model. These models there-
fore predict the dimension to which a given text pertains as a function of the
topic proportions. I then calculate the predicted probability that each legislative
summary – in both the training and test sets – is associated with each of the 7
expert survey dimensions. The intuition here is that by building the model with
the labeled training data, we are able to learn the topics (clusters of words) that
are most associated with each dimension. We then project the topics of the test
and training data onto the estimated multinomial model to recover the probability
that each proposal is associated with each dimension.
As overfitting is a common problem in multinomial logistic regression estima-
tion, and as the number of topics in these models is large as K increases, I use
penalised models in this second stage.26 A nested K-fold cross-validation proce-
dure is used to select the best fitting model: the inner-loop of the cross validation
is used to select the appropriate value of  within each of the penalised models,
25Because the topic proportions for each legislative summary (d(k)) sum to one, I could
exclude one of the topics or the intercept term. The two approaches give identical predicted
probabilities, and I choose to exclude the intercept term.
26As implemented using the glmnet package in R (Friedman, Hastie and Tibshirani, 2010).
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and the outer-loop is used to select between the K penalised models. The outer-
loop indicates that the 94-topic model provides the lowest misclassification rate
in the cross-validation procedure.27 In the analysis I present basic results from
all K topic models, and give a more detailed discussion of the estimates from the
94-topic model.
Before turning to the model specification and results, I validate the performance
of the classification. First, table A.4 in the appendix presents the titles of the leg-
islative proposals for which the (94-topic) multinomial model gives the highest
predicted probabilities for each dimension. Across all 7 policy dimensions, the
results are highly consistent with intuitive expectations. For the ‘Immigration’
dimension, for example, the proposals with the highest probability are concerned
with visa waiver schemes and the Schengen Borders Code. Similarly, the ‘Secu-
rity’ dimension’s top proposals pertain to the situation in Afghanistan, the Eu-
ropean Security Strategy, and the anti-missile shield. The classifier also appears
to discriminate successfully between the related ‘Deregulation’ and ‘Economics’
dimensions: the former is populated mostly by proposals relating to the regulation
of products in the single market, while proposals assigned to the latter deal with
broader economic issues such as the Eurozone, trade, and economic governance.
Second, figure 2.3 depicts the proportion of proposals from each parliamentary
committee that are assigned to each of the expert survey dimensions.28 The blue
boxes are scaled such that when 100% of proposals from a given committee are
allocated to a given dimension, the square has an area of 1, and will fill the dashed
box that contains it. Accordingly, larger squares correspond to a higher propor-
27Figure A.3 in the appendix depicts the model fit statistics for all K topic models.
28For clarity, here I use a discrete classification and assign a proposal to the dimension on
which it has the highest probability from the penalised model.
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Figure 2.3: Proposal committee of origin by expert survey dimension
Note: The plot shows the proportion of proposals from each parliamentary com-
mittee (x-axis) that are categorised to each of the expert survey issue dimensions
(y-axis) in the text classification procedure. Larger squares correspond to a higher
proportion of proposals from a given committee being categorised to a given di-
mension
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tion of proposals from a given committee being categorised to a given dimension.
Again, the results are reassuring: proposals from committees such as the environ-
ment (ENVI) and fisheries (PECH) are assigned to the ‘Environment’ dimension,
proposals on women’s affairs (FEMM) and culture (CULT) are allocated almost
exclusively to the ‘Social’ dimension, and the ‘Security’ dimension is mostly pop-
ulated by proposals deriving from the committee on foreign affairs (AFET). The
figure also makes clear a key advantage of the method: different proposals from
the same committee can be allocated to more than one expert survey dimension.
For example, proposals from the ECON committee are roughly equally divided
between the ‘Economic’ and ‘Deregulation’ dimensions. Overall, these checks
suggest that the classification procedure is successfully assigning proposals to the
relevant expert survey dimensions.
With these classifications in hand, I use the predicted classification probabilities
to calculate the weighted polarisation of the median EPG on each proposal. For
each proposal, I multiply the polarisation of the agenda-setting EPG on each
dimension by the probability that each dimension features in the proposal. Taking
the sum of these values gives me the dimension-weighted polarisation score for
the proposal. For example, if a proposal has a 0.75 probability of being classified
as economic, and a 0.25 probability of being environmental, with median EPG
polarisation scores of 3 and 2 respectively, the weighted median polarisation score
for that proposal would be :753+:252 = 2:75. Repeating this calculation for all
proposals in the data set gives a continuous variable – Agenda-Setter Polarisation
– that I use in the main analysis.29
29Results from an alternative approach in which I simply assign a proposal to the dimension
for which is has the highest predicted probability are given in appendix figure A.4 and the results
from the cross-validation-selected model are given in table A.5.
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Hypothesis 1 suggests that the Conference of Presidents will block legislation
more often when the agenda-setting party group on a proposal is less ideologically
united. As the outcome variable, Blocked, is binary, to investigate this hypothesis
I estimate logistic regression models of the form:
logit(Yj(a)) = 1AgendaSetterPolarisationj +X 0j + c + p + j(a) (2.1)
where Yj(a) is the binary response variable indicating whether proposal j (on
agenda a) is blocked or not, and j(a) is an idiosyncratic error term. 1 is the
quantity of interest, identifying the association between the ideological polarisa-
tion of the median party group and the probability of blocking in the Conference
of Presidents.
In order to account for other potential factors that may influence the proba-
bility of blocking, I include a matrix of covariates, X 0j. First, as emphasised in
the theoretical analysis, the distance between the agenda-setting party and the
floor median should also predict blocking behaviour.30 I therefore control for the
absolute distance between the median EPG and the median national party on
each dimension using the expert survey data described above. I also control for
the polarisation of the parliament as a whole on each dimension, as well as for
the average ‘salience’ of each policy dimension.31 As depicted in figure 2.2, the
agenda-setting power of EPG leaders appears to vary by legislative procedure,
and thus I control for the procedure of each proposal.
30This prediction relates to the distance between x2 and fm in figure 2.1.
31These measures are also derived from the expert survey data: the polarisation of the par-
liament is the MEP-weighted standard deviation of the positions of all the national parties on
a given dimension, and salience is the MEP-weighted mean of the salience of a dimension to all
parties. As with the measurement of the Agenda-Setter Polarisation variable, for each of these
expert survey measures, the score for each proposal is the sum of the scores for each dimension,
weighted by the probability that the dimension is relevant to that proposal.
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Another concern is that that some parties may simply be more obstreperous
than others, regardless of their level of internal polarisation. If some party groups
block legislation often, and are marked by unusually high levels of polarisation,
then this will confound the main effect of interest. To overcome this problem, I also
include fixed-effects (p) for the identity of the party group that holds the median
position on the dimension for which a given proposal has the highest probability
of association. As some policy areas may be more prone to delay than others, I
also include fixed-effects (c) for the committee responsible for each proposal in
some models.
Plenary time is a scarce resource (Cox and McCubbins, 2011), and blocking may
occur if the agenda is more constricted at certain times due to external factors. To
account for this possibility, I include a control variable for the number of proposals
submitted to a given draft agenda, under the assumption that larger numbers of
proposals will increase the probability of blocking. I also control for the number
of days between the date of the draft agenda and the end of the parliamentary
session, with the expectation that the closer the parliament is to the recess, the
more leaders will try to expedite the legislative process. Finally, in order to
account for the potential non-independence of proposals within a draft agenda, in
all models I use cluster-robust standard errors, clustering on the draft-agenda.
Establishing credible causal inferences from observational data such as those
considered here is notoriously difficult. This paper makes progress by exploiting a
new form of legislative blocking data which allows us to directly observe which bills
are removed from the agenda, and by employing a measurement strategy that ties
legislative proposals to the positions of parliamentary actors in a more systematic
fashion than has been possible previously. These methodological innovations help
to move the analysis closer to important theoretical arguments regarding negative
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agenda control, but they do not provide a solution to the more ubiquitous problem
of identifying causal effects from non-experimental data. Accordingly, I do not
claim that the results presented here are causally identified, as there are surely
very many reasons why legislative proposals are blocked by the Conference of
Presidents. However, the analyses presented below – which control for a large
range of possible alternative explanations – can help to establish whether the
available evidence is broadly consistent with the claims made in the theoretical
section above.
Results
Figure 2.4 plots the 1 coefficients from equation 2.1 that result from the classi-
fication procedure for each of the K topic models, along with the cluster-robust
confidence intervals. The top panel of the figure presents results from a baseline
bivariate logistic model, and the bottom panel depicts the estimates from the full
model in equation 2.1. Estimates presented in black represent cases where the rela-
tionship between agenda-setter polarisation and blocking is significant (p < 0:05),
and insignificant relationships are coloured in grey. The points and lines in red
indicate the estimate from the 94-topic model preferred by the cross-validation
procedure. In general, in both the baseline and the full models, the coefficient is
positive and sizeable in magnitude. Focussing on the full model, the estimated
coefficient is positive in all models and the estimates are also, for a large part,
statistically significant. Notably, the estimates from the model selected by cross-
validation are close to the centre of the distribution of coefficients in terms of
magnitude, and are statistically significant in both the baseline model and the
full model.
Table 2.1 presents the detailed results from the 94-topic model selected by
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Figure 2.4: 1 estimates by topic model
Note: The plot shows the 1 coefficient – representing the effect of Agenda-Setter
Polarisation on the probability of blocking – for each of theK topic models. Thick
confidence intervals are calculated from traditional standard errors, and thin lines
represent those from cluster-robust errors. The top panel gives the results of the
baseline models (model 1 in the regression tables), and the bottom panel gives
the estimated coefficients from the full models with fixed-effects and covariates
(model 4). The cross-validation selected model (table 2.1) is presented in red.
79
cross-validation.32 Model 1 provides naive estimates of the effect of agenda-setter
polarisation on legislative blocking by the Conference of Presidents. Model 2 in-
cludes covariates, and fixed-effects for the median party group, and for committee
are included in models 3 and 4 respectively.
Table 2.1: Median party group polarisation and legislative blocking
Blocked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agenda-Setter Polarisation 0.527 0.579 0.766 0.716
(0.123) (0.200) (0.238) (0.281)
Constant  2.699  1.588 0.736  1.767
(0.282) (1.923) (2.396) (3.184)
Covariates  X X X
Median Group FEs   X X
Committee FEs    X
Observations 4,300 4,300 4,300 4,300
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,042.809 3,946.850 3,933.339 3,915.512
Note: Logistic regressions with cluster robust standard errors (clustered by draft
agenda) shown in parentheses. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, across all specifications, the esti-
mated effect of Agenda-Setter Polarisation on legislative blocking is positive, and
is significantly different from zero. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, the
main coefficient from model 4 – the most conservative model – indicates that in-
creasing the polarisation of the agenda-setting group by one unit increases the
odds of a proposal on that dimension being blocked by approximately 48%. An
increase of one standard deviation from the mean level of polarisation is associated
with an increase of 7 percentage points in the probability of blocking. In sum,
32Estimates for covariates are presented in appendix table A.6.
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these findings therefore support the theory that parties screen out potentially
divisive legislation when they hold agenda-setting power.
Voting cohesion
The theoretical analysis suggests that if leaders use negative agenda control to
block legislation on which they are divided, median EPGs in the Conference will
be able to maintain cohesion in spite of increasing polarisation of their constituent
national parties (hypothesis 2). I therefore assess the relationship between polari-
sation and party group cohesion by examining all roll-call votes for the 6th and 7th
European Parliament from 2004 to 2014. The data is from www.votewatch.eu,
a public website which records all European Parliament roll-call votes. For each
of the 13,158 votes in the sample, I calculate a cohesion score for each EPG on
that vote, resulting in a total of 95,443 vote-party observations. I use the cohesion
measure introduced in Desposato (2005), which corrects for potential ‘small party
bias’ and has an intuitive interpretation as the probability that two randomly-
selected members of party p vote together on bill j. When a party is completely
united, then the probability that two randomly-selected members vote together is
equal to one. When a party is completely divided, the measure is equal to zero.33
The agenda-setting EPG on each dimension is identified in the manner dis-
cussed above, and I use the same text-based classification procedure used in the
previous analysis to calculate the probability that each vote addresses each policy
dimension.34 Accordingly, I construct a continuous measure which captures the
33Appendix table A.7 replicates the analysis for another commonly used measure of voting
cohesion: the ‘agreement index’ used by Hix et al (2007). Reassuringly, the results using this
alternative measure are statistically and substantively very similar.
34As each vote is associated with one of the texts presented to the Conference, I use the same
k probability matrices from each of the topic models to measure the dimensions associated with
each vote.
81
agenda-setting power of each party group on each vote (AgendaSettingpj). The
intuition is that if a given EPG holds the median position on all the dimensions
that are relevant to a given vote, then it will have an agenda-setting score of one.
If a group does not hold the median position on any of the expert survey dimen-
sions that are at play in a given vote, then its agenda-setting score will be zero.
It is also possible that, as a vote may address multiple policy dimensions, more
than one party group will hold at least some agenda-setting power. For example,
for a vote made up of 75% economic issues, and 25% environmental issues, where
the EPP is median on the economic dimension and ALDE is median on the en-
vironmental dimension, their agenda-setting scores for that vote will be 0:75 and
0:25 respectively.
I measure the internal polarisation of each EPG on each vote (Polarisationpj)
by calculating the MEP-weighted standard deviation of the expert survey scores
for national parties within each group. These scores are then multiplied by the
dimension classification probabilities of each vote, and then summed to produce a
continuous measure of polarisation for each group on each vote. Recall that in the
absence of agenda control, parties at the centre of the policy space will be most
affected by increases in ideological polarisation of their constituent members.35
However, if the leader of an EPG is able to control the plenary agenda, they will
be able to block bills on which their constituent national parties are most divided,
and thus the effects of polarisation on cohesion will be lower for the agenda-setting
party group.
35See hypothesis 5 in section A.2 of the appendix.
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To assess the cohesion hypotheses I estimate linear models of the following form:
Cpj =  + 1AgendaSetterpj + 2Polarisationpj
+3AgendaSetterpj  Polarisationpj + p + c +X 0j+ pj (2.2)
2 identifies the effect of polarisation on cohesion for EPGs without agenda-
setting power. The equivalent effect for agenda-setting party groups is given
by the sum of 2 and 3. In the absence of agenda-control, we would expect
2 + 3 < 2 < 0, as when leaders are unable to block proposals coming to the
floor, it is the median group (the agenda-setter) who is most at risk of division.
Thus, a negative value of 3 would be consistent with a model in which the median
party group is unable to control the agenda, while a positive value would provide
evidence for the agenda-setting story told above.
I include a number of control variables to reduce the possibility of omitted
variable bias. First, the further an EPG is from the median position on the
parliament floor, the less likely it is to be divided on roll-call votes (Krehbiel
(2006); see also hypothesis 3 in section A.2 of the appendix). I therefore control
for the distance between each party group and the floor median position on each
vote. Second, in line with previous research (Klüver and Spoon, 2013) I include
a variable which measures the salience of a vote to a given group. Both the
salience measure and distance measures are calculated at the party-vote level using
the same expert survey data as for the previous analysis. I construct vote-level
measures for each EPG by multiplying the expert survey scores by the probability
that a given vote pertains to each dimension, and then summing these weighted
scores. Additionally, as Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) find that cohesion is higher
amongst larger EPGs, I control for the number of MEPs that are members of an
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EPG in each parliamentary term. I also control for the legislative procedure under
which the vote takes place, and for whether a vote is the final vote on a given
proposal (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). I also control for the overall margin of
victory in a given vote, with the expectation that parties will be more cohesive
when the parliament is more united as a whole on a given issue.
Finally, in some specifications I include two sets of fixed-effects. First, to ac-
count for the possibility that cohesion is higher on average in some policy areas
than others, I include fixed-effects for the policy area (as recorded in the roll-
call files) of each vote (c). Second, I also include party group fixed-effects (p).
The inclusion of the latter fixed-effects is particularly important, as it ensures
that the estimates of the main parameters of interest are identified solely through
within-EPG variation in agenda-setting power and party polarisation. As the
agenda-setting EPGs are also the largest parties in the parliament, it is possible
that omitting these effects would confound the main estimates: there may be
other reasons that these groups are less affected by internal polarisation than the
smaller party groups. In all regressions I calculate cluster-robust standard errors,
clustering on the legislative proposal to which a vote pertains.36
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Figure 2.5: Estimated effect of polarisation on cohesion for agenda-setting and non-agenda-
setting party groups
Note: The panels depict the estimated effects of interest for each of the K topic
models. Significant effects are coloured black, and insignificant effects are coloured
grey. The red point represents the estimated effect for the 94-topic model preferred
by the cross-validation procedure. The top panel plots the interaction effect (3),
and the bottom panels give the estimated marginal effect of party polarisation on
voting cohesion for agenda-setting (2 + 3) and non-agenda-setting (2) party
groups.
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Results
Figure 2.5 plots three sets of coefficients for each of the topic models. The top
panel depicts the 3 interaction coefficient. Although there is significant variability
in the estimates of the interaction effect, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish
a clear pattern. The interaction effect is positive in 100 of the 101 topic models
and significant in 97 cases. This result is consistent with negative agenda-setting
by the leaders of the European party groups, and inconsistent with a model where
leaders are unable to control the agenda. The bottom left-panel depicts the 2
coefficient, which represents the effect of polarisation on cohesion for non-agenda-
setting party groups (Agenda-Setting = 0). The bottom right panel gives the sum
of 2 and 3, and indicates the effect of polarisation on cohesion for EPGs who
hold the agenda-setting position in the Conference of Presidents (Agenda-Setting
= 1). As is clear from the figure, for groups that hold the balance of power in the
Conference, the effect of polarisation on cohesion is considerably smaller than the
effect for non-agenda-setting groups. Thus, although polarisation reduces voting
cohesion for all party groups, this effect is significantly less for those groups who
are able to control the plenary agenda.
Table 2.2 presents details results for the 94-topic model. Model 1 gives the es-
timates for a baseline model including only the Agenda-Setting and Polarisation
variables, and their interaction. Model 2 introduces covariates, and fixed-effects
36Recorded roll-call votes in the European Parliament do not represent a random sample of
votes taken (Gabel and Carrubba, 2004; Carrubba et al., 2006) and may be subject to selection
bias (Hug, 2009). If groups call roll-calls on votes on which they are generally more cohesive,
the cohesion scores derived from such scores are likely to be upwardly biased. For this to affect
the analysis at hand, however, it would have to be the case that such strategic behaviour worked
differently for agenda-setting and non-agenda-setting party groups. Note that the analysis pre-
sented here attempts to model the effects of (a different form of) selection bias directly: here
we are interested in establishing whether the selection of proposals that reach the plenary floor
affects the cohesion rate of the agenda-setting party.
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Table 2.2: Agenda-setting, polarisation, and cohesion
Party group cohesion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agenda-Setting 0.047 0.069 0.013 0.049
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Polarization  0.074  0.058  0.061  0.067
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interaction 0.034 0.031 0.055 0.021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.993 0.793 0.740 0.835
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Covariates  X X X
Policy Area FEs   X X
EPG FEs    X
Observations 95,443 88,804 88,804 88,804
R2 0.131 0.129 0.142 0.236
Note: OLS regressions with cluster robust standard errors (clustered by legisla-
tive proposal) shown in parentheses. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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for policy area and party group are included in models 3 and 4 respectively. Across
all specifications the interaction effect is positive and statistically significant, im-
plying that the voting cohesion of agenda-setting party groups is less sensitive to
increases in polarisation than that of non-agenda-setting groups. Focussing on the
most conservative estimates (model 4), an increase of one standard deviation in
polarisation for non-agenda-setting EPGs is associated with a decrease in cohesion
of approximately 5.5 percentage points. By contrast, for agenda-setting groups,
increasing polarisation by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease
in cohesion of only 3.9 percentage points. Overall, these results suggest that the
effect of internal polarisation on voting cohesion is systematically different for
groups who are able to control the plenary agenda than it is for groups without
such control.
The evidence presented here suggests that the closer an EPG is to the political
centre, the less it will be affected by internal polarisation of its members. This
is directly contrary to what we would expect if these groups were unable to ex-
ercise negative agenda control. In the absence of agenda control, it is the parties
closest to the political centre that are likely to be most divided by increasing
party polarisation. That centrist groups are more resilient to party polarisation
than non-centrist groups suggests that agenda control plays an important role in
European Parliament politics.
Conclusion
In 2011, MEPs debated a proposal from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs
which concerned the electoral procedure by which MEPs are elected. Amongst
other suggestions, the proposal recommended the introduction of 25 new MEPs
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who would be elected in a pan-European constituency from lists drawn up by
the EPGs. The proposal was highly controversial, dividing the parliament largely
along pro-integration vs anti-integration lines. The proposal had been blocked
by the Conference of Presidents on four separate occasions before it was finally
discussed in parliament, only for Andrew Duff MEP – the rapporteur responsible
– to withdraw the proposal from consideration and to refer it back to committee
for “further informed and expedient consideration”. (Duff, 2011) While there was
disagreement between European Party Groups over the content of the proposal,
disagreement within the main agenda-setting EPGs was a significant factor behind
the extensive delay in the conference. As one MEP put it, “I would like to suggest
to Mr Duff that the reason the vote on his report has been postponed is that
his group [is] hopelessly split.” (Fox, 2011) The argument in this paper is that
such intra-party divisions may often lead to significant restrictions on the issues
considered by the legislature.
Party leaders who are faced with ideologically heterogeneous parties can nor-
mally whip their members to follow a common group line. However, when ‘carrot
and stick’ disciplinary mechanisms are unavailable, leaders may also manipulate
the agenda-setting process in order to avoid potentially divisive votes. In the
context of a simple spatial model, I argued that cohesion-motivated party leaders
must take account of the preferences of non-median party members when decid-
ing whether to pursue legislation. These party members therefore represent veto
players in the intra-party decision-making process. When the preferences of these
veto players diverge, and a party leader can control the agenda, the degree of
gridlock is likely to increase. Consequently, while polarisation of a party’s mem-
bers is likely to have pernicious effects on voting cohesion, negative agenda-setting
powers allow party leaders to mitigate these effects, and thereby help to maintain
89
high levels of cohesion in the face of ideologically heterogeneous legislators.
I evaluated these predictions in the context of the European Parliament, where
traditional forms of discipline are held by national parties, but agenda-setting
powers are controlled by the leaders of the transnational EPGs. The structure of
parliamentary resources in the EP therefore made it possible to isolate the effects
of agenda-control – something that has proved difficult in most national settings.
Empirical analysis of both roll-call and blocking data provided support for the
expectation that when the unity of a political party declines, party leaders block
legislation that threatens to divide their members, and that this has consequent
effects for the relationship between intra-party polarisation and voting cohesion
for agenda-setting parties.
These findings contribute to our understanding of the practice of party politics
in the EP. Contrary to previous findings (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007, 105-131),
the analysis revealed that the possession of negative agenda powers helps EPGs
to overcome internal divisions between their constituent national parties. This
suggests that, when equipped with the legislative tools to do so, EPG leaders are
able to control the voting behaviour of their MEPs even in the face of disagreement
between their national parties and the consequent declining efficacy of traditional
disciplining mechanisms. This has implications for the way in which we think
about representation in the European Parliament, and puts the EPGs in a more
central role than has previously been acknowledged.
In addition, the paper contributes to a literature which seeks to understand the
pace of decision-making in the legislative process in the EU as a whole. Existing
work suggests that inter-institutional divisions over policy between the Parlia-
ment, the Council, and the Commission can contribute significantly to the time it
takes for a policy proposal to be concluded (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2013; Toshkov
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and Rasmussen, 2012). The findings in this paper, by contrast, suggest that the
pace of the legislative process in the EU is also, at least in part, determined by
the degree of preference homogeneity of agenda-setting parties in the Parliament.
More generally, the model I describe provides insights into the relationship be-
tween internal party dynamics and legislative gridlock. The central insight of
canonical studies of gridlock is that polarisation between partisan actors decreases
the range of status quo points that are amenable to change (Tsebelis, 2002; Kre-
hbiel, 2010). By contrast, the analysis here emphasises that when party leaders
are concerned with maintaining party cohesion, it is polarisation within the party
that influences the scope of legislative action. In addition to providing theoretical
foundations for recent empirical findings (Bevan, John and Jennings, 2011; Haber,
2015), the model may also be useful for understanding the lack of legislative action
in other settings.
For example, successive UK governments have blocked or delayed various pro-
posals to reform the House of Lords. The traditional view of policy-making in
majoritarian systems such as the House of Commons is that the government is
able to efficiently implement its stated policies, with little or no obstruction from
other parties. However, my argument suggests that opposition from within the
governing party’s own ranks may contribute to the pace of policy change. This
view is supported by qualitative accounts of Lords reform (Russell, 2009).37 While
voting cohesion in Westminster systems is high, this does not necessarily imply
that government parties are unrestricted in terms of policy change, as cohesion
may be the outcome of strategic agenda control. In general, future work should
37For example, when describing the Wilson government’s failure to implement reform, Russell
argues that “Too radical for some, and too cautious for others, the bill generated so much
backbench dissent that it was ultimately abandoned.” (Russell, 2009, 124)
91
therefore consider the role of intra-party dynamics for understanding the pace of
the legislative process, and the outcomes it produces.
While the structure of politics in the European Parliament is useful for isolating
the effects of agenda control from those of traditional party discipline, this comes
at potential a cost in terms of generalisability. In particular, the findings in this
paper pertain to a legislature in which party group leaders have relatively weak
disciplinary powers with which they can cajole legislators into following a common
group line. However, the European Parliament is not the only legislature in which
party leaders have weak disciplinary powers. In particular, in many presidential
systems the key disciplinary mechanisms are not possessed by the legislative party
leadership (Carey, 2007). However, in many of these systems party leaders are
able to restrict the legislative agenda in a manner similar to that described here.
Accordingly, when the preferences of party members in presidential parties diverge,
we might also expect to see a concomitant increase in the degree of legislative
gridlock. In sum, when cohesion is valuable to party leaders, and when it is not
possible to pressure legislators to vote together, it may be better to forego the
passage of legislation rather than face damaging divisions on the issues at hand.
92
3
Never Let a Good Crisis Go to
Waste: Agenda Setting and
Legislative Voting in Response to
External Shocks
Abstract
When exogenous shocks make status quo policies less attractive, legislators be-
come more tolerant to proposed alternatives that are further from their ideal in
general political dimensions. This increases the discretion of legislative agenda-
setters, and allows them to pass policy that would have been impossible in the
absence of a crisis. We argue that this dynamic explains changes in voting pat-
terns of the European Parliament during the period of the financial crisis, given
control of the agenda-setting process by pro-integration actors. We observe voting
coalitions increasingly dividing legislators along the pro-anti integration dimen-
sion of disagreement, but only in policy areas related to the crisis. In line with
more qualitative assessments of the content of passed legislation, the implication
is that pro-integration actors were able to shift policy further towards integration
than they could have without the crisis.
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Crises are commonly assumed to be catalysts for political action,
opening “windows of opportunity” for dramatic and far reaching reform (Kingdon,
1995; Keeler, 1993; Cortell and Peterson, 1999). Similarly, crises can represent
“critical junctures” which are central to explanations of the punctuated dynamic
of institutional change (Thelen, 2004; Collier and Collier, 2002; Krasner, 1984;
Pierson, 2000; Peters, Pierre and King, 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Baum-
gartner and Jones, 2002). One way that crises can facilitate political action is
by weakening impediments that constrain political actors. When this happens,
certain actors are able to ‘make an opportunity out of a crisis’, and secure changes
that would have been impossible previously. However, beyond broad arguments
that impediments to political action are removed, we often lack detailed theory
of the effects that crises have on specific political decision-making processes. Fur-
ther, which actors benefit from crises? Although ‘policy entrepreneurs’ are well
positioned to benefit from crises (Kingdon, 1995), it is important to specify why
crises represent “an opportunity to be exploited” (Keeler, 1993, 441) for some
actors, but not for others. We address these questions by describing a model of
the relationship between crises, legislative voting behaviour, and agenda-setting,
which we apply to understanding the European Union’s response to the 2008
global financial crisis.
The model we describe implies that crises weaken a key impediment to policy
change: the opposition of legislators. This provides micro-foundations for the
broader ‘crisis as opportunity’ thesis. Legislatures are a key part of the decision-
making apparatus of all democracies and act as a major constraint on policy
change under ‘normal’ political conditions. There exist few accounts of legislative
behaviour in times of crisis. In contrast, there is extensive work on the impact
of exogenous shocks on other political phenomena such as government duration
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and termination (Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber, 1986; Lupia and Strøm, 1995),
ministerial turnover (Diermeier and Merlo, 2000; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011), policy
change (Luong and Weinthal, 2004; Williams, 2009), judicial decisions (Epstein
et al., 2005; Clark, 2006) and public opinion (Ladd, 2007; Aldrich et al., 2006). Of
the legislative studies that do evaluate the effects of such external shocks, there
has been disproportionate focus on the effects of war on voting behaviour in the
US Congress (Meernik, 1993; Howell and Rogowski, 2013; Prins and Marshall,
2001; Wittkopf and McCormick, 1998; Cohen, 1982). This literature provides ev-
idence of the ‘rally round the flag’ effect, but is largely silent on the mechanisms
that link crises to individual decisions made by legislators. Howell and Rogowski
(2013, 164) encourage scholars to “pay closer attention to the micro-foundations
of legislative decision making” in times of war, advice that clearly applies more
generally to crisis response. Additionally, while existing accounts highlight the
potentially destabilising effects of crises on policy, they do not generally provide
specific predictions for the direction that policy will shift in response to a crisis.
For example, the institutionalist literature is unclear as to what form new insti-
tutions will take following an equilibria punctuating shock. As Blyth (2002, 8)
argues, “structural theories of institutional supply are indeterminate as to subse-
quent institutional form.”
Our argument applies the core insight of the agenda setting model originally
developed by Romer and Rosenthal (1978) to the context of a legislature facing a
crisis in the face of pre-existing multidimensional disagreements. By making the
outcomes resulting from inaction less attractive, crises strengthen the position of
agenda-setting actors in the policy process. Crises can be understood as shocks to
the external conditions which frame legislative deliberations and decisions. In our
model, legislators have preferences over the ideological content of the bills that
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they pass, but have a common interest in the extent to which policy is well suited
to current conditions – which we will call the ‘valence’ of policy. By changing the
external context, a crisis reveals deficiencies in existing policies, makes status quo
policies worse for all legislators, and thus encourages them to accept replacements.
Accordingly, agenda-setting actors have more discretion during a crisis-period,
and are able to propose (and pass) policy that would have been impossible in
the absence of a crisis. We show that when standing political disagreements are
multidimensional, this can have observable shifts in the voting coalitions that
form. Such shifts not only provide evidence that policy is in fact moving towards
the agenda setter’s position, but also constitute a realignment of the primary
dimension of political disagreement.
This model speaks broadly to how crises can both empower agenda-setters and
shift the active dimension of politics, and our discussion makes clear that the
effects of crises on legislative behaviour are particularly apparent when pre-crisis
politics are multidimensional. Accordingly, this model is well suited to under-
standing the effects of the global financial crisis on voting behaviour in the Eu-
ropean Parliament (EP), where politics has traditionally operated in two dimen-
sions: left-right, and pro-anti integration (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Kreppel,
2000; Hix, 2002; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006, 2007; Høyland, 2010).
We argue that, in the context of the crisis, MEPs became more tolerant toward
policies that they might previously have opposed, and pro-integration agenda-
setters (the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the
leaders of the large European Parliamentary Groups) exploited this tolerance to
pass highly integrationist policy. Following the logic of our theoretical argument,
this should have led to a shift in the voting patterns of the legislature, with voting
coalitions increasingly dividing legislators into pro vs anti integration coalitions
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rather than left vs right coalitions. We provide evidence that this occurred by
showing that votes in crisis-related policy areas indeed shifted towards the pro-
anti dimension during the period of the crisis. In order to provide a context
for this difference, we combine topic modelling with a two-stage least squares
procedure in order to construct synthetic control comparisons to legislation in
the pre-crisis period. We show that there was a shift towards voting along the
pro-anti integration dimension during the crisis period, but only on crisis-related
issues. The crisis did not occasion the sort of shift towards integrationist policy
that might have resulted if the crisis simply made MEPs more favourable towards
integration in general: changes were confined to the crisis-related policy areas
where status quo policies were increasingly viewed as untenable.
Our argument contributes to a developing literature on European political re-
sponses to the financial crisis. Much of the work in this area aims to describe pol-
icy failures (Taylor, 2009; Berglöf et al., 2009; Begg, 2009; Hodson and Quaglia,
2009; Holinski, Kool and Muysken, 2012) or suggests solutions moving forward
(Dabrowski, 2010; Jacoby, 2014; Grahl and Lysandrou, 2014; Wasserfallen, 2014;
Hild, Herz and Bauer, 2014; Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014; Claessens et al., 2010).
This paper, by contrast, suggests why particular policy responses were taken,
and specifically how the European Union came to have such a prominent posi-
tion in the post-crisis economic governance framework. The EU policy response
to the crisis was dramatic and far-reaching, and required overcoming significant
pre-existing disagreement in the European Parliament. While some attention has
been paid to the crisis response of the Commission (Copeland and James, 2014)
and the European Council (Schimmelfennig, 2014), we are unaware of other re-
search that investigates how the crisis affected the decisions of MEPs. While we
are not the first to observe that the Commission and the Council were strength-
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ened vis-à-vis other actors during the crisis, our argument attributes this change
to how the crisis weakened the Parliament’s ability to block policy changes. That
the Commission and the Council appeared to be the central actors in the EU
policy response is not the entire story: it was the crisis itself that undermined the
Parliament’s ability to stand in the way.
Theory
How do crises affect the decisions of legislative actors? Crises reduce the attrac-
tiveness of existing policy, and make legislators more tolerant towards proposed
alternatives. When voting on policies, legislators operate in specific economic and
political contexts which inform their perception of different policy options, and
they prefer to select alternatives that are well suited to current conditions. At
the time of adoption, policy will be written to ‘fit’ the external circumstances rel-
atively well, but policy is static and can only be changed with further legislative
effort. External circumstances, by contrast, are dynamic and undergo exogenous
changes so that as time passes the degree to which a given policy remains effec-
tive may decline. In normal times, slowly changing external circumstances open
up only limited opportunities to overcome coalitions opposed to policy change.
A crisis constitutes a dramatic change to external conditions which leads to a
large decrease in the efficacy of extant policy. This makes legislators much more
inclined to accept alternatives to the status quo, which (in expectation) will be
better suited to the changed environment.
The form that these alternative policies take depends on which actors control
the agenda-setting process. Actors who monopolise proposal power are able to
exploit the fact that the status quo has become unpopular in order to pass policy
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that previously would have failed to secure a majority. Romer and Rosenthal
(1978) show that agenda-setters with the ability to make take-it-or-leave-it offers
can exploit situations in which the status quo is unattractive. “The worse the
status quo, the greater this threat and, consequently, the greater the gain to
the setter from being able to propose the alternative.” (Romer and Rosenthal,
1978, 35-36) In the Romer and Rosenthal model a status quo is ‘worse’ when
it is in an extreme position in the policy space, and others have considered the
effects of an exogenous shock to the spatial position of the status quo (Tsebelis,
2002). However, for modelling a political crisis, we believe it makes more sense to
think of the status quo as worse in non-spatial terms. A crisis entails a sudden
change to the external conditions in which existing policies operate, rather than an
exogenous change to the policies themselves. We therefore build on these previous
models by modelling a crisis not as an exogenous shift in the position of existing
policy, but rather as a non-spatial shock to the status quo.1
Here, we will use the widely used term “valence” to refer to this non-spatial
quality of policy. In models of elections, a similar intuition is commonly incorpo-
rated through the addition of a valence term to a spatial utility function, where
valence reflects voters’ preferences for universally valued candidate characteristics
such as integrity, competence, and ability to provide local public goods.2 In our
model, valence is the degree to which policy is well suited to external conditions,
and can be expressed formally as the reduced form of a policy dimension on which
there is universal agreement (see section B.1 in the appendix). In our empirical
1We discuss alternative ways of modelling a crisis in more detail below, and in section B.3 of
the appendix.
2See, for example, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009); Enelow and Hinich (1982);
Enelow, Hinich and Mendell (1986); Adams et al. (2011); Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000);
Groseclose (2001).
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analysis we exploit the fact that only certain status quo policies are affected by
the crisis in order to identify changes in legislative behaviour between crisis and
non-crisis periods.
We consider a case where legislators have preferences over locations in two gen-
eral policy dimensions x1 and x2 , and also prefer policies with higher valence v.3
This yields quadratic-loss random utility functions for the proposal and alterna-
tive:
uiq =   (xi1   xq1)2   (xi2   xq2)2 + vq + eiq (3.1)
uip =   (xi1   xp1)2   (xi2   xp2)2 + vp + eip (3.2)
Example cases of voting under these utilities are depicted in figure 3.1. Consider
a situation where there is no valence gap between the status quo and the proposed
alternative (top panel, vq = vp). In the absence of a crisis, voting accords to a
simple spatial model. Legislators vote ‘yea’ if their own ideal point is closer
to the proposal (p) than it is to the status quo (q) and ‘nay’ otherwise. The
dashed cutting-line separates ‘yeas’ from ‘nays’. The dotted circle represents a
hypothetical winset4 – the set of policies that would defeat the status quo in
pairwise comparison. Policies located within the winset will defeat q in an up-
or-down vote, and policies located outside the winset will fail. The proposal p is
determined by the agenda-setter (AS), who makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal
3This ‘2-D plus valence’ example is the simplest version of the model that reveals relevant
observable implications. In appendix section B.2 we also consider a ‘1-D plus valence’ model
that captures the central intuition that agenda-setters secure more preferable policy outcomes
during a crisis. However, in addition to being a poor match to EU politics, the 1-D model
predicts that voting coalitions remain unchanged while the policy proposal positions change
between crisis and non-crisis periods. The former are far more easily measured than the latter.
4Analytically deriving the winset is not possible without first specifying the 2D preference
distribution of legislators. However, an illustrative version is sufficient for our purposes here.
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Figure 3.1: Crises, legislative voting, and agenda-setting in two-dimensions
a) vq = vp
q
AS
p
b) vq < vp
q
AS
p
c) vq < vp
q
AS
p
p0
Note: In the absence of a crisis (top panel), voting collapses to a simple spatial model, with
legislators voting for the proposal p if they are to the right of the cutline, or against the proposal
otherwise. If the status quo q receives a negative valence shock, but the proposed policy is fixed
at p (bottom left), then the cutline will shift to the left, indicating that some legislators who
previously would have voted against p, now would vote ‘yea’. In equilibrium, the agenda-setting
actor (AS) will exploit this tolerance to propose policy (p0) that better represents her interests
(bottom right). The agenda-setter ‘makes an opportunity out of the crisis’. We can identify the
effects of such a proposal in two-dimensional voting patterns, as the cutting-line rotates in the
direction of the ideal point of the agenda-setter.
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that is as close as possible to her own ideal point, within the constraint that the
policy will be approved by a majority vote (that is, within the winset).
In this example, the agenda-setter is located at a relatively moderate position
on the first dimension, but an extreme positive position in the second dimension
and so the proposed policy is close to the top of the winset. Given the illustrative
winset shown, the proposal mostly moves policy from left to right, rather than
south to north. Because of this, the cutting line falls nearly vertically, and the
‘yea’ coalition is formed of legislators on the right side of the policy space.
Consider now the crisis case (vq < vp), where we temporarily hold fixed the
positions of q and p (bottom-left panel). The main implication of the decline in vq
is that any given legislator is willing to accept a broader range of policies because
the ideological cost of accepting a more distant p is compensated for by replacing
the low-valence q. The decline in vq therefore leads some legislators to vote for p
despite their relative proximity to q, resulting in a larger coalition of support for
p in the crisis period. This is depicted by the leftward shift of the cutting-line.
If the proposed policy p is held fixed, a crisis will lead to a larger ‘yea’ coalition
than in the non-crisis period.
However, because more policies are able to defeat q in pairwise competition (the
winset expands), the agenda-setter can propose a policy closer to her own ideal
point that will still win a majority of support. This means that the agenda-setter
can propose p0 instead of p (bottom-right panel). As p0 is within the enlarged
winset, it is approved by the legislature, whereas in the equal valence scenario it
would have been rejected, and the agenda-setter obtains a policy outcome that
would not have been possible in the absence of the crisis.
These figures make clear the agenda-setter’s advantage during crisis periods.
The worse a valence shock (i.e. the lower vq), the larger the winset, and thus
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the more discretion the agenda-setter has over policy outcomes. In short, the
model captures the intuition that agenda-setters can exploit a crisis. Crises make
legislators more tolerant to new proposals, meaning that those with agenda-setting
power can trade off the resulting surplus of legislative votes to achieve spatial
outcomes that are closer to their own preferences than would have been possible
in the absence of a crisis.
There are two major implications of the model. First, the set of legislators
voting to approve the agenda-setter’s policy changes between non-crisis and crisis
periods. Specifically, in the example given in figure 3.1, the cutting-line separating
‘yeas’ from ‘nays’ rotates to become closer to horizontal. The more ‘northerly’ the
policy proposal relative to the status quo, the more legislators will vote based on
their preferences regarding the second dimension rather than the first, leading to a
more horizontal cutline between the voting coalitions. Extending this logic to the
general case, a crisis rotates cutting-lines to run perpendicular to the direction
of the ideal point of the agenda-setters from the political centre, because the
agenda-setter is able to move policy towards her ideal point to a greater degree.
The dimension of observed political disagreement shifts towards the dimension
along which the agenda setter differs most from the typical legislator, in this case
increasingly dividing legislators according to their position in the second dimension
rather than the first.
The second implication of the model is that agenda-setters will obtain policies
closer to their ideal points during crises. Legislators take the broader policy-
making environment into account when deciding on policy, and while always sen-
sitive to deviations from their own policy preferences, they are also concerned
with adopting policies that are congruent with current conditions. This means
that when crises cause sudden changes in the external environment, existing poli-
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cies (the status quo) become less attractive, and make legislators more receptive
to alternative proposals. Agenda-setters are therefore able to propose (and pass)
policies that more closely reflect their own preferences than would have been pos-
sible in the absence of a crisis. The model therefore provides micro-foundations for
the idea that crises represent ‘an opportunity to be exploited’ by agenda-setting
actors.
Our decision to model crises as a non-spatial valence shock distinguishes our
argument from other plausible mechanisms that could link a crisis to changes in
legislative behaviour. First, one could model an exogenous shock as a sudden
movement of the status quo in the policy space (as in Tsebelis (2002)). Second,
one might also model the effects of a crisis as an exogenous shift in the preferences
of legislators. These alternatives both offer plausible descriptions of crisis politics.
In some circumstances they lead to the same predictions, in terms of agenda-setter
discretion, as the valence-shock model. Specifically, whenever a spatial shock leads
to a divergence between decisive legislators and the status quo policy, the main
implication of our argument holds. The less legislators like the status quo – for
either spatial or non-spatial reasons – the greater the costs they face for inaction,
and so the greater the discretion of the agenda-setter. In the appendix section
B.3 we detail the conditions under which spatial and non-spatial shocks result
in equivalent observable implications, and demonstrate that it is not necessary
to accept the ‘valence-shock’ aspect of our model in order to accept most of our
argument as to how crises empower agenda-setters.
However, while these explanations may not differ in terms of their observable
implications, they do differ in terms of what they imply about counterfactuals.
An interesting implication of the valence-shock model is that the winset expands
symmetrically in the event of a crisis. The consequence of this is that the worse
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the valence of the status quo, the greater the discretion of the agenda-setter to
move policy in any direction. This contrasts with modelling a crisis as a spatial
shock – either to preferences or to the position of the status quo – where changes
in the winset will be determined by the specific direction of the shock, meaning
that agenda-setters benefit only under certain conditions. In general we prefer to
conceptualise a political crisis as a non-spatial shock because this better approx-
imates our intuitive understanding of a crisis. Whereas spatial shocks (to either
preferences or the status quo) imply that some actors prefer the crisis, non-spatial
exogenous shocks make the status quo worse for everyone.
Crisis in the EU
Europe suffered two major waves of economic crisis between 2007 and the present.
First, the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market sparked a global financial
crisis which caused major difficulties for European banks (Brunnermeier, 2009).
Second, in 2010, that banking crisis evolved into a sovereign debt crisis, as market
fears spread that national governments would be unable to meet their guarantees
to failing banks (Lane, 2012).
These crises demonstrated that EU economic policies and institutions, con-
structed in an extended period of growth, were ill-suited to times of economic
turmoil. For example, the banking crisis revealed that European banks, which
had become large and over-leveraged, represented a more significant risk to the
stability of the financial system than was previously understood (Alessandri and
Haldane, 2009; Carmassi, Gros and Micossi, 2009; Acharya, Drechsler and Schn-
abl, 2011). Furthermore, the pre-crisis regulatory framework was shown to be
incapable of coping with the systemic nature of the crisis, providing no tools
to respond to the collapse of large international banks (European Commission,
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2013). As the crisis spread, MEPs were quick to notice the deficiencies in exist-
ing regulation.5 Similarly, the debt crisis revealed structural problems with the
design of the currency union as a whole. Existing policy to contain imbalances in
public debt and current account deficits between Eurozone countries had proven
inadequate, as the main rules to encourage fiscal coordination and discipline –
enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – had been consistently broken
(ECB, 2011; Lane, 2012; Holinski, Kool and Muysken, 2012). In the positive eco-
nomic conditions in which the SGP was formed, governments were able to fund
excessive budget deficits relatively cheaply, by borrowing from the international
bond markets (De Grauwe, 2011). However, as the crisis hit, and these markets
dried up, the sustainability of these policies was called into question.6 In general,
the crisis dramatically reduced the attractiveness of existing status quo policies
to legislators, and opened a window of opportunity for economic policy change.
Our model implies that that a relatively wide range of policy options could
plausibly have won majority support in the EP during the crisis period, as MEPs
should have been willing to make ideological compromises in order to replace de-
funct policy. Although the policies adopted during the crisis had a distinctive
ideological profile, two broad policy responses, which proposed opposing shifts
along the integration dimension, were initially discussed. On the one hand, pro-
integrationist actors argued for the integration of banking regulation, the creation
of new EU financial oversight institutions, and further empowerment of existing
institutions to enforce fiscal discipline on member states. Proponents of this in-
5In a debate following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a prominent member of the EP
argued that “the supervision of the financial markets is not working…the status quo is untenable
in the medium and long term.” (Daul, 2008)
6As one MEP argued: “The economic and financial crisis has revealed all too clearly the
shortcomings and weaknesses of the existing instruments and methods for coordinating economic
and currency policy.” (Seeber, 2008)
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tegrationist response included the European Commission President, José Manuel
Barroso, who argued that the EU response to the crisis “must be far reaching
reform…Europe’s contribution must be a big step for an ever closer, ever stronger
Union” (Barroso, 2013).
On the other hand, an alternate policy response, supported largely by Euroscep-
tic actors, focused on streamlining the European institutions to make them more
competitive, safeguarding national regulatory powers, and “repatriating” powers
from Brussels back to the national level. British Prime Minister David Cameron
made this argument in 2013 by emphasising that future EU reforms ought not
to include “an insistence on a one size fits all approach which implies that all
countries want the same level of integration. The fact is that they don’t and we
shouldn’t assert that they do.” (Cameron, 2013) This position was expressed more
strongly by Nigel Farage, leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party, who
argued that “We need to turn back. People need national control over their cur-
rencies and over their economies.” (Farage, 2010) Overall, while the crisis led to
dissatisfaction with the status quo from across the political spectrum, there was
substantial disagreement about the ideal strategy for resolving deficient policy,
disagreement that largely reflected the pre-existing dimensions of disagreement
over EU integration.
Pro-Integration Agenda Control and Preferences in Two Dimen-
sions
Policy preferences in the EP have been widely described in terms of two major
dimensions. One dimension corresponds to the left-right issues that typically
shape national-level politics, while the second dimension relates to the scope of
authority of European institutions, with those favouring more European powers
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at one end and those opposing the expansion of these powers at the other. This
structure manifests itself clearly in roll-call (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006, 2007;
Hix and Noury, 2009; Høyland, 2010; Klüver and Spoon, 2013) and expert survey
(McElroy and Benoit, 2007, 2011) data. The distribution of European Party
Group (EPG) positions over these two dimensions results in an inverted-U shape,
where centrist parties (on the left-right dimension) tend to have relatively strong
pro-integration preferences, whereas parties towards the extremes of the left-right
space tend to be more anti-integrationist. Figure B.3 in the appendix presents
the expert survey located positions of the EPGs on these two dimensions for the
seventh European Parliament (2009-14).
Although agenda-control in the EU is somewhat diffuse (Hix and Hoyland,
2011), the main agenda-setting actors are united by their pro-integration prefer-
ences. First, the European Commission – a supranational body appointed by the
governments of EU member states – holds the exclusive right to legislative initia-
tive within the EU. The Commission is the ultimate external gatekeeper in the
EU-wide policy process (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007, 111) and recent literature
has emphasised the key role of the Commission as agenda-setter during the crisis
period (Copeland and James, 2014). The Commission is usually assumed to be
pro-integration (Tsebelis and Kreppel, 1998; Mattila, 2004; Hooghe, 2005), and
has generally proved to be so in matters relating to the economic crisis.
Second, the internal agenda of the parliament is largely controlled by the leaders
of the EPGs through the Conference of Presidents, a political body responsible for
the organisation of parliamentary business (Kreppel, (2002, 210); see also chapter
two of this thesis). Through the Conference, party group leaders determine the
agenda for plenary sessions, and a voting system which is weighted by party size
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allows the larger party groups – such as the EPP, ALDE, and the S&D7 – to
dominate the process. The large parties also hold the vast majority of lower-level
agenda-setting offices – such as committee seats, chairs and rapporteurships –
which are also distributed according to party group size. Thus, in the internal
agenda-setting process of the Parliament, the large party groups are dominant,
and have significant abilities to restrict the flow of legislative traffic. These parties
are centrist on the first dimension, and distinctly pro-integration on the second
dimension of conflict (see figure B.3 in the appendix). This, again, suggests that
pro-integration actors monopolise agenda-setting privileges within the EP.8
Finally, leaders of national governments also have the ability to exercise agenda-
setting powers in the EU policy process. The European Council, which is made
up of the leaders of national governments, is responsible for setting the “general
political direction and priorities” of the Union (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). Simi-
larly, Schmidt (2001) argues that the Council of Ministers, which is comprised of
government ministers from each member state, has significant informal influence
over the shape of policies proposed by the Commission. While the exact role these
bodies play in the agenda-setting process is opaque, it is clear that they have some
bearing on which issues arise on the legislative agenda. As with agenda-setters
in the Parliament and the Commission, the leaders of the national governments
are also largely united in their preferences for integration. As Warntjen et. al.
(2008) show, preferences for integration in the Council have been positive and
7European People’s Party; Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; Progressive Al-
liance of Socialists and Democrats
8Although the EPGs are relatively cohesive (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005, 2007), they are
comprised of ideologically heterogeneous national parties. This is particularly the case on the
pro-/anti-integration dimension, where EPG positions are “far more pro-European than their
constituent national parties.” (McElroy and Benoit, 2011, 163) Accordingly, figure B.3 does
not reflect the fact that the median voter in the parliament on the pro-/anti-dimension is less
integrationist than the position of the large parties might imply.
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stable across a long time period.
Thus, the preference structure of the EP and location of agenda-setting actors
in the preference space largely reflects the theoretical structure we previously used
to illustrate our model in figure 3.1.9 What then are the implications for the voting
coalitions that formed and the policies that passed during the economic crisis?
Predictions
Our model implies that, as agenda-setters in the EP are uniformly pro-integration,
policies passed by the European Parliament during the crisis should be more inte-
grationist than they would have been without the crisis. It is unambiguous that
integrationist legislation passed during this period. The legislative response to the
financial crisis included many policies that transferred significant powers from the
national to the European level. The EU instigated a major set of banking reforms,
including: a common rulebook for banking practice; the establishment of a Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for the oversight of risk in the banking system; a
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which makes Eurozone governments jointly
responsible for the solvency of private banks; and a host of new institutions which
aim to limit systemic risk. The European Commission acquired dramatically in-
9One possible objection is that the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ agenda power assumed by our model
is unrealistic in the EP, where floor amendments are permissible. If amendments can be used
to rein in proposals that are too integrationist, while still replacing the status quo with a higher
valence proposal, then pro-integration agenda-setters would not profit from increased discretion
during a crisis. However, evidence strongly suggests that amendments tend to change policy on
the left-right dimension of conflict, but not the integrationist dimension (Kreppel and Tsebelis,
1999; Kreppel, 2000; Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). There are techni-
cal limitations to proposing such amendments, as doing so would require legislators to propose
fundamentally reformed institutional structures. This would require significant legislative re-
sources, expertise, and drafting time. The anti-integrationist party groups (the actors with an
incentive to propose such amendments) are resource-poor in comparison with the larger groups
and the European Commission. Thus, in the context of the EP, it is unlikely that the power of
agenda-setters is significantly diminished by the availability of amendments.
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creased powers under the new fiscal framework, the harmonisation of banking
standards directly affects national law, and the new institutions can be seen as
quasi-federal supervisory authorities (Lannoo, 2011, 2).
The response to the debt crisis was perhaps even more integrationist. The
most high-profile changes included the creation of the European Stability Mech-
anism (ESM), a permanent rescue facility for the Eurozone area; legislation to
increase the Commission’s ability to scrutinise member-state finances; and a leg-
islative ‘six pack’ which bolsters the Stability and Growth Pact by establishing
fiscal goals to which member-states must converge. Again, these reforms entail a
significant deepening of integration in economic affairs, empowering supranational
actors such as the Commission and the European Central Bank, and transferring
sensitive policy competences to the European level. In sum, integrationist policies
relating to sovereign finances, macro-economic coordination and banking reform
were proposed by the European Commission, and were adopted by legislators in
the EP.
However, the fact that integrationist policy passed is not sufficient for our argu-
ment, as we suggest that policies that passed after 2008 were more integrationist
than was possible before the crisis. Indeed, if our theoretical model captures the
dynamics of the EU case, there are clear implications for how voting coalitions in
the two-dimensional space of EU politics ought to have changed in response to a
crisis. The main observable implication of the model is apparent in the bottom-
right panel of figure 3.1, where the cutline separating the ‘yea’ from the ‘nay’
voters rotates after the valence shock to become closer to horizontal. We expect
a similar rotation of the cutlines in the EP in response to the financial crisis.
If agenda-setters proposed more pro-integration policy solutions, the cutting-lines
separating voting coalitions should have been increasingly horizontal, dividing pro-
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and anti-European MEPs, rather than vertical, dividing right and left MEPs.
We denote the angle of the cutting line of a given vote as 'j, and define this
angle over an arc of 2 such that it equals zero when the cutting line is horizontal.10
Our argument suggests that when a crisis occurs, the valence of existing policy
will decline, leading to more integrationist policy proposals, and a shift in the
distribution of the cutting-lines. In the context of the EP, for a given set of votes,
we expect that the cutting-lines will become, on average, closer to horizontal after
the onset of the crisis. In terms of 'j, we can characterize the average tendency
of coalitions to align with yes votes among pro-integration MEPs using the mean
absolute angular deviation (MAAD) from zero:
MAAD =
1
M
MX
j=1
j'jj (3.3)
The closer to zero the MAAD is, the greater the tendency of votes to have yes
voters among pro-integration MEPs (of both left and right) and no voters among
anti-integration MEPs (of both left and right).
Crucial to our argument is that we only expect MAAD to decline in policy areas
that are affected by the crisis. As noted previously, not all status quo policies are
affected by any particular crisis. Our argument is policy-domain specific, as it is
only status quo policies in crisis-related areas that will receive a valence shock,
and so only in votes on these issues that we expect to observe a rotation of
cutting-lines. This yields a testable prediction that has the form of a differences-
in-differences: we expect that after the onset of the crisis, cutting lines will shift
10We formally derive the relationship between the cutting line angle and the extent to which
policy is moving in the second relative to the first dimension in section B.4 of the appendix.
Figure B.3 provides a graphical depiction of different values of '.
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towards horizontal in crisis-relevant policy areas relative to non-crisis-relevant
policy areas.
Methods and Data
In order to test this prediction, we make use of two main data sources. First, we
require voting records for legislators in the EP across the crisis period. We collect
this information from www.votewatch.eu which keeps a record of every recorded
vote in the European Parliament. We collect all votes from the sixth and seventh
European Parliaments (2004-2014), therefore including a period before and after
the emergence of the crisis in late 2008. Throughout the analysis, we treat votes
from the 6th European Parliament (EP6) as ‘pre-crisis’, and votes from the 7th
European Parliament (EP7) as ‘post-crisis’, an assumption that we discuss below.
Second, we require information that allows us to differentiate between crisis-
related and non-crisis-related votes. As explained below, we develop a novel text
classification strategy to estimate the degree to which pre-crisis votes were ‘crisis-
relevant’ so that we can make a fair comparison of votes pre- versus post-crisis.
For each vote we collect a legislative summary text from the European Parliament
website.11 The summaries give details of the purpose, background, and content
of legislation under discussion, and thus provide salient textual information for
classification. An example text is provided in appendix figure B.4.
2D Scaling with Expert Survey Identification of Dimensions
In order to make the estimated cutlines for EP6 and EP7 comparable, it is nec-
essary to jointly estimate preferences over both Parliaments. We combine the
roll-call votes taken in EP6 and EP7, holding the preferences of MEPs serving in
11www.europarl.europa.eu
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both constant. To ensure that we can distinguish left-right political preferences
from pro-anti integration preferences, it is necessary to use some kind of auxiliary
information to orient the latent preference space along those axes. To identify
these dimensions, we implement a hierarchical 2D ideal point estimator in Stan
(Stan Development Team, 2014) using expert survey data (McElroy and Benoit,
2011) to locate the average positions of party groups in EP6 and EP7. These
locations form priors over the average positions of MEPs in each of the two di-
mensions, with the party group priors for both EP6 and EP7 informing the priors
of MEPs who served in both Parliaments.
Where jd are the vote parameters for each dimension d for roll call j, and id
are the preferences of MEP i on each dimension d, and xg(i)d is the expert survey
estimate of the party group g of legislator i on dimension d, the core of the ideal
point model is:
p(Yij = 1) =  (j0 + j1i1 + j2i2) (3.4)
jd  N(0; 22) (3.5)
id  N(xg(i)d; 2d) (3.6)
Because individual MEPs are treated as draws from the expert survey party
group mean, with an estimated degree of dispersion around that mean in both
dimensions, the expert survey data provides a weak constraint on the estimated
locations of MEPs. The effect of this prior is to orient the 2D ideal point space
as close to the survey data as possible, but it only weakly influences the locations
of individual MEPs relative to their colleagues, and only to the extent that the
prior generally fits the relative locations of MEPs. The estimated cutting angle
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'j is calculated from the estimated values of the jd as described in section B.4
of the appendix.
Crisis-relevant and non-crisis-relevant votes
Our model implies that there will be a difference in the distribution of the 'j be-
tween votes that relate to the crisis and votes that do not, but identifying ‘crisis-
relevant’ votes is non-trivial. One approach would be to classify votes according
to their committee of origin so that, for example, votes on reports originating from
the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) committee could be crisis-relevant,
and all other votes non-relevant. However, relying on a simple committee cate-
gorisation is problematic. ECON reports include a diverse selection of legislation,
only some of which pertain to the crisis. Similarly, many explicitly crisis-related
reports did not originate in the ECON committee.12 Such an approach would yield
a coding that, at best, only roughly approximated our classification of interest.
Instead, we make use of the legislative summaries introduced above to produce
a binary coding of ‘crisis-relevant’ and ‘non-crisis-relevant’ votes in the seventh
European Parliament (EP7). We search the EP7 summaries for five key phrases
that indicate direct relevance to the crisis: “financial crisis”, “economic crisis”,
“sovereign debt crisis”, “euro crisis”, and “eurozone crisis”. Of the 6,916 votes held
during EP7, our selection procedure codes 1,071 as ‘crisis-relevant’. Based on this
categorisation, we can then compare the distribution of cutting-angles within EP7.
Table 3.1 presents the results of a simple linear regression of the estimated absolute
angular deviation, ', on the binary ‘crisis-relevant’ indicator. The coefficient for
this indicator in the regression is simply the difference in mean absolute angular
12For example, an important parliamentary resolution concerning the feasibility of stability
bonds (or ‘Eurobonds’) did not originate in the ECON committee.
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deviation (equation 3.3) between crisis and non-crisis relevant votes. As implied
by our theoretical model, votes in EP7 on crisis-relevant legislation were marked
by significantly (t =  6:8, assuming independence) and substantially (about 18%)
lower values of the average cutting angle ' than non-crisis relevant votes during
the same period.
This simple comparison of voting in the seventh European Parliament provides
initial support for a major implication of our model. Legislative coalitions on
crisis-relevant votes formed more on the pro-anti integration dimension than did
non-crisis votes, and there are more than enough votes to say that this cannot be
dismissed as the result of unsystematic variation in voting coalitions.
Table 3.1: Linear regression of ' on ‘crisis-relevant’
Absolute Angular Deviation
'
Crisis-relevant  0.204
(0.030)
Constant 1.183
(0.012)
Observations 6,961
R2 0.007
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
Synthesising a control group using legislative texts
The most obvious objection to the preceding comparison of means is that the
difference we identify between crisis-relevant and non-crisis relevant votes in EP7
may reflect a pre-existing feature of EP disagreement across different policy do-
mains. Perhaps we are recovering something about the general structure of voting
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on economic and finance versus other issues, and not a change in voting struc-
ture that resulted from the crisis. Clearly we are unable to observe the relevant
counter-factual: what would voting have looked like in EP7 in the absence of a
crisis? In this section, we synthesise the most plausible, feasible control group
with which to compare the difference estimated above.
Our point of comparison is with the preceding European Parliament, where
voting coalitions were not subject to the crisis effects that our model contem-
plates. Examining changes in voting coalitions between EP6 and EP7 allows us
to compare crisis and non-crisis parliaments. However, to make the relevant com-
parison, we need to identify votes from EP6 that are substantively similar to the
crisis-relevant votes from EP7. One approach would be to manually select a se-
ries of votes from EP6 that we deem to be on issues similar to the crisis-relevant
votes in EP7. However, this would be ad hoc, and would require a great deal of
subjective judgement. It is also sufficiently unclear what it means for a vote to be
‘crisis-relevant’ in EP6 as to make any strictly binary classification problematic.
To circumvent this problem, we develop a linear probability classification of
EP6 votes, using the binary classification of EP7 votes described above as the
training data for a model that predicts crisis-relatedness using features of legisla-
tive summary texts. The intuition behind our estimation strategy is to use the
information contained in the legislative summaries to find votes in EP6 which
are about substantively similar issues to the crisis-related votes in EP7, and to
use these votes to compare voting coalitions on these issues across the crisis and
non-crisis periods. We proceed in three steps.13
First, we estimate a series of topic models (Blei and Lafferty, 2006; Roberts
et al., 2014) from the corpus of legislative summaries of each vote in EP6 and
13We give more detail on the construction of our approach in section B.6 of the appendix.
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EP7. The key quantity of interest recovered from each of these topic models is a
matrix of topic proportions, that describes the fraction of each legislative summary
d 2 f1; 2; :::; Dg that is from each topic t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg. These matrices offer a
high-dimensional summary of the substantive content of each vote, and give us a
basis on which to find thematically similar votes in EP6 and EP7. Choosing the
appropriate number of topics is a common problem in topic models, and typical
solutions (e.g. Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003)) aim to find the model that best
predicts held-out textual data. In our case, we are not interested in predicting
text data out of sample, but rather in predicting our manual classification of ‘crisis-
relevant’ votes. Because the number of topics that will do this best is unclear a
priori, we estimate topic models for all K = 98 integer topic counts from 3 to 100.
Second, we use the topic proportions for the EP7 votes as explanatory vari-
ables in linear regressions, where the dependent variable is the manually coded
‘crisis-relevant’ binary classification introduced above. We then use the estimated
coefficients to generate fitted values, denoted ^j(kd), for all votes in both EP6 and
EP7. These values represent the probability that each vote, j, is crisis-relevant,
given the vector of topic proportions for legislative summary d from topic model k.
The intuition is that the regression coefficients on the topic proportions indicate
the thematic elements (words) that predict a vote being crisis-relevant, and the
fitted values thus provide a measure for whether the issues addressed in each vote
from both EP6 and EP7 were ultimately relevant to the crisis.
Third, we use the fitted values as explanatory variables in K second-stage linear
regressions of the following form:
j'jj = k + k1  EP7j + k2  ^j(kd) + k3  (EP7j  ^j(kd)) + j(d) (3.7)
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where ' is the angle of the cutting line, EP7 is an indicator variable for whether
the vote was taken during the seventh European Parliament (i.e. during the crisis),
and ^j(kd) measures the crisis-relevance of the vote. Because we are using fitted
values for whether the vote was crisis-related, the coefficients remain estimators
of the difference between the MAAD of crisis-related (^ = 1) and non-crisis-
related (^ = 0) votes. Our primary quantity of interest is then the estimated ^k3
coefficient. This is the interaction between the probability of a vote being crisis-
relevant, and that vote being held during the crisis. The theoretical model implies
that the interaction coefficient should be negative, implying that crisis-relevant
votes in EP7 were marked by increasingly pro-versus-anti integration coalitions,
rather than left-versus-right coalitions, relative to non-crisis-relevant votes.
This approach, which is an unusual application of a two-stage least squares
estimator, has two attractive features. First, using the legislative summary texts
ensures that we are comparing thematically or topically similar votes in EP6 and
EP7. This means that if there had always been a difference between how the EP
voted on the issues that ultimately become crisis-related and other issues, we will
observe a constant difference in EP6 and EP7, and the difference-in-differences
(k3) will be zero. Second, using the fitted values for crisis-relatedness for both
EP6 and EP7, rather than using the EP7 binary coding we used to train the first-
stage classifier, enables a fair comparison of the two periods. If our classifier does
not work well, the comparison of the EP7 difference estimated using the binary
classification versus that estimated on the fitted values will provide an indication
that there is a problem with the comparison we are making.
Two methodological issues remain. First, in order to incorporate estimation
uncertainty from the first stage regression model into our estimates at the second
stage, we bootstrap both regression models. As votes are grouped within texts,
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and the topic mixtures vary only at that group level, we use a block bootstrap
to account for within-text error correlation in the first stage model (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009, 315). We jointly bootstrap both regression stages 1000 times,
resampling the texts with replacement, and estimating our quantities of interest
at each iteration. Second, the ambiguity over the number of topics to include in
the topic models means that there is no a priori reason to prefer any one vector
of ^k values, nor any one k3 coefficient. However, while we have no a priori
reason to prefer any particular number of topics, we can assess which topic model
yields the most predictive first stage regression for predicting the manual coding
of which EP7 votes were crisis-related. For each of the first stage regressions, we
therefore calculate BIC, AIC and Adjusted R2. AIC and Adjusted R2 agree on
the 62 topic model, while BIC (which includes a greater penalty for additional
parameters) favours the 29 topic model.14
Results
Before turning to our main results, it is important to evaluate the validity of our
classification procedure for specifying which EP6 votes were in policy areas that
were to become relevant to the crisis once it arrived. First, we can directly ex-
amine the votes from both EP6 and EP7 which our model estimates to have high
‘crisis-relevant’ probabilities (^j(kd)). Table 3.2 presents the titles of the top 20
crisis-relevant texts from the 29 topic model, from both parliamentary terms.15
The results could hardly be more reassuring. As expected, the classification pro-
cedure successfully recovers the explicitly crisis-related votes from EP7. Many of
the well-known economic reforms – such as the ‘Six pack’, the ‘Two pack’, and
14In figure B.5 in the appendix we present the three fit statistics for all 98 models.
15An equivalent table, for the 62 topic model, is given in table B.1 of the appendix.
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the European Semester – feature in EP7 list. The EP6 votes – which occurred
before the crisis – are also all directly related to the economic issues that became
increasingly significant after 2008. Votes relating to the strengthening of national
budgetary positions, public finances, financial markets, credit rating agencies, and
the common currency all feature prominently at the top of the EP6 list. The pro-
cedure is not simply picking up votes from late 2008 and early 2009 in EP6, as
several of the vote titles include the year in which they were voted upon, and they
cover the whole of the EP6 period. In general, these results suggest that our clas-
sification procedure works remarkably well, and that our synthetic control group
is a reasonable basis for comparison.
Second, we can evaluate the degree to which the fitted values enable us to
estimate the ‘true’ difference between crisis-relevant and non-crisis-relevant votes
in EP7 using our two-stage regression procedure. We can compare the estimated
coefficient on the first stage fitted values for EP7 from our second-stage model
(equation 3.7) with the difference in means from our manually coded votes given
in table 3.1. Recall that we are using the fitted values even for EP7 where we
have the direct binary coding in order to make sure that the comparison with
EP6 is a fair one. If the directly calculated difference from the manually-coded
data and the two-stage estimate based on the fitted values constructed from the
topic model estimates are similar, we can be confident that, at least for EP7, our
topic model approach is approximating the ‘true’ difference that we calculated
previously.
The middle panel of figure 3.2 compares the estimates from our manual coding
of crisis-relevant votes (red horizontal line, equivalent to table 3.1) and the coef-
ficients estimated using the fitted probabilities from each of the 98 models. The
solid black points and intervals show the estimated coefficients for EP7 preferred
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Table 3.2: Top ‘fitted values’ votes - 29 topics
EP6 vote titles EP7 vote titles
1 Strengthening of budgetary positions and co-
ordination of economic policies
Macro-financial assistance to Armenia
2 Public finances in economic and monetary
Union EMU in 2004
Economic governance & strengthening of
surveillance of budgetary positions and co-
ordination of economic policies ‘Six pack’
3 2006 annual report on the euro area Macro-financial assistance to Georgia
4 Financial markets & banks affiliated to cen-
tral institutions, large exposures, supervisory
arrangements, and crisis management
Economic governance: implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure. ‘Six pack’
5 Public Finances in EMU 2006 Macro-financial assistance to Ukraine
6 Public finances in EMU 2007 and 2008 Macro-financial assistance to Serbia
7 Credit institutions: taking up and pursuit of
the business. Recast
Economic governance: strengthening of eco-
nomic and budgetary surveillance of Member
States experiencing or threatened with seri-
ous difficulties with respect to their financial
stability in the euro area. ‘Two pack’
8 European Globalisation Adjustment Fund:
redundancies in mobile phone sector
Macro-financial assistance to Bosnia and
Herzegovina
9 Credit rating agencies Economic governance: effective enforcement
of budgetary surveillance in the euro area.
‘Six pack’
10 Report on the ECB annual report for 2007 Economic governance: financial assistance
for Member States whose currency is not the
euro
11 Lamfalussy follow up - Future structure of
supervision
Improving the economic governance and sta-
bility framework of the Union, in particular
in the euro area
12 ECB annual report for 2003 Long-term sustainability of public finances
for a recovering economy
13 Resolution on the G20 Summit April 2009 European Central Bank annual report for
2011
14 ECB annual report for 2003 ECB annual report for 2010
15 Medium-term financial assistance for Mem-
ber States’ balances of payments
Financial institutions: capital requirements
for the trading book and re-securitisations;
supervision of remuneration policies
16 EMU@10: The first 10 years of Economic and
Monetary Union and future challenges
Macro-financial assistance to Kyrgyzstan
17 Mobilisation of the European Globalisation
Adjustment Fund: redundancies in textiles
sector
Further macro-financial assistance for Geor-
gia
18 Facing oil challenges Feasibility of introducing stability bonds
19 Euro zone enlargement EBRD: subscription by the EU to additional
shares in the capital
20 Euro & adoption by Slovenia of the single
currency (Article 122(2), Treaty TEC)
European Semester for economic policy coor-
dination: implementation of 2013 priorities
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by BIC and AIC/Adjusted R2. Aside from the very small topics, which generate
imprecise estimates, nearly all of the topic models yield a significant negative es-
timate of the EP7 difference. Although there is a tendency to overestimate the
magnitude of the coefficient, the estimates based on the selected 62 topic model
are among the closest to the true difference in means. This gives us confidence
that the topic modelling approach is indeed measuring the quantity of interest
from EP7.
With these results in hand, we now turn to the interaction coefficient, which
corresponds to a difference-in-differences estimate of the change in the difference
between crisis-related and non-crisis-related votes between EP6 and EP7. Our
theoretical expectation is that the interaction between the EP7 indicator and
the fitted value for a vote being crisis-relevant will have a negative sign. This
would imply that coalitions on crisis-relevant votes formed increasingly on the
pro-versus-anti integration dimension of conflict during the crisis period, relative
to non-crisis-relevant votes, relative to that difference during the non-crisis period.
Table 3.3 gives the results of the models preferred by BIC and AIC/Adjusted R2,
and the bottom panel of figure 3.2 graphically depicts the individual 3k estimates,
again highlighting the selected models in black.
Crisis-related votes in EP6 were characterised by voting coalitions that were
somewhat more left-right than other votes, although this is inconsistently signif-
icant across the various topic models (top panel, figure 3.2). Combined with the
fact that crisis-related votes in EP7 were significantly more pro-anti than other
votes, this leads to significant differences in differences, not only in the two models
with the best first stage fit, but in all topic models except two of the poorly fitting
ones with very small numbers of topics. The negative difference-in-differences in-
dicates that cutting lines on crisis-relevant votes were closer to horizontal in EP7,
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Figure 3.2: Estimated effect of crisis-relevant and EP7 interaction
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Note: The top two panels show estimates of the EP6 (top) and EP7 (middle) difference between
crisis- and non-crisis-related votes. The bottom panel shows the difference in differences.
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Table 3.3: Second stage linear regressions – BIC and AIC/Adjusted R2 models
Absolute Angular Deviation
29 topics 62 topics
^ 0.076 0.245
(0.089) (0.123)
EP7 -0.056 -0.024
(0.046) (0.047)
^  EP7 -0.368 -0.655
(0.14) (0.167)
Constant 1.243 1.231
(0.029) (0.028)
Observations 12736 12736
Note: The table presents estimates from the two best-
fitting models, as selected by BIC (29 topics) and
AIC/Adjusted R2 (62 topics) at the first stage. Bootstrap
standard errors are given in parentheses.
relative to non-crisis votes, relative to the same difference in EP6.
Recall that the purpose of creating the synthetic control comparison using EP6
was to rule out the possibility that the kinds of issues that became crisis-relevant
had always exhibited relatively pro-anti voting coalitions, even before the crisis.
The estimates here suggest otherwise: pro-integration coalitions formed more fre-
quently on crisis-related votes in EP7 relative to non-crisis-related votes but the
opposite was true in EP6. The effect is both statistically significant and substan-
tively large. Recall that the MAAD was 20% lower on crisis-related votes than on
non-crisis related votes in EP7 (table 3.1). Given the positive coefficient in EP6,
the change in voting once the crisis began was larger than this.
Overall, these results indicate that the coalition structure of voting in the Eu-
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ropean Parliament changed meaningfully after the onset of the financial crisis in
those issue areas that the crisis affected. This is what we expected to observe if
pro-integration agenda-setters were able to exploit the crisis in order to pass inte-
grationist policy that would previously have failed to win a majority of support.
Threats to Inference
One concern with the above analysis is that the change observed in voting be-
haviour could be the result of factors other than the crisis. In particular, two al-
ternative explanations deserve attention. First, changing voting behaviour could
be the result of a change to the composition of the Parliament after the European
elections in early 2009. The EP became more fragmented after the election, with
smaller parties winning seats from the larger parties, with the implication that
fewer pro-integration MEPs were elected. This fragmentation may have lead to
more ‘grand coalition’ votes, where the large party groups vote together due to
their decreased parliamentary strength (Hix, 2009).
Second, the European Parliament changed the rules governing which roll-call
votes were recorded in EP7. Previously, roll-call votes were recorded only when
requested by a political group or one-tenth of the MEPs. Previous research has
shown that roll-calls were called on approximately one-third of all votes (Hix, 2009;
Carrubba et al., 2006). However, from June 2009, and the start of EP7, all final
legislative votes were automatically taken by roll-call. The effects of roll-call se-
lection in the European Parliament are unclear (Carrubba et al., 2006; Yordanova
and Mühlböck, 2015), but it is possible that this change could result in increas-
ingly pro-anti voting coalitions. For example, if roll-call votes had previously
been avoided on final votes that were supported by a pro-integration coalition,
then the rule change would possibly have resulted in increased observations of
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pro-integration coalitions (and, thus, lower MAAD scores) in EP7.
While we are unable to entirely discount these alternative explanations that
involve the EP6/EP7 changeover, if either the electoral explanation or the rule
change explanation were true, we would expect to observe decreasing MAAD
scores across all policy areas rather than just those related to the crisis. The logic
of these arguments is that there was some structural or institutional change that
affected the entire parliament in 2009, but our analysis uncovers significant change
in voting behaviour only on crisis-relevant issues. As table 3.3 makes clear, there
is essentially no change in the average cutting line on non-crisis-relevant votes
between the two parliaments. The EP7 coefficient gives the change in MAAD for
non-crisis relevant votes, and although the coefficient is slightly negative in both
the 29 and 62 topic models, it is statistically indistinguishable from zero and far
smaller in magnitude than the interaction effect. Any alternative explanation for
the findings presented here must explain both the change in behaviour over time,
and the fact that change occurs only in crisis-related votes.
A possible objection to the theoretical framing that we have provided for our
analysis is that the crisis did not affect the valence of the status quo, but rather in-
fluenced the spatial elements of legislators’ utility by making MEPs more favourable
to increased integration. To account for the fact that observed changes are only
in crisis-related policy areas, it would need to be the case that the crisis changed
preferences of MEPs in just those areas, which is possible if you take the view that
the crisis specifically signalled a need for more integration in only those policy ar-
eas. As discussed in our theoretical section, and in section B.3 of the appendix,
this argument is plausible, but not necessarily incompatible with our own. Both
spatial and non-spatial crisis models in this context engage with the idea that
the crisis somehow changed the incentives to integrate for MEPs. We think it
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makes more sense to think about the quality of status quo policy, rather than
the spatial preferences of legislators for integration, being differentially affected
by the crisis, and so we understand the effect of the crisis on voting behaviour
as being transmitted through the non-spatial component of utility. In general,
however, the most interesting theoretical implications of both our story and the
changing preferences story focus on the same counterfactual. Under either ac-
count, the primary dimension of conflict in the EP shifted towards pro-anti votes
in crisis-relevant areas and policies were passed following the financial crisis that
would not have passed in the absence of the crisis.
Conclusion
When José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, gave his
State of the Union speech to the European Parliament in 2013, he argued that,
“If we look back and think about what we have done together to unite Europe
throughout the crisis, I think it is fair to say that we would never have thought
all this possible five years ago.” (Barroso, 2013) The degree of integration in
financial and economic affairs following the crisis was indeed unprecedented, and
the argument we have made here is that these policies succeeded because the crisis
strengthened the position of pro-integration agenda-setting actors (including Mr
Barroso). One implication of our empirical analysis, given our theoretical model,
is that such significant increases in EU competences might not have occurred in
the absence of a crisis.
More generally, our model provides micro-foundations for the intuition that
crises represent ‘opportunities to be exploited’ by industrious agenda-setters in
the legislative process. Exogenous shocks decrease the efficacy of existing policy
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in the context of changing real world conditions, and make status quo policies less
attractive to all legislators. Because legislators want to replace deficient policy,
those with proposal power are able to secure outcomes that would be impossible
without a crisis. In contrast to previous literature on crises, we demonstrated
how a specific impediment to reform is reduced by exogenous shocks, and also
provided predictions about the direction of policy movement during crisis periods
which have empirically observable implications for voting patterns which we were
able to test.
Our model may also be a useful heuristic for understanding the legislative effects
of other crises, particularly when pre-existing policy disagreement is multidimen-
sional. For example, in 1957, Lyndon Johnson, then US Senate majority leader
and a powerful agenda-setter, recognised that the civil rights bill proposed by Pres-
ident Eisenhower was likely to be filibustered by the Senate southern Democrats.
The opposition of these legislators was a significant constraint on executive ac-
tion, and forced Johnson to admit amendments that significantly weakened the
enforcement of the bill (Jeong, Miller and Sened, 2009). By 1964, however, John-
son, now President, was able to pass the more robust Civil Rights Act. It is
commonly accepted that the racial tensions of the early 1960s gave momentum to
the civil rights movement, and offered Johnson a window of opportunity in which
to pass reform (Keeler, 1993, 462). One reading of this is that legislators’ prefer-
ences shifted towards wanting civil rights legislation, but our model indicates that
the marginal legislators could instead have simply recognised that the status-quo
was increasingly untenable. As a pro-civil rights agenda-setter, Johnson was able
to pass reforms that had previously proved intractable in the legislature, shift-
ing patterns of voting towards a north-south dimension during this period (Poole
and Rosenthal, 2011, 141-142). Our model has an important implication for the
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counter-factual: what policies might have been successfully advanced by an anti-
civil rights President in the context of the diverse events of the early 1960s, from
the “March on Washington” to the Birmingham church bombing? Civil rights leg-
islation might now seem like the obvious policy response, but there is no shortage
of historical crises that have been exploited by political agenda setters to achieve
less righteous ends. The kinds of crises we model facilitate shifts in any policy
direction.
A further theoretical implication is that strategic agenda-setters may have an
incentive to exaggerate crisis severity in order to maximise their discretion over
policy outcomes. There are anecdotal suggestions that certain EU institutions
behaved in this manner during the financial crisis. For example, the bond-buying
policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) enabled indebted governments to
secure enough liquidity to stave off immediate sovereign default, but stopped
short of providing a blank cheque which would have fundamentally reassured
nervous market actors. Although not itself an agenda-setting actor, the ECB’s
piecemeal strategy allowed other pro-integration actors such as the Commission to
put additional pressure on national leaders and MEPs to agree to reforms of the
Eurozone’s institutional architecture. As one observer argues, “The central bank
cannot directly compel democratically elected leaders to comply with its wishes,
but it can refuse to bail their countries out and thereby permit the crisis to pressure
them to act.”(Bergsten, 2012) In short, by emphasising the deficiencies of existing
policy, and exaggerating the likely future trajectory of a crisis, agenda-setting
actors can cajole decision-makers into passing the policies that they propose.
We describe how crises enable agenda-setters to overcome legislative opposi-
tion to policy change, but there is no explicit role for voters in our model. An
enrichment of the model would be to make legislators subject to voter pressure.
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However, for this to make a difference to the power of the agenda-setter, vot-
ers would have to respond to crises by sanctioning some courses of action whilst
prohibiting others. More likely, we believe, is that voters’ main desire is for politi-
cians to ‘get something done’ in the face of a crisis, thus endowing agenda-setting
actors with a public mandate that reinforces the legislative mandate they gain in
our model. If anything, this will further discourage legislators from voting for the
status-quo. As Keeler (1993, 441) argues, a sense of public urgency “may serve
to override …caution …and allows for unusually rapid and uncritical acceptance of
reform proposals intended to resolve the crisis.” This urgency therefore makes the
electorate more permissive of policy proposals, and so reinforces agenda-setters
discretion. The incorporation of electoral effects into our model may well serve
to reinforce the central implication that agenda-setters benefit, regardless of what
they aim to use the crisis to accomplish.
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4
Legislative Role Models: Female
Ministers, Participation, and
Influence in the UK House of
Commons
Abstract
When women are promoted to high political office, do they serve as role models to
other women in politics? I evaluate a female role-model hypothesis by examining
patterns of participation and influence in parliamentary debates in the UK House
of Commons. In the context of a difference-in-differences design which exploits
variation in the gender of cabinet ministers over an 18-year period, I demonstrate
that appointing a female minister increases the proportion of words spoken by
other female MPs in relevant debates by approximately one third, compared to
when the minister is male. Further, I develop a new measure of influence in par-
liamentary speech, based on the degree to which the words used by one legislator
are subsequently adopted by other members in debate, which I use to show that
female cabinet ministers also increase the influence of female backbenchers. To
explore the mechanisms that drive these results, I introduce a new quantitative
metric of ministerial responsiveness based on the linguistic similarity between a
backbencher’s speech and a minister’s reply, and show that female cabinet minis-
ters are significantly more responsive to the speeches of female backbenchers than
are male ministers.
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Many years ago I worked in the House of Commons for a woman
that I admired very much called Barbara Castle. She was my
role model because I felt, well, if Barbara can do it then I can do
it. (Boothroyd, 2013)
Baroness Boothroyd, Former Speaker of the House of Commons.
When women are promoted to high political office, do they serve
as role models to other women in politics? The factors that determine the ap-
pointment of women to political leadership roles have been the subject of increas-
ing study in recent years (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson, 2005;
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008; Bochel and Bochel, 2008; Krook
and O’Brien, 2012; O’Brien, 2015), but we know considerably less about the im-
plications of these appointments for the behaviour of other politicians, or for the
representation of women’s interests in politics more generally. This is surprising
as research suggests that female leaders may be especially consequential for in-
fluencing the behaviour of other women in a group. In particular, the idea that
successful or prominent women can act as ‘role models’ receives empirical sup-
port in a number of different settings, including electoral politics (Wolbrecht and
Campbell, 2007; Beaman et al., 2008; Gilardi, 2015), education (Gilbert, 1985;
Nixon and Robinson, 1999; Rask and Bailey, 2002; Bettinger and Long, 2005;
Dee, 2007; Brajer and Gill, 2010; Beaman et al., 2012) and business (Wang and
Kelan, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2014). However, this line of research has not thus far
considered the possible effects of female role models within the legislature. As the
quote in the epigraph suggests, the potential for successful women to act as role
models for other women in the legislature is acknowledged by female politicians
themselves, and yet this idea has not previously been subjected to systematic
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empirical scrutiny.
In this study, I address this gap in the literature, and move beyond anecdotal
evidence, by evaluating a female role-model hypothesis in the context of the UK
House of Commons. I focus on one particularly visible leadership role in the
legislature – cabinet ministers in the UK government – and I study the effects of
the appointment of female cabinet ministers on the participation and influence of
other female members of parliament (MPs) in plenary debates.
Analyses of parliamentary speechmaking are increasingly common in political
science research (Quinn et al., 2010; Proksch and Slapin, 2012; Lauderdale and
Herzog, 2016), and they offer important advantages for improving our under-
standing of patterns of representation in legislative politics. For example, when
speaking is a mechanism for collective decision-making, inequalities in partici-
pation and influence may reflect deeper inequalities between groups (Karpowitz,
Mendelberg and Shaker, 2012). Furthermore, the ways in which individuals inter-
act in group discussions can provide important insights into relative distributions
of power, particularly with regard to gender (Karakowsky, McBey and Miller,
2004). Understanding the conditions under which female legislators participate
and hold influence in political debates is therefore important for evaluating the
representation of women’s interests in politics more broadly. The goal of this pa-
per is to examine one factor that might affect women’s experiences and behaviour
in plenary debate: the presence of female role models in high-powered positions
in the legislature.
I argue that the appointment of a female cabinet minister may have both sym-
bolic and behavioural consequences which affect other female MPs’ willingness to
participate in debate, and the influence they enjoy as a result of their participa-
tion. When women are appointed to high-office, this sends a signal to other female
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legislators about the benefits to be gained from participating in policymaking, and
may help to break down historically constructed stereotypes concerning the ap-
propriateness of female political rule. Furthermore, female ministers’ debating
styles are likely to be more conducive to, and encouraging of, the participation
of other female MPs in parliamentary debate. In the UK, cabinet ministers are
highly visible actors in the policy process and play a central role in the parlia-
mentary debates that relate to their ministries, speaking frequently to answer
questions and to propose legislation for consideration. Consequently, I expect the
appointment of a female minister to lead to higher levels of female participation
and influence in debates that are presided over by the new minister.
Causally identifying such role-model effects is, however, empirically challenging.
Ministries to which women are appointed are likely to differ in several ways from
ministries presided over by men, and these differences may confound any simple
cross-ministry estimates. In particular, the factors that drive the appointment of
female ministers to certain ministries are almost certainly correlated with the prob-
ability that women participate in policy debates pertaining to those ministries.
For example, women are more likely to be appointed to traditionally “feminine”
cabinet posts (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008; Krook and O’Brien,
2012), and female legislators are also disproportionately likely to contribute to de-
bates that deal with traditionally “feminine” policy areas (Taylor-Robinson and
Heath, 2003; Bird, 2005; Catalano, 2009). If this is the case in the UK, then
simple estimates of the relationship between cabinet minister gender and female
debate participation will be upwardly biased.
The strategy here makes progress by examining the participation of female
MPs in a framework which exploits within-ministry variation in the gender of
the cabinet minister. By assigning each debate to a specific ministry, I compare
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the level of female debate participation in a ministry before and after a switch
in the gender of the minister, and compare this difference to changes in female
participation in other ministries where the gender of the minister remains constant.
This approach – which is equivalent to a ‘difference-in-differences’ design in a
multi-period setting – allows me to rule out any omitted variable bias that could be
attributed to any fixed tendencies of women to engage with the work of particular
ministries and not others. Using this design-based framework to analyse over
half a million Commons’ speeches between 1997 and 2015, I demonstrate that
when women are appointed to high-profile cabinet positions, other female MPs are
more likely to contribute to legislative debates that pertain to the relevant female-
occupied ministries. Appointing a female minister increases the participation of
women MPs in relevant debates by between 11% and 64% over the level of female
participation under male ministers.
These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications and provide
strong evidence of a role-model effect, but in isolation they reveal relatively little
about how these debate contributions are received by others in the House. If
women speak more after the appointment of a female minister, but the issues that
they raise are ignored by other parliamentarians, then the substantive importance
of the role-model effect may be questioned. I address this issue by building on
new techniques for identifying important speakers in political debate (Erkan and
Radev, 2004; Fader et al., 2007), which I use to examine the influence of female
MPs. I model the speeches of a parliamentary debate as a directed graphical
network, and assess the relative linguistic centrality of members’ speeches within
a debate-graph in order to infer how influential each MP is in each debate. The
strategy is based on the assumption that the more that an MP’s language is
adopted by other MPs in subsequent speeches, the more influential is the MP.
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Using this measure I show that in addition to becoming more loquacious, women
also become more influential in debate when their female colleagues are elevated
to high-office.
The mechanisms that lie behind the role-model effect are likely to be many and
varied. While the symbolic effects of the appointment of a female minister are
in essence unobservable, I provide evidence consistent with the idea that female
ministers behave systematically differently towards female MPs than do male min-
isters. Drawing on research in social linguistics which emphasises the importance
of facilitative speech styles for encouraging speech from one’s conversational part-
ners (Hannah and Murachver, 1999, 2007; Thomson, Murachver and Green, 2001),
I introduce a new quantitative measure of ministerial responsiveness which cap-
tures the degree to which ministers engage with the words used by backbenchers
in their speeches. A minister is more responsive when the language they use to
reply to a backbencher is more similar to the words that the backbencher uses.
I use this measure to demonstrate that female ministers are substantially more
responsive than their male counterparts to the speeches made by female MPs, but
that there is no gendered difference in ministerial responses to the speeches made
by male MPs.
Next, I discuss the importance of role models in the legislature. In section
three, I outline the data, sample, and identification strategy, and in section four I
analyse how the appointment of a female minister affects the participation of other
female MPs. The fifth section introduces the strategy for measuring influence, and
present results using this strategy. The sixth section considers the importance of
ministerial responsiveness in accounting for the role-model effect, and the seventh
section considers alternative explanations. A final section concludes.
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Role models in the legislature
Existing research provides evidence for a female role-model hypothesis outside of
the legislative setting. For example, in countries with higher proportions of female
representatives, women are more likely to discuss politics, and to participate in
political activities such as demonstrating, petition signing, and joining political
parties (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). The election of female politicians has
been shown to have substantively important effects on the educational attainment
and career aspirations of adolescent girls (Beaman et al., 2012) and to increase the
propensity for other women to stand for elections (Beaman et al., 2008; Gilardi,
2015).1 Beyond political science, assignment to same-sex teachers can significantly
improve educational achievement (Dee, 2007; Nixon and Robinson, 1999; Gilbert,
1985); influence the course choices of students later in their university life (Rask
and Bailey, 2002; Bettinger and Long, 2005); and improve communication between
students and teachers (Brajer and Gill, 2010). In addition, the appointment of
women to corporate boards has been shown to increase the number of women
occupying other leadership positions within business (Wang and Kelan, 2013;
Bertrand et al., 2014). Overall, these studies provide evidence of positive role-
model effects for women in diverse organisational settings. Why, then, might
these role-model effects also translate to the legislative context?
Legislators face a budget constraint in terms of the time available to them when
taking decisions about how to allocate their attention to different policymaking
activities. For example, legislators might devote substantial time to drafting leg-
islation, serving on committees, attending to constituency work, or speaking in
debates in parliament. Rational legislators will therefore devote relatively more
1Though see Broockman (2014) for contrasting evidence.
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time to those activities that bring them higher utility, and refrain from partici-
pating in activities that have higher opportunity costs. In this section I discuss
a number of impediments faced by female politicians deciding whether to spend
time debating policy on the parliamentary floor, and suggest why the appoint-
ment of a woman to a legislative leadership position may help to mitigate these
impediments.
A key finding in the electoral literature is that women see themselves as less
qualified to run for political office than men, even when they have comparable
credentials and experience (Fox and Lawless, 2011). Similarly, holding constant
objective levels of political knowledge, both women and men tend to view women
as less informed about political matters (Mendez and Osborn, 2010). These pat-
terns have been offered as explanations for the fact that women are less likely to
run for political office than men (Fox and Lawless, 2004). In the legislative sphere,
if women see themselves as less qualified for office than comparable men, women
may also see themselves as less qualified for participating in certain aspects of
the policy process. For example, there is evidence that women tend to stand for,
and be elected to, predominantly “feminine” cabinet assignments and committee
positions within legislatures (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008; Krook
and O’Brien, 2012). Similarly, evidence from the House of Commons suggests that
women contribute significantly more to policy debates that concern traditionally
feminine issues, but less to debates associated with more masculine policy areas
(Bird, 2005; Catalano, 2009). When both women and men view women as less
suitable for contributing to legislation in certain policy areas, it is less likely that
women will participate in the process that shapes such legislation.
In addition, parliamentary politics, and political debate in particular, may be
especially subject to gender-imbalances. Theorists have suggested that the politi-
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cal culture of parliament is contra-indicated to female influence in political discus-
sion. These arguments propose that parliament has long been seen as a masculine
institution, where female behavioural traits are considered less important and less
effective than male ones. The implication of this ‘gendered’ nature of the practice
of politics, is that women are subject to pressures that discourage them from par-
ticipating in policymaking. Lovenduski (2005, 48), for example, argues that “the
most difficult obstacle [for women] is the deeply embedded culture of masculinity
that pervades political institutions.” In the specific context of UK politics, the
declamatory and adversarial style of Westminster debate (Childs, 2004) is seen
as particularly antithetical to the participation and influence of women in the
policy-process.
An interesting series of recent experimental papers demonstrate that the gender
balance in a political discussion groups can have significant effects on women’s
experiences in debate. For example, as the proportion of women in a group de-
creases, women are likely to be interrupted more often by men (Mendelberg,
Karpowitz and Oliphant, 2014); discussion will focus less on traditional “women’s
issues” (Mendelberg, Karpowitz and Goedert, 2014); and each individual women
will speak less (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker, 2012). As Karpowitz et al.
(2012, 534) summarise: “In mixed-gender discussions, women will speak less and
be less influential than men. These disadvantages will increase as the group gender
composition skews toward males.” These studies also find that group composition
interacts with the decision-making rule under which the groups operate. When
groups operate under majority-rule (as opposed to unanimity), women experience
less conducive speaking environments. This is particularly relevant when thinking
about parliamentary settings, where women normally constitute a small propor-
tion of discussants, and discussions almost always take place under majoritarian
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decision rules.
Finally, participation in policymaking is costly, and politicians of both sexes will
engage in the political process only to the degree that the costs of participation
are outweighed by the benefits that they receive. However, evidence suggests that
female politicians face a greater degree of uncertainty than their male counter-
parts over the benefits that accrue from participating in policymaking. For exam-
ple, women are systematically under-represented in leadership positions (Davis,
1997; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Krook and O’Brien,
2012), and tend to be appointed to leadership roles in unfavourable circumstances
(O’Brien, 2015). Even when women are appointed to cabinet positions, they tend
to control low prestige portfolios (Studlar and Moncrief, 1999; Russell and De-
Lancey, 2002), and, during scandals, women are more likely to receive adverse
press coverage, and are more likely to stand down (Larcinese and Sircar, 2012).
When the benefits of participating in the policy process are low or uncertain, ratio-
nal politicians will refrain from engaging in the costly process of becoming policy
experts, and will be less likely to engage in policymaking activities, including
participating in legislative debate.
In appendix section C.1, I provide descriptive evidence that female politicians
are indeed underrepresented in parliamentary debates in the House of Commons.
In the period I study, women held approximately 23% of the seats in parliament,
but uttered just 17% of the words in parliamentary debate. Even controlling for
party, women speak on average 18% less than if speaking time were allocated
proportionally according to male and female parliamentary seat shares. Although
this evidence does not reveal the factors that cause such a gender-gap, the data
suggest that in the UK case, in addition to being under-represented numerically in
terms of the number of seats they hold in parliament, women are also significantly
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under-represented in policy debates on the House floor.
Why would the appointment of women to positions of power encourage other
female legislators to participate in plenary debate? I focus on two broad argu-
ments. First, when female legislators are promoted to positions of high office, they
may serve as examples of success to other women in the legislature. According
to this view, female role models have symbolic effects, as their appointment sends
important signals to other women that change the incentives for participating
in debate. Second, although a narrow conception of role models would empha-
sise purely these symbolic effects, female leaders may also behave systematically
differently than their male counterparts, and differences in their behaviour may
change the incentives for other female legislators to participate in parliamentary
debate. In this view, it is the interaction between female role models and other
women in the group that affects the incentives for participation.
First, when women are promoted to positions of high-political office, this serves
as an informative signal to other women regarding their suitability for, and the
rewards to be gained from, participating in plenary discussions. For example, if
female politicians do see themselves as under-qualified relative to male politicians,
then observing the success of one woman in a policy area may send a signal that
women in general are qualified to contribute to that domain. In social psychol-
ogy, this argument is closely tied to how individuals perceive their own qualities
in relation to those of others. As Lockwood (2006, 37) argues, when women see
themselves as unsuited for certain activities, “the success of another woman…may
have a positive impact on their self-perceptions.” Female legislative role mod-
els that lead to such changes in self-perception may therefore encourage further
participation of other women in plenary discussion.
In addition, the appointment of a woman may also reduce uncertainty regard-
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ing the potential benefits of participation. The elevation of a female legislator
indicates that the government is willing to promote women, and if government
promotions are based, at least in part, on legislators’ effort in policymaking activ-
ities, then the appointment of a woman to key ministries or committees demon-
strates that such investments can lead to political rewards. In the literature on
role models in education, Nixon and Robinson (1999, 186) suggest, “The amount
by which the uncertainty is reduced will be a function of how closely the student
can identify with her role model and how easily she can envision herself achiev-
ing what her role model has achieved.” Cabinet ministers, committee chairs, and
other positions of high office, are typically drawn from the existing pool of legis-
lators, meaning that other members are likely to identify closely with the newly
appointed figures. Female legislators will therefore update their beliefs about their
qualifications for participating in the policy process, and the gains to be accrued
from participation, when they observe other similar women being rewarded for
making such investments.
Furthermore, female appointments may break down historically constructed
stereotypes regarding the appropriateness of female leadership. The historical
marginalisation of women in high-power roles may create entrenched perceptions
that certain policy areas, and even politics in general, represent distinctly “male
domains” (Sapiro, 1981, 712). Research in social psychology suggests that group-
based stereotypes are often the source of negative evaluations of the capabilities
of group members – something that is particularly apparent in the context of
women’s suitability for leadership roles (Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Eagly and
Karau, 2002) – and that exposure to role models can help to undermine stereotypic
beliefs (Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004). By breaking with historical patterns, the
appointment of women to powerful cabinet positions may therefore reverse the
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impression that women are unsuitable for participation in politics. As Mansbridge
(1999, 628) suggests, descriptive representation of previously marginalised groups
creates “a social meaning of ‘ability to rule’ for members of a group in historical
contexts where that ability has been seriously questioned.” The consequence of
such a shift may further reinforce beliefs that women can play an active role in
policymaking, and thus make them more likely to participate in plenary debates.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the appointment of a female leg-
islative leader might have important signalling effects which affect the incentives
for other women in parliament to participate in debate. However, the symbolic
presence of female role models, while important, is not necessarily the only mech-
anism through which a role-model effect in the legislature might operate. Agsari
et al. (2010) find, for example, that the motivational effects of female role models
in other settings are driven, at least in part, by the quantity and quality of inter-
actions between role models and other women in a group. This suggests that the
mechanisms underpinning role-model effects may also be due to the differential
ways in which male and female leaders behave toward their fellow group members.
Consequently, one potential source of a female role-model effect in legislative de-
bates is in differences in the debating styles of male and female legislative leaders.
Evidence from previous research suggests that male and female leaders differ
systematically in their leadership styles. For example, Eagly and Johnson (1990)
find that women tend to be more democratic in their approach to leadership. In
the legislative context, Kathlene (1994) finds that female committee chairs act
more as moderators or facilitators, rather than directors, of committee discus-
sions, speaking less and make fewer interruptions than their male counterparts.
Similarly, Karpowitz et al. (2012, 534) suggest that female rhetorical styles are,
in general, less aggressive, more inclusive, and more cooperative than male speech
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patterns.
In the UK context, it is argued that female politicians in the House of Commons
encourage a more cooperative, approachable, and practical form of politics than
their male colleagues (Lovenduski and Norris, 1996; Bochel and Briggs, 2000).
Female MPs also recognise this difference, with many suggesting that women in
parliament tend to employ a distinct form of language and debating style (Childs,
2000). Cabinet ministers have institutionally privileged positions that almost al-
ways mean that they speak first in debates, and speak more often than backbench
MPs (Rogers and Walters, 2006, 287-310). Therefore, it is possible that the ap-
pointment of a female cabinet minister will lead to a qualitative change in the
interactions between ministers and backbenchers in debate. Consequently, cab-
inet ministers may not only set the content of the agenda (Laver and Shepsle,
1994), but may also guide the tone of parliamentary debate for other members.
If female ministers provide a more conducive environment for female legislators,
this may lead to a greater willingness on the part of other women to participate
more fully in plenary debate.
Similarly, an extensive literature in social linguistics also provides evidence for
differences in conversational style between women and men. In general, women are
characterised by facilitative styles of speech, marked by high levels of politeness
and responsiveness, while male speech is seen as less facilitative (Hannah and
Murachver, 1999, 2007; Thomson, Murachver and Green, 2001; Holmes, 2013).
These styles are strongly predictive of the speaking time of conversational part-
ners. As Thomson et al. (2001, 171) suggest, “because women are more likely
than men to function as facilitators in conversation, they are more likely to elicit
speech from their partners.” An important component of these styles is the de-
gree to which an individuals’ contributions to discussion are responded to and
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acknowledged by other participants (Hannah and Murachver, 2007). Legislatures
are often marked by highly gendered conversational dynamics in which male con-
tributions to policymaking are “heard” more than female contributions (Kathlene,
1994; Hawkesworth, 2003). Accordingly, one potential locus of a role-model effect
is in the differential responsiveness of male and female high-office-holders. If fe-
male cabinet ministers provide higher quality responses to the speeches of female
legislators than do their male counterparts, the status of women in legislative de-
bate is likely to increase when a woman is appointed. Such an increase in status
is likely to be concomitant with increases in the degree of influence that women
enjoy, and thus their willingness to participate in plenary debate.
In summary, female legislators face diverse impediments when considering the
decision to participate in plenary debate, and the appointment of women to high
political office may serve to mitigate some of these impediments. Female legislative
leaders represent important symbols for other women – signalling that women are
qualified for participating across a range of issue areas, and that there are signifi-
cant gains to be made from engaging with the policymaking process. Furthermore,
differences in the legislative behaviour of male and female high-office holders may
also affect the participation decisions of female legislators. In the context of the
House of Commons, cabinet ministers are highly visible actors who play a central
role in parliamentary debate, making them good candidates to be role models for
other women in parliament. Accordingly, the central implication that I test in the
next section is that when a female MP is appointed to lead a ministry previously
held by a man, other female MPs will be more likely to participate in debates that
pertain to that ministry than they would have been previously.
In addition, participation and influence in parliamentary debate are closely re-
lated concepts (Kathlene, 1994, 573), and empirical research suggests that inequal-
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ities in participation between men and women are also associated with gender-
based inequalities in influence (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker, 2012). Ac-
cordingly, in the subsequent section I go beyond analysing participation and eval-
uate the hypothesis that the appointment of a female minister will also be asso-
ciated with an increase in the level of influence that female MPs experience in
plenary debate.
Data, sample, and methodology
I study all House of Commons floor debates between May 1997 and May 2015. I
collected this information from theyworkforyou.com, a public website that cat-
alogues all speeches made by UK MPs. The full sample contains 17,749 debates,
comprising just over a million individual speeches. In this section, I am interested
in comparing the volume of speeches delivered by women in debates pertaining to
ministry m at time t when the minister for ministry m is female to the counter-
factual in which the minister is male.
The key independent variable is the gender of the minister responsible for a
ministry at a given point in time. The dummy variable, FemaleMinistermt, is
equal to one when the minister responsible for a given ministry m in time t is a
woman, and zero otherwise.
FemaleMinistermt =
8><>:1; if Ministermt is female0; otherwise (4.1)
Figure 4.1 shows the variation in this variable over time for all 23 ministries
included in the sample. Ministries are sorted by the proportion of the time period
that the ministry is occupied by a female minister. Orange bars pertain to periods
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Figure 4.1: Gender of ministers over time
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the independent variable over time. While some
ministries are never held by a woman (those all in orange), and the Women’s ministry is always
presided over by a woman (all in blue), the gender of the minister in several ministries varies
over time.
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in which the minister responsible is male, and blue bars represent female ministers.
The only ministry that is always held by a woman is the Women’s ministry.
There are several ministries for which the responsible minister is never a woman,
including the Justice ministry, the Defence ministry, as well as the positions of
Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer. While I include all 23 ministries
in the empirical analysis, identification of the role-model effect relies only on those
ministries which see a change in the gender of the cabinet minister over time.
The empirical analysis requires that each debate is mapped to an individual
ministry. As the total number of debates is large, manual categorisation is not
feasible. In order to assign debates to ministries, I note whether a current cabinet
minister speaks in a given debate, and assign the debate to the ministry for which
that cabinet minister is responsible. In the cases where more than one cabinet
minister speaks, I assign the debate to the ministry of the most frequently appear-
ing cabinet minister in the debate. As cabinet ministers speak regularly in the
debates for which they are responsible (to propose legislation and field questions
from other members), this serves as an efficient way of categorising the debates.
As some debates do not contain speeches from any cabinet ministers,2 the final
sample for analysis contains 5573 debates consisting of approximately 650,000
speeches.
The outcome variable is the proportion of words spoken by female legislators
in debate d pertaining to ministry m in month t, which is calculated by dividing
the number of words spoken by women in a debate by the total number of words
2These are mostly procedural debates, and debates held on days where the opposition party
controls the agenda (Rogers and Walters, 2006, 287-310)
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spoken by all legislators.
PropWordsWomendmt =
# words spoken by womendmt
# words spoken by men and womendmt
(4.2)
When calculating this proportion, I exclude the speeches made by the ministers
themselves, ensuring that the figures are not artificially inflated by female minis-
ters speaking more after they are appointed. I also remove speeches made by the
Speaker of the House of Commons, which are almost exclusively procedural.3
Simple comparisons of the difference in the proportion of words spoken by
women between debates held under male and female ministers are likely to re-
sult in biased estimates of the effect of minister gender. Systematic differences
between ministries almost certainly affect the degree to which female legislators
choose to participate in legislative debate. For example, previous research shows
that women are significantly more likely to participate in legislative debates that
relate to areas of traditional concern to women, including health care, social pro-
vision, and children and family issues (Little, Dunn and Deen, 2001; Catalano,
2009; Pearson and Dancey, 2011). Figure C.2 in the appendix suggests that un-
observed ministry characteristics such as these are clearly influential in the data
here. Women speak significantly more in ministries such as ‘Women’, ‘Commu-
nities and Local Government’, and ‘Health’, and significantly less in debates per-
3In the appendix, I consider an alternative dependent variable: the ratio of words spoken by
women. This measure is simply the proportion of words divided by the proportion of parliamen-
tary seats held by women in month m. I also re-ran the analysis using dependent variables that
measure the proportion and ratio of speeches, rather than words. In general, the word-based
measures are preferred to the speech-based measures, as they account not only for the frequency
of debate contribution, but also the length of legislators’ contributions to debate. However, as
the results in the appendix demonstrate, the choice between these various measures is incon-
sequential to the substantive and statistical conclusions. All definitions of these variables, and
summaries of the statistical results can be found in section C.2 of the appendix. Results are
also statistically and substantively very similar if speeches by the Speaker are kept in the data.
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taining to the ‘Defence’, ‘Foreign and Commonwealth’, and ‘Justice’ ministries. If
female ministers are disproportionately appointed to ministries in which the rate
of female participation is already high, then naive comparisons between debates
presided over by female and male ministers are likely to be upwardly biased.
In order to overcome these problems, and to estimate the causal effect of the
appointment of a female minister of female debate participation, I estimate fixed-
effects regressions of the following form:
PropWordsWomendmt = 1  FemaleMinistermt + m + t + dmt (4.3)
where PropWordsWomendmt is defined in equation 4.2, m is a ministry fixed-
effect that washes out any omitted variable bias from unobserved ministry char-
acteristics that are fixed over time (such as the degree to which a ministry deals
with policy that is traditionally of greater concern to women), t is a year-month
fixed-effect to control for common shocks across ministries in a given month, and
dmt is an idiosyncratic error term. 1 is the coefficient of interest, and captures
the (reduced-form) causal effect of the appointment of a female minister on the
participation of women in House of Commons debates for those ministries that
experienced a change in minister gender over time.
This fixed-effect design is equivalent to a multi-period ‘difference-in-differences’
in the style of Angrist and Pischke (2009, 234). 1 identifies the effect of switching
from a male to female minister based on the within-ministry variation of the out-
come variable among those ministries that see changes in the gender of the minister
over time. By accounting for fixed characteristics of ministries that might predict
both female debate participation and the appointment of a female minister, the
model compares changes in female debate participation in ministries that expe-
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rience a switch in minister gender to ministries where the gender of the minister
remains constant, while differencing out the general trends across ministries in a
given month.
Identification of the causal effect relies on changes in minister gender being
exogenous to the level of female debate participation, conditional on time and
ministry fixed-effects. Accordingly, the key identifying assumption of the analy-
sis is that treated ministries would have followed the same trend as non-treated
ministries in the absence of treatment. I relax this ‘common trends’ assumption
by estimating further models which include ministry-specific linear (m1) and
quadratic (m2) time trends:
PropWordsWomendmt = 1  FemaleMinistermt + m0 + t
+m1t+ m2t
2 + dmt (4.4)
where t is a time variable. Furthermore, in contrast to the typical multi-period
‘difference-in-difference’ model, in this setting the treatment (the presence of a
female minister) switches on and off over time. That is, once appointed, a female
minister might also leave office, and ministries often see multiple female ministers
(appointed at different times) over the study period. Accordingly, in order to
account for the possibility that differential local trends within ministries might
confound the causal effect, I also estimate generalised additive models (GAM)
which include non-parametric ministry-specific time trends:
PropWordsWomendmt = 1  FemaleMinistermt + m0 + t
+m1f(t) + dmt (4.5)
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The models that include these various ministry-specific time trends represent
extremely conservative specifications, as the addition of these trends means that
all unobserved and smoothly varying confounding differences are removed from
the estimate of 1, meaning that only sharp changes to the trend in the outcome
variable that occur at the same time as the change in minister gender contribute
to this estimate. As none of the substantive or statistical results change noticeably
when this crucial identifying assumption is relaxed, this lends significant support
to the empirical design I employ. In addition, I provide further evidence for the
validity of the identification assumption by estimating a dynamic panel model,
which estimates the treatment effect in the time periods before and after the
actual change in minister gender. This model allows me to test the whether the
treated and non-treated ministries experienced systematically different levels of
female debate participation in the period leading up to the treatment. The results
from the dynamic model suggest that this is not the case, and thus reduce concerns
that the effect I observe is a feature of some factor other than the appointment
of a female minister. Finally, as there are only 23 ministries in the data, I follow
standard practice in the literature and construct bootstrapped clustered standard
errors at the ministry level for all models (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Cameron
and Miller, 2015).4
4Specifically, I bootstrap the regression model 1000 times, resampling ministries from the
full data with replacement, and estimating equations 4.3 and 4.4 at each iteration. Because
the GAM model is computationally very burdensome, I do not bootstrap this model, and the
standard errors may therefore underestimate the uncertainty in the data. Nevertheless, the
GAM model provides point estimates which are almost identical to the other models.
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Female ministers and debate participation
Before turning to the main results, I present two simple graphical analyses. First,
figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the dependent variable over time in the ministries
that experienced a change in the gender of the minister. The y-axis in the figure
gives the proportion of words spoken by female MPs in each debate (scaled from
0 to 1), and the x-axis gives the date of the debate. Blue line segments represent
periods in which the presiding minister is female, and orange segments represent
male ministers.
The plot provides clear evidence of a role-model effect whilst also revealing het-
erogeneity across ministries. In many cases, the appointment of a female minister
is accompanied by an increase in the proportion of words spoken by other female
MPs. The effect appears to be particularly pronounced in the ‘Business’, ‘Home’,
‘Local Government’, and ‘International Development’ ministries. By contrast,
there is less evidence of an effect in other ministries, though in no cases does the
appointment of a female minister appear to lead to a decrease in the proportion of
words spoken by other female MPs. This figure therefore provides initial evidence
of the hypothesised role-model effect.5
Second, figure 4.3 presents results which are akin to a regression-discontinuity
design. This analysis aims to isolate the effect of a change in the gender of
a minister on the dependent variable defined in equation 4.2. In a standard
difference-in-difference analysis, the treatment usually occurs at a fixed point in
time and affects treated units but leaves untreated units unaffected. The multi-
5In the regression analyses below, which also control for general trends in female participation
over time (i.e. across ministries), I average over this underlying heterogeneity. Although not my
primary concern here, future work could address the factors that contribute to the variation in
the role-model effect across different ministries.
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of words spoken by women in treated ministries, over time
Note: The plot shows the proportion of words spoken by women in each debate, in each
ministry that experienced a change in the gender of the presiding minister. The y-axis is the
proportion of words spoken by women in a debate (scaled from 0 to 1), and the x-axis is the date
of the debate. Blue segments represent periods when the minister in charge of a given ministry
is female, and orange segments represent periods when the minister is male.
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period model is somewhat different, as the treatment switches on at different
points in time for different ministries (as shown by figure 4.1). The plot presented
in figure 4.3 compares the average proportion of words spoken by female MPs in
debates for ministries that appoint a female minister over time to the ministries
that never appoint a female minister. I define a variable which measures the
number of months before and after a change between male and female ministers.
This variable is equal to zero in the month that a change occurs. Using this
re-centred variable, I then calculate the averages for both treated and untreated
ministries, and then plot them over time along side separate local linear regression
curves for the treated and control ministries.
Figure 4.3: The effect of female ministers on the participation of female MPs in debates
Note: The figure shows the average proportion of words spoken by women in treated (blue)
and control (orange) ministries in each month leading up to and following a change in the sex
of a minister.
The figure makes clear that while the treated and untreated ministries follow
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very similar trajectories before a female minister is appointed, there is a sharp
(positive) discontinuity when a female minister is appointed in the treated min-
istries, but a considerably smaller discontinuity for the ministries that do not
appoint a female minister. Furthermore, while the proportion of words spoken
by women in the treated ministries grows significantly after the treatment, the
trajectory for the untreated ministries remains essentially flat over time. Overall
these graphical analyses provide initial support for the main hypothesis, and give
relatively clear evidence that the rate of female participation in House of Com-
mons debates increases markedly when the minister responsible for a particular
ministry changes from male to female.
Table 4.1 presents the results of the regression analyses. Model 1 presents the
naive estimate of the effect of a female minister, without controlling for ministry or
year-month fixed-effects. Models 2 and 3 introduce these fixed-effects separately,
and model 4 presents the results of the ‘difference-in-differences’ model which
includes both ministry and time fixed-effects. The coefficient of the main variable
of interest, FemaleMinister, is positive and significant in all four of these models,
but it decreases noticeably when accounting for ministry. This suggests that
female ministers are indeed appointed to lead ministries where the level of debate
participation of other female MPs is already high. Nevertheless, the effect remains
significant in the specification in model 4, implying that the appointment of a
female minister leads to an increase in the degree of debate participation of other
female MPs in the House of Commons. The size of the effect is also substantial.
Based on model 4, the appointment of a female minister increases the proportion of
words used by women by over 5 percentage points of total words. This corresponds
to an increase of approximately 35% over the average speech rate of women in
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debates under male ministers, with a 95% confidence interval of 8% to 61%.6
The main effect is also robust to a number of alternative specifications. Models
5 and 6 introduce linear and quadratic ministry-specific time trends, and model
7 presents the results of the GAM regression, which includes non-parametric
ministry-specific time trends. As stated above, the inclusion of these trends relax
the crucial identifying assumption that treated and non-treated ministries would
have followed parallel trends in the absence of treatment. The table shows that
the effects are highly robust, regardless of these alternative specifications, and the
effect size is consistent: based on the estimates in model 6, the appointment of
a female minister increases the proportion of words spoken by other female MPs
by between 11% and 64%. That the inclusion of ministry-specific time trends
changes the estimates so little is encouraging, as it rules out the possibility that
the documented effect is driven by either global or local trends in unobserved
confounding variables.
As a final robustness check, figure 4.4 plots the coefficients estimates from the
dynamic panel (‘leads and lags’) model. Here I code a binary indicator for the
first 6 months of the treatment period in a given ministry, and then add four leads
and two lags of this indicator in addition to the full set of fixed-effects and linear
and quadratic time-trends. In line with other approaches (Autor, 2003), the final
lagged variable captures all treated periods from twelve months until the end of
the treatment period for a given ministry. The coefficients therefore represent the
estimated difference in the outcome between treated and untreated ministries in
the periods before and after the treatment occurs.
The results strongly support the identifying assumption, as I find no signif-
icant ‘placebo’ effects in the two years prior to the change in minister gender.
6The results are almost identical when considering the ratio measure (table C.1).
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Figure 4.4: Dynamic panel model estimates
Note: The plot presents estimates of switching from a male to a female minister before and
after the actual change occurred. The vertical dashed line indicates the timing of the change,
and the points indicate (at six month intervals) the difference between treated and untreated
ministries at the given time point. Estimates are generated from a dynamic panel regression
including ministry and time fixed-effects, ministry-specific linear and quadratic time trends, and
indicator variables for four leads and three lags of the change in minister gender. Confidence
intervals are constructed by bootstrapping the regression model, blocking on ministry.
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This strengthens the plausibility of the design, as it suggests that there are no
unobserved variables leading to differential trends in the outcome between the
treatment and control ministries prior to the appointment of a female minister.
Furthermore, there is a large difference between the treatment and control min-
istries once a female minister is appointed, and the effect is significantly different
from zero after the first six months. That the coefficient on the first post-treatment
period is positive but not significant might be attributed to the conservative cod-
ing of the treatment period – I measure the gender of a cabinet minister on the
1st day of each month, and therefore it is possible that some debates which occur
early in the month in which a female minister is appointed are coded as treated
whilst in reality these debates are still presided over by a male cabinet minister.
This coding would cause a downward bias in the estimate, and might explain the
insignificant coefficient on the first post-treatment indicator here.
Overall, the results presented in the graphical analyses, the main specification,
and in robustness checks, provide strong support for a female role-model hypoth-
esis: when a female minister is appointed, other women speak approximately
one third more in debates pertaining to that ministry than when the responsible
minister is male.
Female ministers and influence
The findings in the previous section indicate that female backbenchers are more
likely to participate in the policymaking process when the responsible minister is
a woman. However, changes in relative levels of participation tells us little about
how these debate contributions are received by others in the House. While partic-
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ipation and influence are likely to be linked,7 if women are speaking at increasing
rates, but the issues and concerns that they raise are largely ignored by other
parliamentarians, then the substantive importance of the documented role-model
effect may be limited. In this section, I use the texts of the parliamentary speeches
to provide evidence that female backbenchers do not only speak more after the
appointment of a female minister, but also that they play a more influential role
in political debate than under male ministers.
Which features of text might identify ‘influential’ speakers? Rather than di-
rectly analysing the content of each speech in an attempt to infer influence in
isolation, I instead study the links between speeches in order to assess the influ-
ence of any particular speech in a debate. I consider an MP to be influential
when the issues and concerns she raises in her speeches are adopted and discussed
by other members in subsequent speeches. Having other people pick up on your
framing of an issue is a way of controlling how the debate proceeds: it means
other people are taking up your perspective, whether or not they agree with it.
Influential MPs are therefore literally ‘shaping the debate’. The intuition behind
the measurement strategy is to identify distinctive language that first appears in
the statement of one MP, but then gets used subseqeuntly by later MPs.8
To proceed, I apply a method developed in machine learning for detecting influ-
ence in text corpora. The method treats a corpus of texts as a graphical network,
where influential documents are identified by their lexical centrality in the network
7“The same conditions that create disproportionate silence by women also create dispropor-
tionate authority for men.” (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker, 2012, 542, emphasis added)
8Recent experimental research in political science (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker, 2012)
measures the perceived influence of discussion participants by asking participants to indicate the
most influential discussants in a preceding debate. Such an approach is clearly not possible
here. Rather, the strategy outlined below attempts to infer speaker influence by modelling the
diffusion of distinctive language throughout a debate.
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(Erkan and Radev, 2004; Mihalcea and Tarau, 2004). Debates can be viewed as
clusters of documents that are related to each other in the language that they use.
Some speeches within a debate will share similar language, while others will share
less information with one another. The crucial intuition behind the model em-
ployed here is that those speeches that are similar to many other speeches within
the same debate are more central to the topic, and speakers of central speeches
are more influential in a legislative debate.
I assess the influence of a speech, i, by calculating how many ‘references’ i re-
ceives from other speeches within the debate.9 One speech, j, can be understood
to ‘reference’ another, i, when it occurs after i in the debate and when it comprises
language which is sufficiently similar to that used by i. By using similar language
to i, j is implicitly indicating that i is relevant and important for the discussion
at hand. Of course, there are myriad reasons why one speech may use similar lan-
guage to another (direct quotation; expression of criticism; statement of support;
coincidence). However, the goal here is not to assess the substantive meaning of
each link. Rather, we assume that a speech that is linked to (shares language
with) many other speeches is being collectively referenced and thus can be con-
sidered an important and influential speech within the debate. A simple way of
assessing influence would therefore be to simply count the number of references
each speech receives. That is, to count up how many speeches are similar (given
an appropriate minimum similarity threshold) to the speech we are interested in.
Here, I take a more nuanced approach which considers not only the number of
9The use of the term ‘reference’ here does not imply that one member is literally referring to
the speech of another member (as would be the case, for instance, in the phrase “the honourable
member makes an important point in her speech”), nor does it imply that the member is directly
quoting another member’s speech. Rather, I use the term as a heuristic for describing the
tendency for the vocabulary used in the speech of one member to be subsequently used in the
speeches of other members.
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references a given speech receives, but also incorporates information about the
influence of the referencing speeches. Thus, the more references i receives, and
the higher the influence of the referencing speeches, the higher is the influence i
within the debate.
I draw on the work in Fader et al. (2007) which describes a model for identi-
fying salient participants in political discussion. This method aims to measure
the influence of speeches in a debate by analysing the debate as a network in
which speeches are nodes and the similarity between the speeches are edges. The
method proceeds in two steps: first, I construct similarity graphs for all speeches
in each debate; second, I analyse the graphs using an iterative ranking algorithm
to calculate a vector of centrality scores, P , which correspond to the influence of
each speech in each debate.
Construction of a debate-specific similarity graph, Sd, begins with the selection
of a metric which measures how linguistically similar two speeches are to one
another. I follow Fader et al. (2007) and Erkan and Radev (2004) and use term-
frequency-inverse-document-frequency (tf-idf) cosine-similarity. I use a ‘bag-of-
words’ model to represent each speech as an N -dimensional vector, where N is
the number of unique words in the entire corpus. Each element in the vector is
a count of the number of times a given word, w, appears in a given speech, s,
multiplied by the logged inverse document frequency of that word, to create a
weighted term-frequency score, vws, for each word in each speech. Where N is
the total number of unique words in the corpus, and nw is the number times that
word w appears in the corpus, and tfws is the number times that word w appears
in speech s, the score for w in s is given by:
vws = tfws  log(N
nw
) (4.6)
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A high value of vws occurs when a word is used frequently in a given speech,
but infrequently in the corpus as a whole. The weights thus filter out very com-
mon words such as ‘stopwords’, and ensure that the vector representation of the
speeches mostly reflects topically-salient features of the political debate.
Having calculated the tf-idf vectors for each speech in the corpus, I construct D
similarity matrices (one for each debate), the typical element of which is: Sd(i; j) =
sim(vi; vj), the cosine-similarity of the weighted word-count vectors of speeches i
and j in debate d. Each graph (again, one for each debate) therefore consists of
nodes that represent speeches in a debate, and edges which are placed between
speeches for which sim(vi; vj) is greater than some threshold value, Smin.10 The
edges are then weighted by the similarity scores.
The method presented here differs from the original formulation in Fader et al.
(2007) and Erkan and Radev (2004) in that I construct directed rather than undi-
rected graphs for analysis. Because the cosine-similarity relation is symmetric
(i.e. because Sd(i; j) = Sd(j; i)), previous work has only considered undirected
networks where edges between nodes run in both directions and receive the same
weight. However, as I conceptualise influence as the degree to which language used
in one speech is adopted in subsequent speeches, it is necessary to take the tem-
poral ordering of debate into account when constructing the graphical network.
Put simply, it does not make sense for speeches that occur later in the debate
to ‘influence’ speeches that occur earlier in the debate. To address this issue, I
focus on only the upper triangle of the similarity matrices, Sd, while setting all
elements in the lower triangle to zero. The consequence of this is that ‘references’
from one speech to another can only flow in one direction: later speeches can
10Throughout the analysis I set Smin to 0.1, in line with Erkan and Radev (2004).
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reference earlier ones, but not vice versa.11 While this is an important theoretical
distinction between my approach and previous work, using a directed graph makes
no difference to the computation of the influence scores.
As described above, the influence of a speech is determined by the number of
references it receives from other speeches within a debate (i.e. by the number
of speeches which are linguistically similar to it), and by the influence of the
referencing speeches. In the simplified case where all edges receive a weight of
1, an intuitive way of formulating this idea is to imagine that each speech has
an influence value, and that this value gets distributed to the speeches that it
references:
p(i) =
X
j2adj(i)
p(j)
deg(j)
(4.7)
Where p(i) is the influence of speech i, adj(i) is the set of speeches that have
edges with i, and deg(j) is the degree of node j (the degree of a node is simply
the number of edges that connects the node to other nodes). This formulation
emphasises that a speech is more influential when it is referenced by many other
speeches (adj(i)), when the influence of the referencing speeches (p(j)) increases,
and when the referencing speeches reference relatively few other speeches (deg(j)).
Weighting the edges of the network by Sd(i; j) allows references to vary in strength
(according to the similarity between speeches i and j) and we can reformulate
11An implication of this choice is that a speaker is more likely to be influential when he or
she speaks earlier in the debate. As discussed below, and as I demonstrate in figure C.3 in
the appendix, although the influence scores correlate with debate position, they clearly measure
distinct concepts. Nevertheless, it is of course possible that influential speeches may be made
in the closing stages of a debate, and this would clearly not be captured by my measure. An
alternative approach would be to allow references to run in both directions (i.e. by using an
undirected graph). However, I opt for the former approach, as an undirected graph would run
the risk of counting as influential those MPs who simply summarise preceding speeches.
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equation 4.7 to include the weights in Sd via:
p(i) =
X
j2adj(i)
Sd(i; j)P
k2adj(j) Sd(k; j)
p(j) (4.8)
Equation 4.8 makes clear that the reference that speech i receives from speech j
is determined by the linguistic similarity between i and j (the numerator), and the
similarity between j and all of the speeches that j references (the denominator).
Fader et al. (2007) and Erkan and Radev (2004) show that computation of the
vector of influence scores, P , is achieved by calculating the left eigenvector of
the row-normalised similarity matrix Sd via the PageRank algorithm, which was
originally designed for computing webpage prestige in the Google search engine
(Page et al., 1999). I implement the algorithm using the iGraph package in R
(Csardi and Nepusz, 2006).
Figure 4.5 provides two plots to highlight the intuition behind the measurement
procedure. The left-hand plot depicts the similarity matrix, Sd, for an example
debate with 14 separate speeches. Speakers are sorted according to the order in
which they participated in the debate, such that Taylor is the first speaker and
Boothroyd is the last speaker. As explained above, I only allow one speech to ref-
erence another when it occurs later in the debate than the speech it is referencing.
Accordingly, the bottom triangle of the matrix is empty. I also exclude the possi-
bility that a speaker can reference herself (as indicated by the grey shaded boxes in
the figure). The orange-shaded squares indicate the cosine similarity between two
speeches, and are scaled such that when the similarity between a pair of speeches
is 1 (i.e. when the speeches are identical in terms of the weighted word vectors)
the orange square will fill the dashed box that contains it. Several elements of the
upper triangle are empty, and these cases correspond to the speech pairs where
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Figure 4.5: Schematic example of ‘influence’ in a debate
Note: The left panel shows the ‘reference’ patterns for an example debate. Speakers
are sorted according to the order in which they speak in debate (such that Taylor was the first
speaker in this debate, and Boothroyd the final speaker). The orange-shaded squares indicate
the similarity between two speeches and are scaled such that when two speeches are identical,
the orange square will fill the dashed box that contains it. Larger orange squares therefore
indicate a greater linguistic similarity between two speeches, and thus a stronger ‘reference’
from one speech to another. The right panel depicts the similarity matrix as a network graph.
An edge exists between two speeches when the similarity between the two speeches is greater
than the threshold Smin. The nodes are shaded so that more influential speakers are darker.
the similarity between the speeches is lower than Smin. The left panel shows, for
example, that Taylor’s speech is referenced by many subsequent speeches, while
Tyler’s speech is referenced only by Trimble and Illsley. The right margin of the
plot gives the vector of influence scores for this debate as calculated from the
PageRank procedure. In this debate, Taylor’s speech has an influence score of
0.27 and Tyler’s speech has an influence score of just 0.06. The right-hand panel
depicts the same similarity matrix as a directed network graph, with speeches as
nodes and edges as the ‘references’ flowing from one speech to another. Consistent
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with the left-hand panel, Taylor’s speech is referenced by many other members,
while other speakers receive very few references. Bottomley, Smyth, Colman and
Boothroyd, for instance, make speeches which are not sufficiently similar to any
subsequent speeches and therefore these speakers receive no references.
A potential objection is that the measure here may be driven by other features of
parliamentary speech. Crucially, we may be concerned that influence is proxying
for speech length. If this is the case, then finding that the appointment of a female
minister increases the influence of other female MPs would be unsurprising, as the
previous section has already demonstrated that women are using relatively more
words in debate after such an appointment. Additionally, because references only
flow from later speeches to earlier ones, there may be a relationship between
influence and the position that a speech occurs in a debate. In the example in
figure 4.5, there appears to be a correlation between speech position and influence,
with earlier speeches being more influential than later ones. In figure C.3 in the
appendix I investigate the relationship between influence and both speech length
and debate position across all debates in the sample. As the figures show, there
is a very weak relationship between length and influence (the average correlation
across all debates is 0.09), and although there is a stronger negative association
between influence and debate position, the influence measure is clearly picking up
information above and beyond simple debate ordering (the average correlation is
 0:49).
Validation is essential for text-based measures of political concepts (Grimmer
and Stewart, 2013), and the influence measure proposed here has been subjected
to validity checks in previous work.12 I test two relatively unambiguous intu-
12Fader et al. (2007) show that the influence scores calculated for speeches made in the US
Senate correlate strongly with membership and seniority in Senate legislative committees.
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itions about which actors in the House of Commons we expect to be influential
in parliamentary debate. First, government ministers should be on average more
influential than other MPs when participating in plenary debate. Ministers play
a crucial role in setting the agenda for parliamentary business, and their speeches
are frequently used to outline policy that we would expect others to comment on
extensively. Second, the Speaker of the House should be on average less influential
than other members. The majority of the Speaker’s contributions are procedural,
and have little to do with the substantive matters under discussion. Therefore, the
language the Speaker uses should not be adopted frequently by other members. I
test these expectations by regressing the influence score on binary indicators for
whether the MP delivering the speech was either the cabinet minister responsible
for the current debate, or the Speaker. The results, presented in table C.4 in the
appendix, strongly support the expectations: speeches made by cabinet ministers
are on average 62% more influential than those of other MPs, while speeches made
by the Speaker are 12% less influential than speeches made by other members.
This provides reassuring evidence regarding the face validity of the measure of
influence described above.
With this measure in hand, I now analyse the effect of the appointment of a
female cabinet minister on the influence of female MPs. I use a similar fixed-effects
identification strategy as employed above, but in contrast to the previous analysis
here I concentrate on changes at the individual speech – rather than debate –
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level.13 I estimate models of the form:
influences(imt) = 1  FemaleMPi + 2  FemaleMinistermt +
3  (FemaleMPi  FemaleMinistermt) +
m0 + m1t+ m2t
2 + t + s(imt) (4.9)
where influences(imt) represents the influence of speech s by member i in a
debate pertaining to ministry m at time t. FemaleMPi is a binary variable,
equal to one when the MP delivering the speech is female, and zero otherwise.
FemaleMinistermt is equal to one when the minister responsible for ministry m
and time t is female, and zero otherwise. 1 captures the average difference in
influence between male and female MPs when the minister is male. 2 represents
the marginal effect of a female minister on the influence of male MPs, and the
equivalent effect for female MPs – and the main quantity of interest – is given
by 2 + 3. The role-model hypothesis implies that 2 + 3 > 0, i.e. that fe-
male MPs’ influence increases after the appointment of a woman minister. As
with the previous analysis, in addition to ministry and time fixed-effects (m0 and
t, respectively), I also relax the common trend assumption with the addition
of ministry-specific linear (m1) and quadratic (m2) time trends. I also provide
estimates for a GAM model, which includes ministry-specific non-parametric time
trends. Finally, as in the previous analysis, errors are clustered at the ministry
level to account for correlation of the error term within ministries. Table 4.2
presents the results.
Model 1 gives the results of a naive specification without controlling for ministry
13As in the previous analysis, I exclude all speeches made by cabinet ministers to avoid
artificially inflating the influence scores for female MPs. Speeches made by the Speaker of the
House are likewise excluded.
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or time fixed-effects. The naive estimate indicates that while the appointment of
a female minister has no effect on the influence of male MPs in parliamentary
debates, female MPs’ influence does increase when a female minister is appointed.
The introduction of ministry (model 2) and time (model 3) fixed-effects, does not
appear to change the estimate dramatically, and the estimate in model 4 also
supports the story: the appointment of a female minister is significantly related
to an increase in the influence of female MPs in parliamentary debate, but has
no effect on the relative influence of male MPs. Models 5 and 6 include ministry-
specific linear and quadratic time trends, and model 7 includes non-parametric
time trends from the GAM. As before, the fact that the effect does not disappear
once controlling for these trends gives additional support to the design-based
identification strategy.
The influence measure is not straightforward to interpret in terms of the mag-
nitude of the coefficients and so I present the estimated marginal effects for male
and female MPs from these models in figure 4.6. The figure shows the percent-
age change in influence for male (orange lines) and female (blue lines) MPs after
the appointment of a female minister, relative to a baseline where the minister is
male. Under all models, the marginal effect for male MPs is close to zero, and is
never statistically significant. For female MPs, the effect is always positive and
significant, and the magnitude of the effect is non-trivial: based on the results in
model 6, under a female minister, female MPs are 24% [5%, 42%] more influential
compared to the baseline level of influence when the minister is male. In sum,
the results in this section indicate that, consistent with a role-model effect, the
appointment of a female minister leads to an increase not only in the degree to
which female MPs participate in plenary debate, but also in the level of influence
that female MPs enjoy when debating with their fellow parliamentarians.
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Figure 4.6: Marginal effect of female minister on male and female influence
Note: The plot shows the marginal effect of the appointment of a female cabinet minister on
the debate influence of male (orange lines) and female (blue lines) MPs, relative to the average
level of influence when the minister is male.
Ministerial responsiveness
The analysis in the previous sections demonstrated reduced-form evidence of a
female role-model effect in the House of Commons, both in terms of participation
and influence. How might we account for these effects? The processes underpin-
ning these findings are likely to be many and varied, and isolating the mechanisms
behind causal effects is notoriously difficult with observational data (Imai et al.,
2011). However, in this section I provide evidence consistent with one potential
mechanism: the responsiveness of female ministers to female MPs. In the next
section I consider some alternative explanations for the findings. Although these
explanations do not constitute all of the possible factors that might link the ap-
pointment of a female minister to the increased participation and influence of
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female MPs, they do represent some of the more plausible possibilities.
As demonstrated above, female MPs come to play a more central role in parlia-
mentary debate following the appointment of a female minister. One explanation
for this finding might be that female cabinet ministers behave in a systematically
different manner towards female MPs than do male ministers. In particular, we
might imagine that female ministers are more responsive to the speeches of female
MPs. Such a hypothesis is consistent with findings in the literature on social lin-
guistics: “conversational partners who offer encouragement and are attentive and
responsive are more likely to elicit frequent and active participation from speak-
ers in the conversation…When a conversational partner offers little encouragement
and appears inattentive, the active participation of speakers diminishes.” (Hannah
and Murachver, 1999, 157) If female ministers are disproportionately ‘responsive’
to women, this may therefore give female MPs greater reason to invest in the pro-
cess of participating in debate. When female MPs receive ministerial responses to
their speeches that are of higher quality, this is likely to serve as a signal that they
are valued colleagues in the House, and may encourage higher levels of participa-
tion in future debates. Similarly, the measure of influence outlined in the previous
section is based on the idea that speakers are more influential when the language
that they use is adopted by other members is subsequent speeches. Accordingly,
if female cabinet ministers provide fuller responses to the contributions of female
MPs than do male ministers, then this could directly explain the empirical results
presented above.
What are the important properties of responsiveness? First, a response is the
occurrence of one phenomenon after the occurrence of another phenomenon. Sec-
ond, a responsive speech is necessarily reactive, and involves engaging with or
replying to concepts raised in an original speech. To measure ‘responsiveness’, I
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therefore assume that a speech, j, responds to another speech, i, when it occurs
directly after i and when it engages with the same thematic content as i. I also
consider one speech to be more responsive to another when that speech is longer,
on the assumption that longer responses provide more information to the origi-
nal speaker than shorter ones, and give a greater impression of attentiveness and
fullness of reply than shorter responses.14
I define a metric which measures how similar two (consecutive) speeches are
in terms of the words that they use. Making use of the vector-representation of
speeches described in equation 4.6, the responsiveness of speech j to speech i is
given by:
resj!i = sim(i; j)  nj (4.10)
where the first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the cosine-similarity
between the two tf-idf vectors, and nj is the number of words in speech j. When
all elements of vi and vj are positive, as they are here, the cosine-similarity of two
documents is bounded between zero and one. An intuitive interpretation of resj!i
is therefore the (weighted) number of words in speech j that are responding to
speech i.15
I provide two types of validation for this measure. First, within a debate,
MPs might use similar words even when they are not responding to one another.
14The modelling of ‘responsiveness’ here differs from previous approaches. For example, Eggers
and Spirling (2014) evaluate the changing levels of ministerial responsiveness to questions of
backbench MPs in the 19th century House of Commons by analysing the relative frequency
with which ministers speak directly after backbenchers in parliamentary debate. By contrast,
I focus on the degree to which – conditional on a minister speaking after a backbencher – the
language used by a minister is similar to that used by the backbencher.
15Note that as i occurs prior to j, it therefore cannot be understood to ‘respond’ to j. For
this reason, resi!j is not meaningful in our context, and I calculate equation 4.10 only for
sequentially adjacent speeches.
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Debates are normally focussed on a small number of topics, the discussion of
which will lead MPs to use similar language regardless of whether they are talk-
ing directly to one another. Note that weighting the term-frequency scores by
the inverse-document-frequency does not solve this problem, as the idf vectors
are calculated across debates, meaning that while words common to all debates
are down-weighted, words that are common within a debate may still have high
weights due to their relatively low levels of usage in the corpus as a whole. How-
ever, if the measure defined in equation 4.10 captures responsiveness, and not
merely topicality, then speeches that are adjacent to one another should demon-
strate higher responsiveness scores than speeches that are not adjacent. Table C.5
in the appendix tests this hypothesis. From each debate in the corpus, I randomly
sample two speech pairs. One of the pairs is adjacent, and one is non-adjacent.
I then regress the responsiveness score on a binary indicator which is equal to
one for an adjacent pair of speeches, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on this
indicator is statistically significant, and implies that adjacent speeches are approx-
imately 40% more responsive than non-adjacent speeches. This provides strong
evidence that equation 4.10 is capturing something distinct from topicality: com-
paring pairs of speeches within the same debate, those speeches that follow directly
after each other are more responsive than speeches that are non-adjacent.
Second, in a subset of debates, government ministers go before the House to
field questions from backbenchers, and are required to provide answers to these
questions. In these ‘Question Time’ debates, questions by backbenchers need
not address the same topic as the question just answered by the minister. For
example, a first backbencher might ask the minister about schools, to which the
minister will provide an answer, and then a second backbencher might ask about
child care provision, to which the minister must also respond. In these debates, we
177
should therefore expect that when a minister’s speech follows a backbencher, that
speech should be more responsive than when a backbencher’s speech follows that
of a minister. For each speech in each ‘Question Time’ debate, I code whether
the speech is made by a minister responding to a backbencher, or a backbencher
asking a new question.16 I then regress the responsiveness score on a binary
indicator which is equal to one when the speech is made by a minister in response
to a backbencher. The results in table C.6 show that ministerial replies are 153%
more responsive than are questions posed by backbenchers to the minister. This
indicates that the measure is accurately recovering intuitive properties of the
concept of responsiveness.
I now turn to the main analysis. To reiterate, if female MPs speak more and
become more influential because they receive higher quality responses from female
ministers than male ministers, then ministerial speeches subsequent to female
speeches should be marked by higher levels of res when the presiding minister is
female. I therefore subset the data to those speeches made by backbench MPs
which are immediately followed by speeches made by ministers, and estimate
models of the following form:
ress(imt) = 1  FemaleMPi + 2  FemaleMinistermt +
3  (FemaleMPmt  FemaleMinistermt) +
m0 + t + m1t+ m2t
2 + s(imt) (4.11)
The unit of analysis in these models is a speech made by a backbencher, which
is immediately followed by a speech made by a minister. Thus, ress(imt) is the
16To simplify the analysis, I exclude all instances where a backbencher follows from another
backbencher or a minister follows from another minister.
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response received by a speech s made by MP i in a debate pertaining to ministry
m at month t. FemaleMPi is a binary variable, equal to one when the MP is
female, and zero otherwise. FemaleMinistermt is equal to one when the minister
responsible for ministry m and time t is female, and zero otherwise. 1 indicates
the difference in responsiveness received by male and female MPs when the minis-
ter is male. 2 captures the effect of the appointment of a female minister on the
responses received by male MPs. 3 therefore captures the interaction between the
gender of the MP speaking, and the gender of the minister responding. A positive
3 coefficient would indicate that the appointment of a female minister leads to an
increase in ministerial responsiveness to speeches by female MPs, conditional on
ministry and time fixed-effects. As before, I include ministry-specific linear and
quadratic time trends, and I also provide estimates for a GAM which includes
non-parametric versions of these trends. Also as before, errors are clustered at
the ministry level to account for correlation of the error term within ministries.
Table 4.3 presents the results. The interaction effect of interest, 3, is positive,
significant, and sizeable in magnitude across all model specifications. To interpret
the substantive magnitude of these effects, I plot marginal effects in figure 4.7,
where the baseline is the average responsiveness of male ministers to male and
female speeches. Under a male minister, the average response to a speech by a
female has a res score of 23. Based on the estimates in model 6, this implies
that the appointment of a female minister increases the responsiveness to female
speeches by 33% [7%, 59%]. By contrast, the appointment of a female minister
has no discernible effect on the responsiveness to male speeches: across all models
in table 4.3, the coefficient on “Female minister” is small in magnitude, varying
in sign, and in all cases statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, when
the first speaker is a woman, then the gender of the responding minister matters.
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Figure 4.7: Marginal effect of a female minister on the responsiveness to male and female MPs
Note: The plot shows the marginal effect of the appointment of a female cabinet minister on
the responsiveness to speeches by male (orange lines) and female (blue lines) MPs, relative to
the average level of responsiveness when the minister is male.
In sum, the analysis suggests that female MPs receive systematically different
responses from male and female ministers. These results help to explain the in-
crease in influence of female MPs detailed in the previous section. Female MPs
become more influential in parliamentary debate (the language that they use in
debate is adopted more often in subsequent speeches) after the appointment of a
female minister, and this effect is at least partially driven by higher levels of re-
sponsiveness of the female minister herself. This may also explain the increase in
the participation of female MPs in debate, as higher levels of ministerial respon-
siveness indicate that the concerns of female MPs are receiving more attention
from powerful government figures, and send a signal that the issues that female
MPs raise are worthy of governmental concern.
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Alternative explanations
The central claim made in this paper is that that female cabinet ministers serve
as role models to other women in the legislature. I have provided evidence that
the appointment of a female minister is associated with an increase in the par-
ticipation and influence of other female MPs in parliamentary debate, and that
female ministers respond in a systematically different fashion to female MPs than
do male ministers. I do not claim that the differential level of responsiveness is the
only mechanism through which the role-model effect could operate. It is possible,
for example, that the driving force behind female MPs’ increased willingness to
participate stems from the purely symbolic effects of appointing a female minister
rather than the behavioural differences that such an appointment may lead to.
Such effects are very difficult to study empirically as, by definition, they rely on
essentially unobservable signals that result from the promotion of a woman to
high office. Regardless, even if the results above are attributable to such sym-
bolic effects, they would remain consistent with a role-model hypothesis, albeit
operating through a different mechanism to the one outlined above.
More concerning is the possibility that the reasons for the increase in female
participation and influence are completely distinct from the hypothesised role-
model effect. I consider two alternative explanations here. First, the increase in
female participation and influence could be the result of strategic behaviour on
the part of the opposition party. If appointing women to visible positions confers
a valence advantage to the governing party, opposition parties may respond to the
appointment of a female government minister by appointing a woman to lead the
competing shadow ministry (Gilardi, 2015; Matland and Studlar, 1996). If this is
the case, the increase in participation may not be due to a role-model effect at
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all, but rather to the fact that institutional rules give both ministers and shadow
ministers more time to speak on the House floor than other MPs.
I investigate this hypothesis in appendix section C.3 by analysing the relation-
ship between the gender of a newly appointed shadow minister and the gender
of the current government minister in a given ministry. If opposition parties are
behaving strategically, then the probability that a female shadow minister is ap-
pointed should be positively associated with the presence of a female government
minister. As my regressions show, there is little empirical support for such an
argument. This suggests that it is unlikely that the effects documented in the
main analysis are driven by the strategic appointment of female shadow ministers
by opposition parties.
Second, ministerial positions in the House of Commons come with significant
agenda-setting powers (Laver and Shepsle, 1994), and ministers determine the
direction and substance of legislation deriving from their ministries (subject to
cabinet approval). One possible explanation for the increase in female participa-
tion and influence in floor debates is the idea that female ministers may propose
legislation that focuses on topics which are traditionally of greater interest to
women, and on which women’s contributions are more respected. While such a
finding would itself be interesting, it would undermine the notion that female min-
isters are acting as role models, and suggest instead that female MPs increase their
level of participation thanks to a substantive change in the legislative agenda.
In section C.4 of the appendix, I investigate this hypothesis by examining
whether topics that are typically associated with high levels of female participa-
tion become more prevalent when a female minister is appointed. I use statistical
topic models to estimate which legislative topics are associated with high levels
of female participation under male ministers, and then assess the degree to which
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these topics increase when a female minister takes office. I find no evidence that
female ministers are disproportionately introducing legislation that is tradition-
ally associated with high levels of female participation. Although female ministers
may have different legislative priorities compared to their male counterparts, it
does not appear to be the case that differential agenda-setting dynamics explain
the role-model effect discussed in this paper.
Conclusion
In a debate in the House of Commons on International Women’s Day in 2003,
Joan Ruddock, a Labour Party MP, paid tribute to the minister for Women and
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt:
“It is a great pleasure, as it always is, to participate in a debate
that is dominated by women. I want to start by congratulating my
right honourable Friend the Minister for Women, who is a great role
model for us – not just in her role as Minister for Women…but by being
the head of a substantial Government Department.” (Ruddock, 2003)
That female parliamentarians themselves recognise the importance of role mod-
els in the legislature makes it all the more surprising that such a premise has been
missing from the academic literature. In this paper, I provided evidence for a fe-
male role-model effect in the House of Commons by showing that the appointment
of a female cabinet minister is associated with an increased propensity for other
female MPs to speak in parliamentary debates under the jurisdiction of the new
minister. Further, I find that female MPs also become more influential in debates
under the purview of female ministers. While there are many mechanisms through
which a role-model effect may operate, I show that female ministers respond in
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a systematically different fashion to the speeches of female MPs than do male
ministers, while the responsiveness to male MPs’ speeches is constant regardless
of minister gender.
These results have implications for the study of representation in legislative pol-
itics more broadly. Legislatures are hierarchical institutions in which some actors
have access to positions which confer important powers to the office holder. While
the general consequences of these institutional powers are well-studied (Laver
and Shepsle, 1994; Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005), there has been less written
about the implications of female occupation of such roles for the representation
of women. Cabinet posts, committee chairs, and other high-profile legislative of-
fices are normally marked by high levels of visibility and prestige, and make the
politicians that hold these posts natural focal points for the public, but also for
other members of the legislature. The results here suggest that when women hold
high-profile offices, they have significant effects on the behaviour of other legisla-
tors, and, crucially, that their appointment can increase the voice of other women
in the policy process.
On top of the fact that women are significantly underrepresented in terms of
their numerical power in most parliaments, in the UK case it is also apparent that
women contribute less to parliamentary debates than their male colleagues. The
evidence presented here pertains to just one legislative setting, and comparative
evidence on the extent to which male and female legislators participate would
be useful for establishing a more general understanding of the gender gaps in
the policymaking process. Regardless, the results here suggest that any such
gender gaps in participation may be ameliorated as more women are promoted to
positions of high office – a trend that has been increasing in recent years in some
areas of the world (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008).
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Furthermore, a central focus of legislative scholars studying gender issues has
concerned the link between descriptive representation – the number of women
elected to parliament – and substantive representation – the incorporation of
women’s interests into policy outcomes (Dahlerup, 1988; Phillips, 1995; Loven-
duski and Norris, 2003; Mansbridge, 2005; Childs and Krook, 2009). While there
is growing empirical evidence for this link (Wängnerud, 2009), the mechanisms
that connect increasing numbers of women in parliament to qualitative changes in
political outcomes have not been fully articulated (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers,
2007).
One possibility is that it is not merely the number of women who gain elected
office that matters for substantive representation, but also the heights to which
those women rise once they have been elected. A limited amount of experimental
research indicates that when women take leadership roles, collective decisions tend
to reflect distinctly female preferences (Humphreys, Masters and Sandbu, 2006).
More research is needed to examine the down-stream effects of female leadership
on policy outcomes, but the findings here indicate a possible mechanism through
which policy change may occur: female leaders promote increased participation
and influence of other women in policymaking. Tracing out a full causal relation-
ship between female leadership and policy outcomes that enhance the substantive
representation of women is a difficult empirical task, but the results here sug-
gest, at the very least, that the appointment of women to high-office can have
non-negligible effects on the behaviour of other legislators. The findings there-
fore provide empirical support for recent recommendations to extend the study of
women’s legislative representation “from critical mass to critical actors” (Childs
and Krook, 2009, 125).
In addition, future work should also consider the potential for a role-model effect
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for other disadvantaged groups in different legislative settings. Historically, polit-
ical elites have disproportionately shared characteristics of the dominant groups
in society, and several groups remain significantly underrepresented in the policy
process. It would be profitable in the US case, for example, to examine whether
the elevation of African-American members to senior positions in the Congres-
sional hierarchy is associated with a concomitant increase in the participation of
black legislators in policymaking.
Finally, a growing formal literature examines the consequences of leaders’ com-
munication strategies in collective decision making (Riker, 1996; Dewan and My-
att, 2007, 2008, 2012; Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp, 2008). However, thus
far, the empirical literature on communication and leadership has lagged behind
(Ahlquist and Levi, 2011, 15). In part, this is due to the difficulty of operational-
ising reliable measures of spoken communication and establishing credible identi-
fication strategies that isolate the effects of leaders in observational settings. This
paper makes progress on both fronts. First, the identification strategy I employ
suggests that by exploiting variation over time in the identity of political leaders,
it is possible to estimate causal effects of leadership on parliamentary outcomes.
Second, the measures of influence and responsiveness introduced here could be
profitably applied to other questions of rhetoric and parliamentary leadership.
More generally, recent advances in quantitative text analysis provide political sci-
entists with new opportunities to study important questions of communication
and leadership. I leave such endeavours for future work.
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5
Conclusion
The papers in this thesis addressed two central questions. First, the thesis was
concerned with establishing how the actions of the legislative leadership affect the
behaviour of other parliamentarians. In particular, in the first paper I argued that
by selecting the legislative proposals that are allowed to progress to the parliament
floor, cohesion-motivated party leaders are able to prevent roll-call votes which
threaten to divide their members. The second paper suggested that by proposing
legislation during crisis periods, industrious agenda-setters are able to change the
dominant dimension of politics and realign voting coalitions in their favour. The
third paper argued that by occupying highly visible positions in the legislative
hierarchy, leaders can act as role models to other parliamentarians which can
encourage their participation in the policymaking process.
Second, the thesis emphasised that these behavioural effects also have impor-
tant implications for parliamentary outcomes. The first paper demonstrates that
when party leaders opt to block divisive legislation in order to prevent party splits,
policy gridlock in the system increases. In the second paper, the model I describe
implies that the shift in voting behaviour that occurs subsequent to a crisis is
the result of policy moving towards the preferences of the agenda-setting actor
in the parliament. The centralisation of agenda-setting powers therefore provides
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legislative leaders with significant discretion over policy outcomes in periods of
crisis. Finally, the third paper suggests that the appointment of descriptive role
models can change the representation of interests in political discussion. Particu-
larly in instances where certain demographic groups have been under-represented
historically, the elevation of a role model to high political office can help address
representational gaps that persist within the legislature.
In this final chapter, I summarise the findings of each paper and broaden my
discussion of the implications of this research. I conclude by commenting on the
limitations of the analyses, and outline a number of potential avenues for further
work.
Substantive contributions and further implications
The internal dynamics of parliamentary parties have long been of interest to schol-
ars of legislative politics. Although the inner-workings of parties are interesting
in their own right, intra-party politics can have important consequences for the
policymaking process as a whole. As Laver & Shepsle (1999, 23) argue, we “need
to consider what goes on inside parties if we want to include an account of party
decision making in a model of some political process.” Chapter two investigated
party leaders’ use of cohesion-inducing strategies in order to shed light on the
relationship between party management and legislative outcomes. I argued that
when party leaders are motivated to maintain high levels of voting cohesion, and
are unable to discipline their members to follow a common party line, they can
restrict the range of proposals which are allowed to progress onto the legislative
agenda. By blocking potentially divisive bills, party leaders’ strategic agenda-
setting decisions can significantly increase the cohesion of their parties in roll-call
votes.
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Empirically, chapter two addressed two shortcomings of existing research. First,
previous studies have struggled to disentangle the effects of agenda control and
‘carrot and stick’ discipline on party cohesion, because party leaders often have
access to both mechanisms in national parliaments. By situating the study in the
context of the European Parliament – where the main disciplinary powers are held
by national party leaders but the agenda is controlled by leaders of the European
Party Groups – I was able to distinguish between the effects of these mechanisms
on party cohesion.
Second, I presented a new source of legislative data which allowed for a novel
and direct test of the agenda-setting argument. Existing studies typically require
analysts to make significant inferential leaps from the theoretically implied, but
empirically unobserved, blocking behaviour of party elites to observed patterns
of voting behaviour in roll-call votes (Krehbiel, 2006). This new data therefore
represents a substantial contribution to the existing literature, as it isolates a
critical juncture in the agenda-setting process in which party leaders are able to
remove proposals from the plenary agenda. I used this data to document the
frequency with which proposals are blocked, and I introduced new techniques to
measure the internal division of the pivotal agenda-setting party on each proposal.
By relating the frequency of blocking to the measure of agenda-setter polarisation,
I was able to provide evidence that when the party of the agenda setter is more
divided, the probability that proposals will be blocked increases. In combination,
these innovations allow for a closer mapping between theory and empirics than
has been possible in previous research.
Chapter two also has broader implications for our understanding of the col-
lective action problems faced by political parties and their legislative leaderships.
When acting independently, rational decision-making by individual legislators can
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lead to Pareto inferior outcomes, and the centralisation of powers to the party
leadership is key if atomistic legislators are to secure potential joint gains (Fior-
ina and Shepsle, 1989). However, by using these powers to enforce collective effort
by party members, leaders’ actions may have externalities which affect the policy
process more generally. In particular, the choice over which cohesion-inducing
tools party leaders employ may be consequential: while strong disciplinary mech-
anisms will enable a party to push forward policy proposals, reliance on negative
agenda control as a strategy for maintaining voting cohesion can limit the scope of
the parliamentary agenda. Chapter two suggests that, in certain circumstances,
party leaders may therefore face a trade-off between voting cohesion and legislative
gridlock. This thesis does not specify the conditions under which party leaders
will forego voting cohesion in order to advance the policy interests of (small) ma-
jorities of their parties, but it does highlight that, when traditional disciplining
tools are weak, leaders cannot always have both.
The twin financial and sovereign debt crises that struck Europe in and after
2008 had severe consequences for the economies of European countries. The in-
stitutional architecture developed to deal with these crises transferred significant
powers to actors at the EU level, integrating many policy competences that had
previously been held exclusively by national governments. The theoretical model
in chapter three provided an interpretation of the European crisis which empha-
sised the important role played by pro-integration agenda setters in shaping these
institutional reforms. I argued that the severity of the financial crisis revealed de-
ficiencies in existing policies, which increased legislators’ tolerance to new policy
proposals. In turn, integrationist agenda-setting actors in the EU were able to
exploit this tolerance and implement new policies that would have been extremely
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unlikely to have been approved by the Parliament in the absence of the crisis. I
used the spatial model to demonstrate that when pre-crisis politics is multidimen-
sional, the effects of a crisis can be observed in the changing composition of the
winning coalition in parliamentary votes. By combining a probabilistic classifi-
cation of ‘crisis-relevant’ proposals with an ideal point model which allowed me
to estimate the composition of the winning coalition on each vote, I showed that
coalitions in the European Parliament shifted in ways consistent with the model
on votes that pertained to the crisis, but not on other votes.
This argument provides more general insights into the relationship between
politics and policymaking during periods of crisis. In particular, scholars have
analysed the effects of crises for a variety of political outcomes, but there has
been surprisingly little work focused on the relationship between external crises
and legislative behaviour. As described above, the findings reveal that crises
can have significant implications for the voting coalitions that form in legislative
roll-call votes. More importantly, however, the model implies that such shifts
in voting behaviour can be attributed to the additional discretion that agenda-
setting actors enjoy over policy during crisis periods. The argument I provide
suggests that policy choices in periods of crisis are determined by those actors
who are in strong institutional positions before such crises begin. That crises may
open “windows of opportunity” for industrious political actors is a commonly held
view. The model I present goes beyond this conventional wisdom, and suggests
that it is specifically leaders who possess proposal powers that are best situated
to “make an opportunity out of a crisis”, and, during crises, it is toward those
actors that we should expect policy to shift.
This perspective may be helpful for understanding the political dynamics of
other crises. For example, as with the financial crisis I discuss, the unprecedented
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increase in migrants arriving in Europe since 2014 has uncovered significant defi-
ciencies in current EU policies. Pro-integration actors have the power to initiate
legislation pertaining to migration at the EU level, and the European Commission
has recently drafted legislative proposals that would create a new common border
force equipped with powers to overrule national authorities (Commission, 2015).
However, support for the Commission’s proposal is limited, and, in contrast to the
case discussed in chapter three, anti-integrationist responses to the migrant crisis
would not require legislation at the European level. This implies that the agenda-
setting power of pro-integration actors is diluted in the area of migration. My
model implies that the relatively equal distribution of proposal powers between
EU and national levels will have consequences for the policies that are adopted
in response to this crisis. In this case, although there is increasing dissatisfaction
with status quo policies, because the ability to propose policy alternatives is dif-
fuse, reforms to asylum and border protection are likely to be less integrationist
than were the reforms to the financial architecture in the post-financial crash
world. As partial evidence in support of this view, several countries within the
Schengen free-movement area have recently reintroduced national border controls
in an attempt to curb the number of migrants.
The final paper (chapter four) investigated gendered patterns of participation
in legislative politics. By collecting and analysing a longitudinal dataset of over a
million parliamentary speeches, chapter four presents findings which indicate that
women are under-represented in UK politics not only in terms of their numerical
strength in parliament but also in terms of their participation in legislative debate.
To the extent that inequalities in parliamentary speaking time are reflected in the
process of policymaking as a whole, this descriptive result should be of concern
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to normative theorists who put a premium on the equal participation of different
demographic groups in political affairs (Phillips, 1995; Dovi, 2002; Mansbridge,
1999). The findings in chapter four reinforce the idea that, despite their increasing
numbers, women’s experiences in parliament remain different from those of their
male counterparts.
Furthermore, the results also suggest that the representation of women’s inter-
ests in politics can be affected not only by the number of women elected to the
legislature, but by the position that women – once elected – hold in the parlia-
mentary hierarchy. The empirical analysis revealed causal evidence of a female
role-model effect in the legislature. When a woman is appointed to the post of
cabinet minister in the House of Commons, the participation of other female MPs
in debates that relate to that ministry increases by approximately one third. In
addition, by developing a new measure of influence in parliamentary debate, I
was able to show that – as well as increasing female participation in debates –
the appointment of a female minister also increases the influence that women en-
joy when discussing policy with their fellow parliamentarians. In explaining the
mechanisms that underpin these results, I also developed a new measure of debate
responsiveness and used this to show that female cabinet ministers engage more
fully with the speeches made by female backbenchers than male ministers do.
Taken together, these results have implications for the way we think about the
representation of historically disadvantaged groups in legislative politics. Nor-
mative scholars have argued that democratic societies that have historically de-
nied representation to certain groups should make institutional commitments that
guarantee the participation of those groups in contemporary political life (Dovi,
2002, 729). In general, recommendations derived from this literature suggest that
an important element of such ‘descriptive representation’ is the need to increase
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the number of disadvantaged group members who are elected to parliamentary
bodies. However, chapter four implies a complementary approach for increasing
the substantive representation of group interests: the appointment of group mem-
bers to positions of high political office. While increasing the number of women, or
ethnic minorities, or LGBT members of parliament is likely to help in redressing
historical biases, the elevation of members of these groups to positions of power
may also have consequences for the representation of group interests independent
of simple ‘numbers-based’ approaches (Beckwith, 2007).
The findings also have broader implications for women’s representation in other
organisational settings. For example, increasing attention is paid to the represen-
tation of women on corporate boards (Matsa and Miller, 2013; Wang and Kelan,
2013; Commission, 2012). As a recent UK government report on this issue ar-
gued, “the relatively low number of successful female role models often compounds
stereotypes and reinforces perceived difficulties in rising up the corporate ladder”
(Davies, 2011, 17). A number of governments have embraced policies to increase
the number of women on boards, and a driving motivation behind this agenda is
the notion that when women are promoted, their success can challenge existing
norms of business culture, and inspire other women at earlier stages of their ca-
reers. The findings presented here are consistent with this view, and suggest that,
in the political world at least, the promotion of high-achieving women can have
significant motivational effects on other women in an organisation.
Institutional privileges enjoyed by political leaders lie at the heart of many
accounts of parliamentary politics, but in addition to controlling important par-
liamentary levers of power, leaders can also influence behaviour thanks to the
highly visible nature of the positions that they hold. The results in chapter four
support the notion that political leaders can act as focal points to other legislators,
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helping them to coordinate their actions in uncertain environments (Dewan and
Myatt, 2007, 2008, 2012; Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp, 2008). Female
cabinet ministers in the UK appear to be focal points for other female legislators,
providing important signals that encourage women to participate more in the pol-
icymaking process. In addition, by demonstrating that different leaders display
distinctive communicative styles in debate, the findings show that the relationship
between parliamentary leaders and their followers is conditioned not only by the
institutional powers that leaders wield, but also by the way that leaders interact
with followers during political exchanges. While institutional resources are im-
portant, they do not represent the sole source of a leader’s influence in legislative
settings.
Finally, the identification strategy that I employ in chapter four also helps to
overcome a thorny empirical issue that has proved difficult in previous research:
variation in leadership is often endogenous to the outcomes we are most inter-
ested in studying. Previous work has largely relied on experimental evidence to
address this issue (Wilson and Rhodes, 1997; Eckel and Wilson, 2007; Komai and
Grossman, 2009; Komai, Grossman and Deters, 2011). These studies provide im-
portant findings regarding the effects of leadership on group decisions, but few
researchers have attempted to isolate a causal effect of the identity of political
leaders in observational settings. As Ahlquist and Levi (2011, 18) suggest “the
artificiality of the settings and the relative inattention to external validity pose
serious limits to what these experiments tell us about how the world actually
works.” The studies that do isolate a causal effect of leadership outside of the
laboratory tend to focus on atypical situations in which leaders are randomly
assigned to different decision-making groups (Humphreys, Masters and Sandbu,
2006; Beaman et al., 2012). The strategy I present results in plausible causal
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evidence from an observational setting by exploiting variation in the identity of
leaders over time. This strategy demonstrates substantively meaningful effects of
female leadership in the legislature, and future work might profit from employing
similar panel-based studies for detecting leadership effects elsewhere.
Limitations and future work
The empirical findings presented in this thesis concern a specific set of parlia-
mentary outcomes in the context of single legislative settings. As argued in the
introduction, making credible inferences about the effects of leadership behaviour
is a complicated problem in cross-country studies, as legislatures differ on many
relevant institutional dimensions, making it difficult to isolate distinct theoretical
mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is clear that single case studies of legislative be-
haviour may not be representative of broader patterns cross-nationally. To what
extent are the regularities described above useful for understanding the role of
political leaders in other contexts?
The findings in chapter two suggest that when party leaders have control over
the plenary agenda, increases in intra-party heterogeneity will be associated with
increased levels of legislative gridlock. This finding applies specifically to the con-
text of the European Parliament, where leaders’ negative agenda-setting powers
are in fact somewhat weaker than they are in many national contexts – EPG
leaders in the European Parliament can block proposals that come before the
Conference of Presidents, but they cannot do so unilaterally. Accordingly, in
systems where party leaders have a monopoly over agenda-setting powers, the
effects of internal party division on gridlock may plausibly be larger than those
estimated in this thesis. Of course, this is only likely to be the case when party
leaders are unable to enforce cohesion in other ways. For instance, party leaders
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in many parliamentary systems have a near-monopoly over control of the plenary
agenda, but we would not in most circumstances expect intra-party polarisation
to translate into systemic gridlock, because the same leaders also control many
perks and privileges which can be used to keep their members in line. By con-
trast, legislative party leaders in presidential systems – where disciplinary powers
are weaker (Carey, 2007) – might be more likely to face the trade-off described in
chapter two, with internal party divisions more likely to result in gridlock.
The model of crisis politics developed in chapter three is also vulnerable to con-
cerns about external validity, as we provide evidence that is restricted not only
to one legislature, but which also applies to a single crisis period. An alternative
approach would be to compare policy outcomes across multiple legislatures which
are subjected to a common external shock, but where the preferences of agenda-
setting actors vary from system to system. If our model is a good description of
crisis politics, such a study should reveal that crisis responses differ according to
the preferences of the agenda-setting actors in each country. This type of analysis,
however, would require overcoming significant empirical obstacles such as measur-
ing partisan preferences towards a crisis scenario across many political systems,
and assuming away important variation in the powers associated with agenda-
setting offices cross-nationally. By focussing on the dynamics of parliamentary
behaviour within a specific political context, chapter three removes much of the
ambiguity over the mechanisms that drive behaviour in the EU response to the
financial crisis, albeit at a cost in terms of generalisability.
In contextualising the results presented in chapters two and three, it is also
important to note that powers of political leaders in the European Parliament,
and in the EU more generally, differ from those possessed by national leadership
figures along many dimensions. For instance, in contrast with most domestic
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parliaments, agenda-setting powers in the EU are broadly distributed across many
actors (the EPG leaders, the Commission, the Council, etc). At the national
level, agenda-setting offices are typically concentrated in the hands of government
leaders, though, as Döring (1995, 223-246) shows, there is considerable variation
in governments’ agenda-setting power across domestic systems. Accordingly, in
order for the findings to be generalised to other settings, it is clearly important
for future work to take such institutional variation into account.
By contrast, despite the variation in their formal powers, legislative leaders are
highly visible actors in the political process across many different parliamentary
settings. Therefore, it seems plausible that the role-model effects demonstrated
in chapter four may also be relevant for understanding representation in other
legislatures. Future work could profitably apply a similar design to that used here
in order to investigate whether role models matter for women in other systems,
and also for other historically disadvantaged groups. It is only by extending
the analysis to additional contexts that we can validate the findings presented
in this thesis externally, but the ubiquitous presence of high-profile leaders and
historically disadvantaged groups in modern legislatures suggests that such work
could reveal important additional evidence.
In sum, rather than aiming to provide broad generalisations of legislative be-
haviour, this thesis prioritises establishing precise and credible inferences of the
effects of legislative leadership in specific contexts. However, while I have opted
for empirical precision over external validity, such a decision need not be zero-sum:
this trade-off might be overcome by extending the analyses introduced in these
papers to other legislatures. In addition to helping to generalise the results de-
scribed here, such work would also undoubtedly uncover interesting heterogeneity
cross-nationally.
199
Some additional limitations deserve discussion here. First, one objection to the
results presented in chapter two is that they do not account for the length of time
that legislative proposals are kept off the parliamentary agenda by EPG leaders.
If proposals are shelved only temporarily, this would call into question the effects
of negative agenda control on policy outcomes for the legislature as a whole. It is
not necessary for such proposals to be delayed indefinitely in order for leaders to
enforce cohesion – even relatively small delays on time-sensitive legislation may
be sufficient to persuade recalcitrant legislators to follow the party line – but
the consequences for legislative gridlock are clearly less serious if blocking is only
temporary. A more nuanced approach would therefore do more to measure the
duration of any such delay. Data limitations prevented me from pursuing such an
approach here, but recent work in the UK context (Haber, 2015) suggests that
data on legislative delay can help to further clarify the relationship between party
divisions and legislative gridlock. In future work I intend to collect new data for
measuring such delays in the European Parliament policy process.
Second, while I explore a number of the more plausible mechanisms behind the
role-model effect in chapter four, alternative explanations may still account for
at least some of the patterns I report. For example, one alternative rationale for
the existence of a female role-model effect – both in politics and elsewhere – is
that when women succeed, they help to break down historical stereotypes which,
by favouring masculine characteristics over feminine ones, have inhibited women’s
progress in many organisational settings (Stout et al., 2011; Asgari, Dasgupta
and Cote, 2010; Lockwood, 2006). While the theoretical arguments for such a
mechanism are strong, empirically documenting changes in cultural attitudes is
a formidable task. Interviews with parliamentarians have provided important
insights into the gendered dynamics of parliaments in the past (Childs, 2000),
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and such an approach may well be beneficial in establishing further mechanisms
that lie behind the causal estimates presented in this thesis. Overall, to the
extent that the presence of a high-profile woman does have motivating effects
for other women, it seems likely that the mechanisms that underpin these effects
will be many and varied. The results here provide an incomplete account of
these mechanisms, and future work should examine factors linking role-model
appointments and legislative outcomes in more detail.
In addition, chapter four tells us little about the direct consequences of female
leadership for the substantive representation of women’s interests in parliamen-
tary outcomes (Pitkin, 1967). While the data and methods I present in chapter
four move us somewhat closer to this notion by analysing women’s influence in
parliamentary debate, they do not provide direct evidence that female leaders
substantively improve policy outcomes for other women. There are two main
difficulties in providing an empirical answer to this question. The first is that
causally identifying the effects of female leaders is very difficult in observational
settings, as the appointment of a female leader is clearly endogenous to many of
the substantive outcomes that scholars may wish to investigate. The design em-
ployed in chapter four makes progress on this issue, and could be usefully applied
to other outcomes variables. However, the second difficulty is that it is not clear
how best to measure the concept of substantive representation in a principled
manner (Wängnerud, 2009, 61-65). One potential way forward would be to track
the progress of policy amendments proposed by female legislators, and see whether
the frequency and success of such amendments increases when policy is under the
jurisdiction of a female leader. This approach is not, unfortunately, possible in
the House of Commons, as successful backbench amendments are relatively rare,
and the proposers of amendments are not well documented in the parliamentary
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archives. Nonetheless, an amendment analysis might help to establish the effects
of female leaders on substantive representation in other contexts.
Finally, this thesis introduced a number of new quantitative measures derived
from digitised political texts. In chapters two and three I developed probabilistic
approaches for assigning legislative texts to dimensions of substantive interest
for which researchers already have well-defined measures of party preferences.
Chapter four developed two new metrics of political discourse which measure
the influence and responsiveness of participants in plenary debate. I provided a
number of validation tests for each new measure, but future work could develop
these measures further and subject them to additional testing in order to make
them available to legislative scholars more broadly. Validation is an essential
stage in the development of automated measures, and seems especially important
when considering metrics that aim to capture complex human concepts such as
influence and responsiveness. Moving forward, I plan to run a series of validation
experiments to compare the quantitative measures developed in this thesis to
hand-coded measures of the same concepts.
Further work on developing and validating these measures is justified by the
potential value they have for answering important questions regarding political
leadership. For example, although the relative influence of different actors is
clearly important for our understanding of political conflict, we have so far lacked
systematic approaches for measuring which politicians are influential in the cut
and thrust of legislative debate. The influence measure I describe in chapter four
therefore addresses an important gap in the methodological toolkit of legislative
scholars, and might be used to shed light on a host of important research ques-
tions. More generally, the rapid expansion of new forms of digitised legislative
data – many of which have been used in this thesis – and the development of
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new statistical methods for analysing this data have created unprecedented op-
portunities to improve our understanding of legislative politics. The papers in
this thesis have offered a small contribution to this broader research agenda, and
represent a starting point for further quantitative research into legislative leaders,
their parties, and the outcomes of the parliamentary process.
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A
A.1 Roll-rate of the UK Conservative Party
In this section I analyse the ‘roll-rate’ of the UK Conservative Party in the period
before the party left the EPP group to form the new ECR group. I use the
concept of a ‘roll’ as defined in Cox and McCubbins (2005), which is measured as
any vote on which a majority of a party votes to reject a given bill, but the bill
nevertheless passes on the house floor. I analyse 6199 votes from the 6th EP, and
compare the roll-rate of the Conservative Party to the roll-rate of other national
parties. Table A.1 presents the results of a linear probability model, in which the
dependent variable measures 1 if a given party was rolled on a given vote, and
0 otherwise. The independent variable is an indicator for the UK Conservative
Party. Model 1 in table A.1 compares the roll probability of the Conservatives to
that of all other parties in the parliament. Model 2 compares the roll probability
of the Conservatives to other national parties within the EPP group.
The results clearly demonstrate that the Conservatives were rolled much more
frequently than other parties during the 6th European Parliament. Focussing first
on model 1, while the average roll-rate for all national parties in the parliament
was approximately 28%, the Conservative party’s roll-rate was over 20% higher. In
model 2, the Conservative roll-rate is more than twice as a high as other national
parties within the EPP.
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Table A.1: Roll rates – UK Conservative party vs other parties
Rolled
All parties EPP parties
(1) (2)
Conservatives 0.062 0.170
(0.003) (0.005)
Constant 0.277 0.169
(0.0004) (0.001)
Observations 1,200,058 289,882
R2 0.0003 0.004
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
A.2 A spatial model of voting cohesion without agenda-control
The analysis in the main body of the text suggests that while intra-party polarisa-
tion will reduce the cohesion of European Party Groups, this relationship will be
weaker when an EPG holds the median position in the Conference of Presidents,
as when this is the case the leader of the EPG will be able to block potentially divi-
sive proposals from reaching the parliamentary floor. As agenda-setting power in
the EP is a function of the position of the EPG in the policy space, it is necessary
to clarify expectations regarding the level of cohesion of median and non-median
parties in the absence of negative agenda control. That is, if in the absence of
agenda control we would also expect median parties to be more cohesive than
non-median parties, empirical tests of hypothesis 2 may not identify the effects of
purposive agenda control by party leaders in the Parliament.
In this section, I therefore focus attention on expectations for party cohesion in
a parliamentary setting in which no actor is able to control the plenary agenda.
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The discussion of this simple model establishes baseline expectations about the
relationship between party position, ideological polarisation, and voting cohesion
which are then contrasted with expectations derived in the main text.1
Consider a parliamentary agenda constructed from a set of J independent poli-
cies, in which each j 2 J is unidimensional. Bills are considered under an open-
amendment rule on the plenary floor meaning that all policies pass at xm, the
position of the median member of the parliament. Each legislator, i, votes for a
bill j when xi is closer to the position of the median legislator than to the status
quo outcome xq. Thus, i votes yea if and only if:
 (xi   xm)2 >  (xi   xq)2 (A.1)
Parties are treated as collections of likeminded individuals, where, for each
policy issue j, the positions of party members xij are iid draws from a normal
distribution characterised by a mean parameter pj and a variance parameter
2pj. Each legislator from party p on policy issue j has a policy position given
by xi(p)j = N(pj; 2pj), where  captures the average placement of members of
party p on policy j, and 2 captures the idea that parties are more ideologically
united on some policy issues than on others. The subscripts on these parameters
(p and j) indicate that both party positions and party polarisation can vary across
parties within policy issues, and within parties across issues.
We are concerned with the effect that the party parameters  and 2 have on
the cohesion of a party’s members in plenary votes in the absence of any agenda-
1This simple model in this section is equivalent to the ‘floor agenda’ model in Cox and
McCubbins (2005), and similar to the model presented in Krehbiel (1993). The main difference
is that other models focus on the subset of bills that will be considered and passed by the
parliament, while here I am specifically interested in voting cohesion.
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setting activity. A party is completely cohesive on a bill when all of its constituent
members vote either for or against the bill. By contrast, a party is divided when
some members vote to approve the bill, while other members vote in opposition.
We can therefore characterise the voting cohesion of party p on bill j by the
probability that two randomly selected members, a and b, will vote together on
j.2 Denoting this probability as Cpj, and the cutpoint separating the yea voters
from the nay voters on a given vote as equal to c = (xm + xq)=2, then probability
that a and b are either both less than c or both greater than c (on a given roll-call
vote) is given by:
Cpj = Pr[(xa < c) \ (xb < c)] + Pr[(xa > c) \ (xb > c)]
= ((c  pj)=pj)2 + (1  ((c  pj)=pj)2)
= 1  2((c  pj)=pj) + 2((c  pj)=pj)2 (A.2)
where  is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribu-
tion. As can easily be seen from this formulation, the cohesion of a party on a
given vote is therefore increasing in the distance between cj and pj, and decreas-
ing in 2pj. This implies the intuitive notion that the closer the average member of
the party is to the cutpoint, the less cohesive the party will be overall in a roll-call
vote. Similarly, on a given vote, when party members are more ideologically dis-
persed (i.e. when 2 is large), the party is more likely to be divided. I assume that
status quo positions are uniformly distributed across the policy-space and centred
on the position of the floor median, which in turn means that the cutpoints for
each bill (cj) are also uniformly distributed around xm. The expected value of Cp
2A similar characterisation of voting cohesion is used by Desposato (2005). In the empirical
analysis, I use this approach to estimate the cohesion of each EPG on each vote in the 6th and
7th European Parliaments.
207
across J votes is therefore:
E[Cpj; 2] =
PJ
1 1  2((cj   )=) + 2((cj   )=)2
J
(A.3)
We are concerned with the interaction between the parameters  and , and
the effect that this interaction has on the expected level of voting cohesion. As
there is no closed-form expression for equation A.3, I proceed by using computer
simulations to investigate the relationship between pj, pj, and E[Cp]. Each
simulation represents a policy j, where the status quo is drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution. For each status quo, I calculate the cohesion score (equation
A.2) over a range of  and  values, and then take the average score for each com-
bination of  and  across all simulations (as per equation A.3).3 The righthand
panel of figure A.1 presents the (smoothed) average level of cohesion for a party
as it traverses the policy space for low and high values of . The lefthand panel
gives the average cohesion level across the range of  for two hypothetical parties:
one close to the median, and one further away.
The lefthand figure demonstrates that as  approaches xm the voting cohesion
of the party will decline, but that this decline is more pronounced for the more
polarised (high ) party. More importantly, the righthand panel of figure A.1
shows that while increasing  leads to a monotonic decrease in voting cohesion,
the strength of this relationship is stronger the closer the party is to the position of
the floor median. This implies that – in the absence of agenda control – it is when
a party is close to the centre of the policy space that the party’s cohesion level is
most affected by the level of intra-party polarisation: the opposite prediction of a
3In particular, I draw 1000 values for xq from a uniform distribution on the range [-10,10]. I
vary pj from -9 to 9, and pj from 0.01 to 3.
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Figure A.1: Voting cohesion as a function of party position and polarisation in the absence of
agenda control (simulation)
Note: The plot on the left shows the relationship between party position and voting cohesion
across a set of simulated parliamentary votes. Status quo points are uniformly distributed on the
range [-10,10], meaning that cutpoints are also uniformly distributed around the position of the
median legislator (cutpoints are depicted as grey tick marks at the bottom of the figure). When
the party is located closer to the centre of the policy space, the voting cohesion of the party
declines, as the party will find itself divided more often. The righthand plot depicts the rela-
tionship between polarisation (2) and cohesion. While increases in ideological polarisation lead
to decreases in voting cohesion regardless of party position, the figure also demonstrates that,
in the absence of agenda control, parties close to xm are particularly sensitive to polarisation.
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model in which the party can control the legislative agenda (hypothesis 2 in the
main text).
The intuition here is straightforward. In the absence of agenda-control, we
should expect centrist parties to be on average more divided on roll-call votes
than extremist parties, as their members find themselves on opposite sides of the
(centrally distributed) cutting-lines more often. More importantly, the voting
cohesion of centrist parties is greatly reduced by increased ideological polarisa-
tion, while for extremist parties the effects of polarisation on cohesion are less
pronounced. When a party is central, increases in the ideological diversity of its
members will result in more instances when members of the party find themselves
on opposite sides of an issue. When a party is positioned at an extreme position in
the policy space, polarisation is less consequential, as even relatively high levels of
ideological difference between members may not translate into disunity in voting:
the members of extremist parties are sufficiently far from the point separating
‘yeas’ from ‘nays’ that they will vote together despite their relative ideological
differences.
This simple model, in which no agenda-setter is able to prevent some subset of
J from being considered, leads to the following expectations:
Hypothesis 3 As parties approach the median floor position of a given policy
dimension, the voting cohesion of the party will decline
Hypothesis 4 As the legislators of a party become ideologically more polarised on
a given policy dimension, the voting cohesion of the party will decline.
Hypothesis 5 The effect of ideological polarisation on voting cohesion will be
stronger the closer a party is to the median position of a given policy dimension.
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Hypothesis 5 reveals that if EPG leaders hold the median position in the Con-
ference of Presidents but this position does not afford them agenda-control powers
then they will be more affected by increases in intra-party heterogeneity than
when they hold non-centrist positions. This contrasts directly with hypothesis 2
in the main text, which suggests that when EPGs hold median positions, they
will be able to block proposals that threaten to divide them, and therefore it is
when they hold these positions that they will be less affected by increases in intra-
party disagreement. In sum, this analysis reveals that hypothesis 2 therefore does
indeed identify the effects of agenda control on voting cohesion in the European
Parliament.
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Table A.2: Median party group by expert survey policy dimension, EP6 & EP7
Dimension EP6 EP7
Collective Security SOC SOC
Decentralisation/Subsidiarity EPP-ED EPP-ED
Deregulation EPP-ED EPP-ED
Economic (Spending v. Taxes) EPP-ED EPP-ED
Environment ALDE ALDE
EU: Authority EPP-ED EPP-ED
Social SOC SOC
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TITLE: Prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms
PURPOSE: to strengthen prudential requirements for credit institutions and
investment firms that relate strictly to the functioning of banking and financial
services markets and are meant to ensure the financial stability of the operators on
these markets as well as a high level of protection of investors and depositors.
PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. BACKGROUND:
the extent of the financial crisis has exposed unacceptable risks pertaining to the
current regulation of financial institutions. According to IMF estimates,
crisis−related losses incurred by European credit institutions between 2007 and 2010
are close to 1 trillion or 8% of the EU GDP. In order to restore stability in the
banking sector and ensure that credit continues to flow to the real economy, both
the EU and its Member States adopted a broad range of unprecedented measures with
the taxpayer ultimately footing the related bill. In this context, by October 2010
the Commission has approved 4.6 trillion of state aid measures to financial
institutions of which more than 2 trillion were effectively used in 2008 and 2009.
The level of fiscal support provided to credit institutions needs to be matched with
a robust reform addressing the regulatory shortcomings exposed during the crisis.
Priorities and challenges: it should be noted that one of the priorities of the
Commission in the reform of EU financial services regulation has been to ensure that
the banking sector is able to fulfil its fundamental purpose, namely lending to the
real economy and providing services to citizens and businesses in Europe. The
proposal is designed to tackle regulatory shortcomings in the following areas:
Management of liquidity risk: existing liquidity risk management practices were
shown by the crisis to be inadequate in fully grasping risks linked to
originate−to−distribute securitization, use of complex financial instruments and
reliance on wholesale funding with short term maturity instruments. Definition of
capital: institutions entered the crisis with capital of insufficient quantity and
quality. Given the risks they faced, many institutions did not posses sufficient
amounts of the highest quality capital instruments that can absorb losses
effectively as they arise and help to preserve an institution as a going concern.
Counterparty credit risk: the crisis revealed a number of shortcomings in the
current regulatory treatment of counterparty credit risk arising from derivatives,
repo and securities financing activities. It showed that the existing provisions did
not ensure appropriate management and adequate capitalisation for this type of risk.
Options, discretions and harmonisation (entire Regulation): in 2000, seven banking
directives were replaced by a single Directive. This directive was recast in 2006
...
Figure A.2: Example legislative text summary
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Figure A.3: Proportion of test set correctly predicted, by topic count
Note: The figure shows the proportion of the test set of legislative summaries
that are correctly predicted by the multinomial model.
A.3 Discrete classification method
In this section I replicate the main ‘blocking’ results using a similar method of
classification, with the nuance that here I assign proposals to the (single) policy
dimension on which they have the highest probability from the penalised multi-
nomial logistic model. Figure A.4 gives the results for all K topic models, and
table A.5 gives the results from the 94-topic model.
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Figure A.4: 1 estimates by topic model – discrete classification
Note: The plot shows the estimated 1 coefficient – which represents the effect of
median EPG polarisation on the probability that a proposal will be blocked by the
Conference of Presidents – for each of the K topic models. The top panel gives
the results of the baseline (covariate-free) models, and the bottom panel gives
the estimated coefficients from the full models with fixed effects and covariates
(model 4 in the regression tables). The cross-validation preferred model coefficient
(corresponding to the results presented in table A.5) is presented in red.
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Table A.4: Highest probability proposals, by expert survey dimension
Deregulation Economic
1 Aromatised wines, aromatised wine-based drinks
and aromatised wine-product cocktails: definition,
description and presentation
Trade in raw materials and commodities
2 FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into
the EU: aligning the Regulation with the TFEU
Long-term sustainability of public finances for a re-
covering economy
3 Community control system for ensuring compliance
with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy:
aligning the Regulation with the TFEU
Economic governance: implementation of the exces-
sive deficit procedure. ’Six pack’
4 Aligning a number of legal acts with the TFEU:
Commission delegated and implementing powers
2006 annual report on the euro area
5 Denominations and technical specifications of euro
coins intended for circulation. Recast
Trade and economic relations with the countries of
South East Asia (ASEAN)
6 Glucose and lactose: customs treatment (repeal.
Regulation (EEC) No 2730/75). Codified version
Economic governance: strengthening of budgetary
positions and coordination of economic policies. ‘Six
pack’
Environment EU Authority
1 Fuels and energy from renewable sources: transition
to biofuels to deliver greenhouse gas savings
Defence of parliamentary immunity of Umberto
Bossi
2 Energy end-use efficiency and energy services EP Rules of Procedure: final vote and voting in com-
mittee
3 Promotion of the use of energy from renewable
sources
EP Rules of Procedure: proceedings before the ECJ
4 Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon
economy
Request for waiver of the immunity of Antonio Di
Pietro
5 Specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil: “Fuel
Quality Directive”
Request for defence of parliamentary immunity of
Renato Brunetta
6 Emission performance standards for new light com-
mercial vehicles
Car industry: location and identification of hand
controls, tell-tales and indicators, UN/ECE Regu-
lation
Immigration Security
1 Schengen Borders Code: use of the Visa Information
System (VIS) at the external borders
New strategy for Afghanistan
2 External borders: residence permits issued by
Switzerland and Liechtenstein as equivalent to na-
tional visas
Space and security
3 EC/Seychelles agreement: short-stay visa waiver European Security Strategy
4 EC/Saint Kitts and Nevis agreement: short-stay
visa waiver
Anti-missile shield for Europe and its political and
strategic implications
5 EC/Ukraine agreement: facilitation of the issuance
of visas
Implementation of the European Security Strategy
and the Common Security and Defence Policy
6 EC/Mauritius agreement: short-stay visa waiver EU comprehensive approach and its implications for
the coherence of EU external action
Social
1 Impact of the crisis on access to care for vulnerable
groups
2 Gender aspects of the European framework of na-
tional Roma inclusion strategies
3 How marketing and advertising affect equality be-
tween women and men
4 Equality between women and men - 2008
5 Early years learning in the European Union
6 Equality between women and men in the EU 2009
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Table A.5: Agenda-setter polarisation and legislative blocking – discrete classification
Blocked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agenda-Setter Polarisation 0.295 0.244 0.357 0.420
(0.084) (0.137) (0.169) (0.199)
Agenda-Setter Distance 0.018 0.041 0.030
(0.073) (0.079) (0.083)
Parliament Polarisation  0.060  0.043 0.216
(0.191) (0.203) (0.200)
Salience  0.085  0.383  0.310
(0.096) (0.235) (0.288)
Distance from recess 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# proposals  0.003  0.003  0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant  2.167  0.755 2.165 0.005
(0.219) (1.509) (2.957) (3.809)
Median Group FEs   X X
Committee FEs    X
Observations 4,300 4,300 4,300 4,300
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,058.429 3,976.077 3,964.982 3,929.701
Note: Logistic regressions with cluster robust standard errors (clustered by draft
agenda) shown in parentheses. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table A.6: Median party group polarisation and legislative blocking
Blocked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agenda-Setter Polarisation 0.527 0.579 0.766 0.716
(0.123) (0.200) (0.238) (0.281)
Agenda-Setter Distance 0.379 0.462 0.381
(0.195) (0.202) (0.214)
Parliament Polarisation  1.260  1.771  0.975
(0.606) (0.704) (0.768)
Salience 0.202 0.079 0.072
(0.149) (0.232) (0.278)
Distance from recess 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# proposals  0.002  0.002  0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant  2.699  1.588 0.736  1.767
(0.282) (1.923) (2.396) (3.184)
Median Group FEs   X X
Committee FEs    X
Observations 4,300 4,300 4,300 4,300
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,042.809 3,946.850 3,933.339 3,915.512
Note: Logistic regressions with cluster robust standard errors (clustered by pol-
icy area) shown in parentheses. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table A.7: Agenda-setting party groups, polarisation, and cohesion – Hix et al. (2007) agreement
score
Party group cohesion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agenda-Setting  0.015 0.023  0.034 0.051
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Polarization  0.115  0.094  0.097  0.107
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interaction 0.090 0.081 0.106 0.041
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 1.040 0.755 0.694 0.848
(0.003) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Covariates  X X X
Policy Area FEs   X X
EPG FEs    X
Observations 95,643 88,973 88,973 88,973
R2 0.152 0.144 0.152 0.276
Note: The table shows the estimates of equation 2.2 when using the Hix, Noury
and Roland (2007) measure of party cohesion, rather than the measure presented
in Desposato (2005) which is used in the main analysis. As is clear from the
table, results are not sensitive to this choice. OLS regressions with cluster robust
standard errors (clustered by legislative proposal) shown in parentheses. p<0.1;
p<0.05; p<0.01
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B
B.1 Valence as a spatial policy dimension with universal agree-
ment
Consider an n-dimensional model, where the utilities for legislator i, for the status
quo (q) and a proposal (p), given positions x, and an idiosyncratic (legislator-
specific) error term ei, are:
uiq =   (xi1   xq1)2   (xi2   xq2)2   : : :  (xin   xqn)2 + eiq (B.1)
uip =   (xi1   xp1)2   (xi2   xp2)2   : : :  (xin   xpn)2 + eip (B.2)
To derive a valence dimension, we simply constrain all legislators to have the
same ideal point on the vth dimension so that xiv = xv8i. As preferences on this
dimension are identical, all legislators prefer policies that satisfy xv = xpv, all else
equal. Our assumption is that during a crisis, xqv will diverge sharply from the
shared preferences of legislators.We therefore define the valence of the proposal p,
and the status quo q as follows:
vp =   (xv   xpv)2 = 0 (B.3)
vq =
(  (xv   xqv)2 = 0 absent a crisis (B.4)
  (xv   xqv)2 < 0 during a crisis (B.5)
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A negative ‘shock’ to the valence of the status quo occurs when a crisis dra-
matically changes external conditions, shifting xqv away from xv, and resulting in
a smaller value of vq. As legislators preferences over valence are identical, this
formulation captures the central intuition: shocks to the valence dimension are
painful for everyone. The crisis negatively affects legislators evaluations of the
status quo, regardless of their ideological disagreements on other spatial dimen-
sions.
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B.2 Uni-dimensional model, plus valence
The central intuition of our model – that agenda-setters have more discretion over
policy outcomes during a crisis – holds when the policy space is uni-dimensional.
Consider the one-dimensional case where there is no valence gap between the
status quo and proposed alternatives, vq = vp (top panel, figure B.1). The median
voter, m, is decisive, and the spatial discrepancy between the status quo and her
position is always influential in determining the size of the winset, W (q). Policies
(p) located within the winset will defeat the status quo (q) in an up-or-down vote,
and policies located outside the winset will fail. As in the two-dimensional case,
the choice of policies to be considered against q is determined by the agenda-
setter (AS), who makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal that is as close as possible
to her own ideal point, within the constraint that the policy will be approved by a
majority vote (that is, withinW (q)). Thus, when valence is equal, voting collapses
to the normal spatial model, with the median voter separates those voting ‘yea’
from those voting ‘nay’.
During a crisis, when vq < vp, the main implication of the decline in vq is
identical to that of the two-dimensional model: legislators will vote to approve a
wider range of policy proposals. Holding the proposed policy fixed at p (middle
panel, figure B.1), the valence shock increases the size of the winset, meaning that
legislators in the shaded area of the ‘yea’ coalition vote to approve the proposal.
These legislators, when valence is equal, vote against the proposal. As with the
2D model, the negative shock to q implies that more policies are able to defeat q
in pairwise competition, and so in equilibrium, the agenda-setter will propose a
policy that is closer to her own ideal point that will still win a majority of support.
The agenda-setter proposes p0 instead of p (bottom panel, figure B.1). As p0 is
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supported by m, it is approved by the legislature, whereas in the equal valence
scenario it would have been rejected.
This shows how the valence shock gives greater discretion to the agenda-setter.
In the absence of a crisis (when vq = vp), the winset is determined by the spatial
discrepancy between the status quo and the ideal point of the median legislator xm.
During a crisis (when vq < vp), the winset is determined by both the discrepancy
between the status quo and the median, and also the valence differential between
the status quo and the proposed policy alternative.
W (q) =
8<:xq; 2xm   xq if vq = vpxm  q(xm   xq)2 + (vp   vq); xm +q(xm   xq)2 + (vp   vq) if vq 6= vp
As in the 2D model, as vq declines, the winset grows, and the agenda-setter’s
discretion over policy outcomes increases. In short, the 1D model with a valence
shock captures the same intuition as the 2D model: agenda-setters can exploit a
crisis by trading off surplus legislative votes to achieve spatial outcomes that are
closer to their own preferences.
However, the one-dimensional model illustrates an inferential problem for em-
pirical analysis. While the size of the winset and the spatial position of the policy
proposal changes between non-crisis (top panel) and crisis (bottom panel) periods,
the most easily measurable quantity (the membership of the winning coalition)
is identical in both periods. This is because the agenda-setter always proposes a
policy that makes m indifferent between q and p, meaning that the ‘yea’ coalition
will always consist of m and those legislators who are located on the same side of
m as the agenda-setter. As status quo and policy positions are poorly identified
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in standard roll-call voting models, if the model predicts the same crisis and non-
crisis coalitions, the opportunities for validation are limited. It is for this reason
that we devote most of our attention to the 2D model, and evaluate our theory
in the two-dimensional setting of the European Parliament.
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Figure B.1: Crises, legislative voting, and agenda-setting in one dimension
vq = vp
q m p AS
Winset
‘Yea’ coalition
vq < vp
q m p AS
Winset
‘Yea’ coalition
vq < vp
q m p p0 AS
Winset
‘Yea’ coalition
Note: In the absence of a crisis (top panel), voting collapses to a simple spatial model, with
legislators voting for the proposal p if they are to the right of the median voter m, or against the
proposal otherwise. If the status quo q receives a negative valence shock, but the proposed policy
is fixed at p (middle panel), then legislators falling in the grey zone of the ‘yea’ coalition will
vote for the policy, where previously they would have voted against. In equilibrium, however,
such a situation should not emerge as the agenda-setter, AS, exploits the expanded winset to
propose a policy at p0 (bottom panel), to secure an outcome that is closer to her ideal point.
The agenda setter ‘makes an opportunity out of the crisis’ to obtain favourable policy outcomes.
The median voter is indifferent when vq = vp and the proposed policy is p, as well as when
vq < vp and the proposed policy is p0. This implies that, in one-dimension, the ‘yea’ coalition is
identical in crisis and non-crisis periods.
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B.3 Alternative mechanisms
The central implication of our model also holds, under many conditions, when we
consider two other plausible mechanisms (within our general theoretical setting)
through which crises might lead to legislative change. First, we consider a model
in which crises cause the status quo to shift in the ideological space (as in Tsebelis
(2002)). A second alternative model considers how the preferences of legislators
might shift in response to a crisis. The figures below indicate how these alternative
models would affect the predictions we make in the paper.
In the top panel of figure B.2 we consider a one-dimensional space under three
different models of crisis:
• Preference-shift model: The crisis shifts the preferences of legislators, mov-
ing the median voter from m to a position closer to the agenda-setter at
m0.
• SQ-shift model: The crisis moves the status quo q away from the position
of AS to q0
• Valence-shock model: The crisis causes a decline in the valence of the status
quo (vq < vp)
For each model, we can evaluate the effect of the crisis by comparing the new
winset with the “Original winset” that applies in non-crisis conditions. If the crisis
moves the preferences of the legislative median toward the position of the agenda-
setter (m ! m0), the preference-shift winset extends rightwards, and allows the
agenda-setter the same discretion as in the valence-shock model, although in this
case the winset expands asymmetrically. By contrast, if the status quo is shocked
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away from the positions of the median and the agenda-setter (q ! q0), the SQ-shift
winset expands symmetrically around m.
As is clear, under each of these models, the main qualitative predictions remain
the same: the agenda-setter benefits from the crisis. Under each model, a crisis
expands the size of the winset, making it possible for AS to propose and pass
policy at p0, where previously the best she could have achieved would have been
at p. Although the implications of the three models are the same, the mechanisms
are different. In the preference-shift and SQ-shift models, the agenda-setter is
empowered because the median voter is ideologically more distant from the status
quo, and will thus accept policy proposals that diverge further from her ideal
point than in non-crisis conditions. In the valence-shock model, the median voter
will also accept such deviations from her ideal point, but here the winset expands
because the non-spatial utility she receives from the status quo decreases (vq < vp).
The top panel of figure B.2 also makes clear why it is difficult to empirically
discriminate between these alternative mechanisms: in all three, the crisis-winset
gives the same degree of discretion to the agenda-setter, and therefore results in
the same proposal (p0) from the agenda-setter. However, the main point revealed
by this analysis is that, under a broad set of conditions, the central implication
of our (preferred) valence-shock model – that agenda-setting actors benefit from
crises – is robust to alternative conceptualisations of crisis politics.
However, in certain scenarios (second panel of figure B.2), the predictions of
these alternative models differ with regard to the discretion of the agenda-setter
during a crisis period. Consider the following scenarios:
• Preference-shift model: The crisis shifts the median voter from m to a po-
sition further away from the agenda-setter at m0.
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• SQ-shift model: The crisis moves the status quo q toward the position of
AS to q0
• Valence-shock model: The crisis causes a decline in the valence of the status
quo (vq < vp)
When the median voter moves away from the agenda-setter to m0, the winset
contracts, giving the agenda-setter less discretion than in the pre-crisis period.
This is because the median voter is now closer to the position of the status quo.
Similarly, if the status quo receives a spatial shock such that it shifts toward the
position of the median voter, from q to q0, the winset also contracts around m.
Thus, as the second panel demonstrates, if a crisis results in a convergence of the
preferences of the median voter and the position of the status quo, the discretion
of the agenda-setter would decrease during the crisis. This is because the decisive
voter prefers the crisis-status quo to the non-crisis status quo, and therefore is less
willing to accept deviations from her ideal than she would have been previously. In
these scenarios, then, the models offer implications that are qualitatively different
from those of the valence-shock model.
Motivating the types of movement that would lead to such restrictions of the
winset is difficult, as doing so implies that some legislative actors prefer the crisis-
stricken status quo policies. Nonetheless, the second panel makes clear the salient
differences between our preferred model, and the alternatives: the valence-shock
model suggests an unambiguous increase in agenda-setter discretion during a cri-
sis, while the alternative models suggest that the discretion of the agenda-setter
increases only under certain conditions.
We prefer the valence-shock model for a number of reasons. First, we think
it is more intuitive to think of political crises as non-spatial shocks, rather than
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shifts in the ideological position of the status quo. A crisis entails a sudden
change to the external conditions in which existing policies operate, rather than
an exogenous change to the policies themselves. Accordingly, conceptualising a
crisis as an exogenous shift in the position of the status quo does not fit well
with our intuitive notion of what a crisis is. While a spatial shock to the status
quo would imply that some actors prefer a crisis, the non-spatial model we prefer
implies that crisis are bad for all actors.
Second, while our model holds (spatial) preferences fixed, it is certainly plausible
that legislatures update their policy preferences in light of new evidence, and that
crises would play an important role in this process. However, the preference-shift
model is not entirely contradictory with our account. One way of understanding
the static preferences that we assume in the valence-shock model is to consider
the legislators spatial preferences as their long-term ideological beliefs, and the
valence component of their utilities as their short-term analyses of current condi-
tions. We think that this is a reasonable approximation of the way that legislators
consider policy: longstanding ideological dispositions underpin and guide short-
run responses to change.
Note that, in many circumstances, it is not necessary to accept the ‘valence-
shock’ aspect of our argument in order to accept that crises empower agenda-
setters. Our main contention is that exogenous shocks will empower agenda-
setters and enable them to pass policy that would otherwise have failed to win
support. The alternative models discussed here do not contradict this basic argu-
ment, but rather imply different mechanisms by which agenda-setters are empow-
ered. Agenda-setter discretion will increase when a crisis moves either the status
quo or legislative preferences in certain directions. Our mechanism gives a more
unambiguous benefit to agenda-setters during crisis periods than the alternatives.
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Nevertheless, the differences between these alternative models should not be over-
stated, as, in general, all three arguments lead to the same substantive conclusion:
in a variety of circumstances, agenda-setters are likely to gain legislative discretion
after the onset of a crisis.
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Figure B.2: Alternative models
(1)
q m p AS
Original winset
Valence-shock winset (vq < vp)
m0 p0
Preference-shift winset (m! m0)
SQ-shift winset (q ! q0)
q0
(2)
q m p AS
Original winset
Valence-shock winset (vq < vp)
m0
q0
p0
Preference-shift winset (m! m0)
SQ-shift winset (q ! q0)
Note: The figure indicates that the different models often result in equivalent implications
for agenda-setter discretion during crisis periods. In the first panel, all three models result in
greater policy discretion for the agenda-setter (AS) in the crisis period. All three models allow
the agenda-setter to propose and pass p0, where she would only have been able to achieve p
previously. In the second panel, the three models lead to different implications for agenda-setter
discretion. If preferences shift away from the agenda-setter, moving the median voter from m to
m0, then the winset of the status quo becomes smaller, giving the agenda-setter less discretion.
If, rather, the status quo moves toward the position of the medianm, the winset likewise shrinks,
again restricting the ability of AS to secure favourable policy outcomes. In the second panel, it
is only the valence shock that gives AS additional legislative discretion.
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B.4 Cutting angle derivation
We can formally derive the connection between integrationist policy proposals and
the angle of the cutting line between voting coalitions. For each legislator i, the
utility difference between the status quo and the alternative is:
up   uq = (vp   vq) + (eip   eiq) 
 
x2p1   x2q1
   x2p2   x2q2 (B.6)
+xi1(2xp1   2xq1)
+xi2(2xp2   2xq2)
It is not possible to identify the effect of the crisis directly, because the valence gap
(vp   vq) is just one of a set of linearly additive, vote-specific terms in the model.
If we redefine the parameters of the model in terms of identifiable quantities:
j0 = (vp   vq) 
 
x2p1   x2q1
   x2p2   x2q2 (B.7)
j1 = (2xp1   2xq1) (B.8)
j2 = (2xp2   2xq2) (B.9)
ij = (eip   eiq) (B.10)
this gives us a model of the form:
up   uq = 0 + 1xi1 + 2xi2 + ij (B.11)
which is a standard 2D random utility model for voting (Jackman, 2001).
While we cannot identify the proposal and status quo locations or the valence
gap, the definitions of j1 and j2 reveal why the cutting-line orientation is rel-
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evant. These are, respectively, two times the gap between the proposal and the
status quo in dimensions one and two. Therefore, if the j2, corresponding to
the integration dimension, get larger relative to the j1, that indicates that pol-
icy proposals are shifting more towards integration than was previously the case.
The connection to the cutting-line orientation can be seen by solving for the set
of positions that yield zero utility difference (assuming ij = 0):
0 = 0 + 1xi1 + 2xi2 (B.12)
2xi2 =  0   1xi1 (B.13)
xi2 =  0
2
  1
2
xi1 (B.14)
That is, the cutting-line has an intercept on the second dimension (xi2) at  02 ,
and more relevantly, a slope of  1
2
. When proposed policy is more integrationist,
we will observe cutting-lines with a different angle than when a proposal mainly
operates on the first dimension. This cutting angle 'j is related to the  param-
eters:
'j =   arctan

 j1
j2

(B.15)
We define this cutting angle over an arc of 2 in order to distinguish between
parallel cutting lines with yea coalitions on opposing sides. A pro integration
coalition on the yes side of the vote corresponds to 'j = 0. A right coalition
on the yes side of the vote corresponds to 'j = =2 A left coalition on the yes
side of the vote corresponds to 'j =  =2. An anti-coalition on the yes side of
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the vote corresponds to 'j =   or 'j = , the scale wrapping around from a
slightly left-leaning anti-integration coalition at 'j =   +  shifts into a slightly
right-leaning anti-integration coalition at 'j =    . We depict these example
cutting lines in figure B.3.
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B.5 MAAD depiction
Figure B.3 gives a graphical depiction of different values for ' (the angle of the
cutting line). In the top-left quadrant, when ' = 0, the coalition of yes voters is
pro-integration. The top-right and bottom-left quadrants demonstrate the neces-
sity for the definition of ' over an arc of 2. In both cases, the cutting-line is
vertical, separating left-wing from right-wing voters, but when ' = =2, the right-
wing voters are voting for the vote, and the left-wing voters are voting against.
By contrast, when ' =  =2, it is the left coalition that is on the yes side of the
vote. The final quadrant shows the cutting-line (with ' = =4) where the yes
coalition is pro-integration but right-leaning.
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B.6 Constructing a synthetic control group
This section outlines our approach for synthesising a plausible control group for
the crisis-related votes in EP7 (the crisis period) using the legislative summaries
of votes held in EP6 (the non-crisis period).
We start by applying a series of unsupervised topic models to all legislative
summaries in our data. We use the Correlated Topic Model (CTM) as introduced
by Blei and Lafferty (2006) and implemented as the null model for the Structural
Topic Model (Roberts et al., 2014). The CTM is similar to Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA), but allows for a covariance structure between topics, and has
been shown to have greater predictive accuracy than LDA (Blei and Lafferty,
2006). The crucial assumption behind this model, as with all topic models, is
that the relative frequency with which terms co-occur within different documents
gives information about the topics that feature in those documents. The two main
inputs into the model are a user-specified number of topics, T , and the unordered
word tokens within each document.
The key quantity of interest recovered from the STM is , which is a J x D
matrix of topic proportions that describe the fraction of each legislative summary
d 2 f1; 2; :::; Dg that is from each topic t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg. Choosing the appropriate
number of topics is a common problem in topic models, and typical solutions (e.g.
Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003)) aim to find the model that best predicts held-out
textual data. In our case, we are not interested in predicting text data out of
sample, but rather in predicting our manual classification of ‘crisis-relevant’ votes
(j 2 f1; 2; :::; Jg). Because the number of topics that will do this best is unclear
a priori, we estimate topic models for all K = 98 integer topic counts from 3
to 100. This results in 98 separate k matrices, with typical elements td(k): the
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proportion of vote-text d in topic t from topic-model k.
We then use each k matrix as the model matrix1 for a linear regression pre-
dicting Yjd, the manual binary coding of crisis-relevance for vote j in text d.2 We
repeat this exercise K times, once for each topic model.
E[Yj(d)jk] = j(kd) = bk1k1d + bk2k2d + :::+ bkT kTd + jd (B.16)
We then use the estimated b coefficients to calculate fitted values for all votes in
EP6 and EP7:
^j(kd) = b^k1k1d + b^k2k2d + :::+ b^kTd (B.17)
where ^j(kd) is the probability that vote j is crisis-relevant, given the topic mixture
matrix k.
Finally, to evaluate whether there is evidence of the predicted change between
EP6 and EP7, we use the estimated ‘crisis-relevant’ probabilities ^j(kd), as an
explanatory variable in second-stage linear regression models of the following form:
j'jj = k + k1  EP7j + k2  ^j(kd) + k3  (EP7j  ^j(kd)) + jd (B.18)
where 'j is the angle of the cutting line and EP7 is an indicator variable for
whether the vote was taken during the seventh European Parliament (i.e. during
1Because the topic proportions for each vote (td(k)) sum to one, we could exclude one of the
topics or the intercept term. The two approaches give identical fitted-values, and we choose to
exclude the intercept term.
2Our approach is analogous to a two-stage-least-squares regression, where the topic weights
are ‘instruments’ and the ‘treatment’ variable is whether a vote is crisis-relevant or not. As
such, we follow the advice of Angrist and Pischke (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 190) and use a
linear model for the first stage even though the ‘treatment’ variable is dichotomous.
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the crisis). Because we are using fitted values for whether the vote was crisis-
related, the coefficients remain estimators of the difference between the MAAD of
crisis-related (^ = 1) and non-crisis-related (^ = 0) votes. Our primary quantity
of interest is then the estimated ^k3 coefficient. This is the interaction between
the probability of a vote being crisis-relevant, and that vote being held during the
crisis. The theoretical model implies that the interaction coefficient should have a
negative sign, implying that crisis-relevant votes in EP7 were marked by increas-
ingly pro-versus-anti integration coalitions, rather than left-versus-right coalitions,
relative to non-crisis-relevant votes.
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Figure B.3: Examples of '
Note: The figure illustrates the voting coalitions for different values of '. The model we present
predicts that more votes will result in a situation similar to the top-left quadrant, where ' = 0
and the coalition is pro-integration, in the post-crisis period.
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TITLE: Prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms
PURPOSE: to strengthen prudential requirements for credit institutions and
investment firms that relate strictly to the functioning of banking and financial
services markets and are meant to ensure the financial stability of the operators on
these markets as well as a high level of protection of investors and depositors.
PROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. BACKGROUND:
the extent of the financial crisis has exposed unacceptable risks pertaining to the
current regulation of financial institutions. According to IMF estimates,
crisis−related losses incurred by European credit institutions between 2007 and 2010
are close to 1 trillion or 8% of the EU GDP. In order to restore stability in the
banking sector and ensure that credit continues to flow to the real economy, both
the EU and its Member States adopted a broad range of unprecedented measures with
the taxpayer ultimately footing the related bill. In this context, by October 2010
the Commission has approved 4.6 trillion of state aid measures to financial
institutions of which more than 2 trillion were effectively used in 2008 and 2009.
The level of fiscal support provided to credit institutions needs to be matched with
a robust reform addressing the regulatory shortcomings exposed during the crisis.
Priorities and challenges: it should be noted that one of the priorities of the
Commission in the reform of EU financial services regulation has been to ensure that
the banking sector is able to fulfil its fundamental purpose, namely lending to the
real economy and providing services to citizens and businesses in Europe. The
proposal is designed to tackle regulatory shortcomings in the following areas:
Management of liquidity risk: existing liquidity risk management practices were
shown by the crisis to be inadequate in fully grasping risks linked to
originate−to−distribute securitization, use of complex financial instruments and
reliance on wholesale funding with short term maturity instruments. Definition of
capital: institutions entered the crisis with capital of insufficient quantity and
quality. Given the risks they faced, many institutions did not posses sufficient
amounts of the highest quality capital instruments that can absorb losses
effectively as they arise and help to preserve an institution as a going concern.
Counterparty credit risk: the crisis revealed a number of shortcomings in the
current regulatory treatment of counterparty credit risk arising from derivatives,
repo and securities financing activities. It showed that the existing provisions did
not ensure appropriate management and adequate capitalisation for this type of risk.
Options, discretions and harmonisation (entire Regulation): in 2000, seven banking
directives were replaced by a single Directive. This directive was recast in 2006
...
Figure B.4: Example legislative text summary
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Figure B.5: Fit statistics for first stage regression model
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Table B.1: Top ‘fitted values’ votes - 61 topics
EP6 vote titles EP7 vote titles
1 Facing oil challenges State aid to facilitate the closure of uncom-
petitive coal mines
2 Euro zone enlargement Economic governance: strengthening of
surveillance of budgetary positions and coor-
dination of economic policies & ‘Six pack’
3 Resolution on the input to the Spring 2009
European Council in relation to the Lisbon
Strategy
Long-term sustainability of public finances for
a recovering economy
4 2006 annual report on the euro area Macro-financial assistance to Bosnia and
Herzegovina
5 Fishing industry: improving the economic
situation
Economic governance: implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure. ‘Six pack’
6 Strengthening of surveillance of budgetary
positions and surveillance and coordination
of economic policies
ECB annual report for 2010
7 ECB annual report for 2004 Macro-financial assistance to Serbia
8 Relocation and regional development ECB annual report for 2011
9 Social reality stocktaking Feasibility of introducing stability bonds
10 Macro-economic impact of the increase in the
price of energy
Macro-financial assistance to Georgia
11 Employment and productivity and their con-
tribution to economic growth
Economic governance: enforcement of bud-
getary surveillance in the euro area. ‘Six pack’
12 Fisheries sector: restructuring of the EU fish-
ing fleets affected by the economic crisis
Macro-financial assistance to Armenia
13 Restructuring and employment Economic governance: strengthening of eco-
nomic and budgetary surveillance of Member
States experiencing or threatened with seri-
ous difficulties with respect to their financial
stability in the euro area. ‘Two pack’
14 Deterioration of the situation in Georgia Improving the economic governance and sta-
bility framework of the Union, in particular
in the euro area
15 Resolution on the preparation of the EU-
India Summit (Marseille, 29 September 2008)
External Borders Fund: increasing the Union
co-financing rate
16 Resolution on combating the rise of extrem-
ism in Europe
Resolution on the feasibility of introducing
stability bonds
17 Resolution on the situation in the Republic
of Moldova
European semester for economic policy coor-
dination
18 Resolution on combating cancer in the EU Macro-financial assistance to Ukraine
19 Report on the ECB annual report for 2007 European Globalisation Adjustment Fund:
redundancies in textiles and computer man-
ufacturing
20 Resolution on the situation in Burma Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
(EAFRD): increased contribution rates for
certain Member States
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C
C.1 The gender-gap in parliamentary debates
Figure C.1 depicts the gender-gap in debate participation in the House of Com-
mons from 1997 to 2015 by measuring the ‘female speech ratio’ in each calendar
month. The ratio is defined as the proportion of words spoken by women in a
given month, divided by the proportion of women in parliament in that month.
When the ratio is equal to one (horizontal black lines) the proportion of words
spoken by women is equal to the proportion of seats held by women.
As is clear from the plot, for the majority of the time period analysed, women
speak systematically less than their proportion in parliament would suggest. Av-
eraging across the entire period, the mean female speech ratio for these three
parties is 0.78, implying that women contribute a significantly smaller proportion
of words to legislative debate than the proportion of seats they hold in parliament.
This different is apparent even when controlling for party: female legislators from
the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat parties all speak less than their
male counterparts. Overall, it is clear that in addition to being under-represented
numerically in terms of the number of seats they hold in parliament, (in the pe-
riod studied, women never account for more than 23% of MPs) women are also
significantly under-represented in policy debates on the House floor.
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Figure C.1: Female legislators are under-represented in parliamentary debate.
Note: The plot shows the ratio of words spoken by female MPs in a calendar month, based
on 17,749 debates from 1997 to 2015. The smoothed lines are loess regressions and the dashed
lines indicate 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The horizontal black lines indicate the
expected level of speech when female MPs’ contributions to plenary debate are equal to their
representation in the House.
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Figure C.2: Female speech ratio, by ministry
Note: The figure shows the average female speech ratio as defined in equation C.1 for each
ministry, pooled across all months in the data. It is clear from the figure that some ministries
are subject to greater levels of female participation than others.
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C.2 Alternative dependent variables
Equations C.1, C.2, and C.3 provide alternative definitions of the dependent vari-
able in equation 4.2. Results for the main fixed-effects models using these alterna-
tive operationalisations are presented in tables C.1, C.2, and C.3 below. Regard-
less which of these measures is used, the main results hold: the appointment of a
female minister leads to an increase in the level of participation in parliamentary
debates by female MPs.
RatioWordsWomendmt =
PropWordsWomendmt
Proportion of women in parliamentt
(C.1)
PropSpeechesWomendmt =
# speeches by womendmt
# speeches by men and womendmt
(C.2)
RatioSpeechesWomendmt =
PropSpeechesWomendmt
Proportion of women in parliamentt
(C.3)
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Figure C.3: Correlation of speech ‘influence’ with speech length and debate position
Note: The left panel shows the average correlation between the length of a speech and influence
measured at the debate level across all years in the sample. The right panel shows the equivalent
correlation between speech position and influence. While there is no systematic relationship
between speech length and influence, the same is not the case for position. As expected, the
later a speech occurs in a debate, the less influential it is.
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Table C.4: Ministers are more influential, and Speakers of the House are less influential
influence
(1) (2) (3)
Minister 0.005 0.005
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Speaker  0.001  0.001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003)
Observations 575,903 575,903 575,903
R2 0.010 0.0002 0.010
Note: OLS regressions where the outcome variable is influence as defined in equation
4.8, and the independent variables are “Minister” – an indicator that is equal to one
when a speech is given by a government minister – and “Speaker” – an indicator that
is equal to one when a speech is given by the Speaker of the House. The baseline
corresponds to the average level of influence for speeches delivered by backbench MPs.
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table C.5: Adjacent speeches are more responsive than non-adjacent speeches
res
(1) (2)
Adjacent 6.379 7.263
(1.331) (1.539)
Constant 16.470  0.000
(0.778) (46.144)
Debate FEs  X
Observations 11,576 11,576
R2 0.002 0.547
Note: OLS regressions for adjacent and non-adjacent speeches (within a debate). Re-
gression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. The outcome vari-
able is res as defined in equation 4.10, and the independent variable is an indicator
that is equal to one when a given pair of speeches occupy adjacent positions in the
debate. The baseline corresponds to speeches that are non-adjacent. p<0.1; p<0.05;
p<0.01
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Table C.6: Minister and backbencher responsiveness
res
Minister responding to backbencher 12.763
(0.164)
Constant 8.317
(0.117)
Observations 119,531
R2 0.048
Note: OLS regressions for 2650 “question time” debates. Regression coefficients are
shown with standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is res as defined in
equation 4.10. The independent variable is an indicator that is equal to one when a
speech is spoken by a minister, and comes immediately after a speech by a backbencher.
The baseline corresponds to backbench speeches that follow directly after a speech by
a minister. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
C.3 Strategic appointment of female shadow ministers
To investigate the hypothesis that opposition parties may respond strategically to
the appointment of a female government minister by appointing a female shadow
minister to the opposition cabinet, I analyse the relationship between the sex of a
newly appointed shadow minister and the sex of the current government minister.
I estimate this relationship using logit models of the following form:
logit(E[ShadowFemaleMinistermt]) =  + 1  FemaleMinistermt + m + mt
where ShadowFemaleMinistermt is equal to one when the shadow minister ap-
pointed to ministry m at time t is a woman, and zero otherwise. FemaleMinister
is defined as in equation 4.1, and m is a ministry fixed effect. If opposition par-
ties are responding strategically to the sex of the government minister in a given
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ministry, then the 1 coefficient will be positive, indicating that the probability
of appointing a female shadow minister is associated with the sex of the current
cabinet minister for that ministry. The results of these regressions are given in
table C.7.
While the coefficient on the ‘female government minister’ variable are positive
in both models, these effects are imprecisely estimated, and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. This suggests that it is unlikely that the effects documented
in the main analysis are driven by the strategic appointment of female shadow
ministers by opposition parties.
Table C.7: Probability that a female shadow minister will be appointed, conditional on the sex of
the current government minister
Female shadow minister
(1) (2)
Female government minister 0.141 0.504
(0.456) (0.659)
Constant  1.288  0.504
(0.399) (1.560)
Ministry FEs No Yes
Observations 149 149
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Logit model
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C.4 Differential agenda-setting of male and female ministers
The main idea here is to measure the topical content of the issues under discussion
in debate, and to evaluate whether topics which are associated with high levels of
female participation (when the minister is male) increase when a female minister is
appointed. In order to measure the topical content of the legislation under debate,
I focus on the speeches made by ministers during each debate, rather than the
speeches made by all members. In many cases, debates begin with a long opening
statement by the minister, in which they put forward the purpose and detail of
the legislation to be considered by the House. As the content of speeches made
by other members may itself be a result of the appointment of a female minister,
these speeches provide a useful resource for estimating the agenda proposed by
the ministers.
I proceed in four steps. First, I estimate a series of topic models to produce
debate-level topic proportions for all debates in the sample. These proportions
indicate the topical content of each debate, and give a basis on which to find
thematically similar debates under both male and female ministers. Second, I
use the topic proportions for debates which are held under male ministers as
explanatory variables in linear regressions, where the dependent variable is the
ratio of words spoken by women as defined in equation C.1. The coefficients from
these regressions indicate the degree to which each latent topic is traditionally
associated with female participation in debate. Third, in a second set of linear
regressions, I estimate the relationship between the prevalence of a topic and the
sex of a minister. The coefficients from these regressions indicate whether a topic
increases or decreases when the minister is female. Finally, I compare the two sets
of regression coefficients. If the agenda-setting hypothesis is correct, there should
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be a positive correlation between these two sets of coefficients: topics that are
traditionally associated with female participation will increase when the minister
is female. Such a finding would suggest that female ministers are indeed focussing
on topics that are more conducive to female participation in legislative debate.
I start by applying a series of unsupervised topic models to all speeches made by
ministers in the entire sample. I use the Correlated Topic Model (Blei and Lafferty,
2006), which, as with all topic models, assumes is that the frequency with which
terms co-occur within different documents (here, debates) gives information about
the topics that feature in those documents. The key quantity of interest recovered
from the CTM is , which is a T x D matrix of topic proportions that describe
the fraction of each ministerial statement d 2 f1; 2; :::; Dg that is from each topic
t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg. Analysts must choose how many topics to estimate from the
data, and because the ‘correct’ number of topics is unclear, a priori, I estimate
K topic models for a range of topic counts from 20 to 100, at 5 topic increments.
This results in 17 separate k matrices, with typical elements ktd: the proportion
of ministerial-statement d in topic t from topic-model k.
I then use each k matrix as the model matrix1 for a linear regression predicting
Yd, the female speech ratio in debate d. As the goal of this first-stage model is
to establish a baseline level of female participation associated with each topic, I
estimate this model only for those debates where the presiding minister is male.
I repeat this exercise K times, once for each topic model.
Yd = bk1k1d + bk2k2d + :::+ bkT kTd + d (C.4)
1The topic proportions for each statement (kd) sum to one, and so I could exclude one of
the topics or the intercept term. I choose to exclude the intercept term.
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The estimated b coefficients represent the degree to which each topic (collection
of words) is associated with female participation in debates, holding other top-
ics constant. An example of the substantive information that these coefficients
contain is clear from table C.8 , which contains each topic from the 35 topic
model, ordered by their respective b coefficients. Reassuringly, the topics with
the largest b coefficients deal primarily with topics that match intuitive notions
of female interests, including children, parents, and women’s issues. Additionally,
women appear relatively more likely to contribute to debates that focus on the
NHS, teachers and schools, and energy issues. By contrast, women participate
relatively less on debates pertaining to Africa, and intelligence and terrorism is-
sues. This implies that when (male) ministers present legislation to the House that
concerns explicitly female-focussed issues, women are more likely to participate in
debate.
Next, I estimate a series of regressions to establish which topics are more preva-
lent under female ministers. As we are concerned here with establishing the dif-
ferences in agenda-setting within government ministries, I estimate models of the
following form:
ktd(m) =  + kt  FemaleMinisterd + m + ktd (C.5)
Where ktd(m) is the proportion of debate-text d (in ministry m) devoted to topic
t from topic model k. FemaleMinisterd is a binary variable equal to one when
debate d is presided over by a female minister (as defined in equation 4.1), and
m is a ministry fixed effect. The model is estimated separately for each topic,
and, as in the previous step, I repeat this exercise for each of the 17 topic models.
The estimation therefore results in K vectors of t coefficients – one coefficient for
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Table C.8: Topics ordered by the level of female participation under male ministers
Topic beta
child_women_lone_parent_disabl_wage_welfar 2:006
energi_carbon_climat_emiss_gas_electr_renew 1:406
olymp_sport_lotteri_game_gambl_footbal_art 1:405
nhs_patient_nurs_cancer_hospit_doctor_clinic 1:386
teacher_student_school_pupil_teach_educ_academi 1:357
asylum_polic_immigr_prosecut_arrest_metropolitan_constabl 1:352
local_author_fire_council_region_town_counti 1:323
bank_deficit_enterpris_economi_growth_busi_manufactur 1:306
offend_sentenc_prison_probat_drug_antisoci_disord 1:101
post_card_passport_ident_mail_custom_offic 0:986
rail_railway_railtrack_passeng_airport_road_transport 0:887
farmer_anim_farm_outbreak_beef_diseas_vaccin 0:777
claus_amend_bill_provis_legisl_draft_convent 0:752
scotland_scottish_kingdom_glasgow_execut_snp_devolut 0:729
debat_tuesday_thursday_monday_motion_wednesday_adjourn 0:728
russia_syria_iran_kosovo_israel_palestinian_isra 0:677
look_sure_absolut_thing_think_get_done 0:655
committe_select_motion_scrutini_sit_parliamentari_modernis 0:633
recommend_assess_arrang_inform_report_board_staff 0:628
africa_zimbabw_aid_sudan_african_relief_develop 0:597
elector_elect_vote_candid_chamber_voter_lord 0:589
pension_incom_retir_credit_save_earn_payment 0:576
conserv_cut_tori_spend_shadow_oppos_opposit 0:571
bbc_broadcast_digit_licenc_ofcom_fee_televis 0:464
deliv_white_approach_sector_strategi_challeng_set 0:451
inquiri_investig_alleg_evid_panel_sir_data 0:383
ireland_northern_ira_sinn_fein_paramilitari_decommiss 0:312
afghan_armi_afghanistan_deploy_defenc_troop_aircraft 0:286
awar_certain_friend_matter_concern_gentleman_hon 0:225
saddam_iraqi_iraq_hussein_weapon_destruct_resolut 0:195
treati_europ_european_union_enlarg_euro_currenc 0:110
welsh_wale_assembl_cardiff_plaid_cymru_devolut -0:008
tri_say_think_reason_thing_differ_happen -0:083
cent_per_billion_budget_rise_spend_inflat -0:136
terror_terrorist_intellig_threat_attack_muslim_counterterror -0:184
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each topic, in each topic model. When kt is positive, this implies that the use of
the topic increases when a female minister is appointed, and when it is negative
it suggests that the use of the topic decreases on the appointment of a female
minister.
Equations C.4 and C.5 therefore result in two vectors of coefficients: bk gives
the relationship between each of the topics in topic model k and the level of female
debate participation under male ministers, and k indicates how much each of the
same topics in topic model k increases (or decreases) when a female minister is
appointed. Assessing the correlation between these coefficient vectors allows us to
test whether female ministers introduce legislation that focusses on topics which
are associated with high levels of female participation under male ministers. Thus,
to test the agenda-setting hypothesis, I regress the estimated b coefficients from
equation C.4 on the  coefficients from equation C.5 according to:
bt(k) =  + k  t(k) + t(k) (C.6)
If the agenda-setting hypothesis is correct, then the bt(k) and t(k) coefficients
should be positively correlated, indicating that high female-participation topics
(under male ministers) play a more prominent role on the policy agenda when a
female minister is appointed. That is, we expect the k coefficient from equation
C.6 to be positive. Such a finding would contradict the legislative role-model
hypothesis, as it would suggest that the increased levels of legislative participation
documented in the main results section could be attributed to the development
of an increasingly ‘female-friendly’ agenda under female ministers. I present the
estimated k coefficients – one for each of the topic models – in figure C.4 along
with their associated 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure C.4: There is no increase in the use of ‘female friendly’ topics on the parliamentary agenda
when a female minister is appointed.
Note: The graph plots, on the x-axis, the number of topics, and on the y-axis, the estimated
 coefficients from equation C.6. There is no clear evidence that when female ministers are
appointed, they focus more on topics that are traditionally popular with other female MPs.
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Figure C.4 provides no clear evidence that female ministers focus more attention
on topics that are traditionally marked by high levels of female participation.
While the relationship in the 20-40 topic range appears to be positive, none of the
slopes is statistically significant at traditional levels. In the higher topic ranges
(from 50 to 100), the relationship between the two sets of regression coefficients is
even weaker. The plot suggests that it is unlikely that changes to the legislative
agenda are responsible for the changes in female participation documented in the
main text.
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